License: Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International license (CC BY 4.0)
When quoting this document, please refer to the following
DOI: 10.4230/DagSemProc.07271.9
URN: urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-11514
URL: http://dagstuhl.sunsite.rwth-aachen.de/volltexte/2007/1151/
Go to the corresponding Portal |
Wolfstetter, Elmar ;
Giebe, Thomas
License Auctions with Royalty Contracts for (Winners and) Losers
Abstract
This paper revisits the licensing of a non--drastic process innovation by an outside innovator to a Cournot oligopoly. We propose a new mechanism that combines a restrictive license auction with royalty licensing. This mechanism is more profitable than standard license auctions, auctioning royalty contracts, fixed--fee licensing, pure royalty licensing, and two-part tariffs. The key features are that royalty contracts are auctioned and that losers of the auction are granted the option to sign a royalty contract. Remarkably, combining royalties for winners and losers makes the
integer constraint concerning the number of licenses irrelevant.
BibTeX - Entry
@InProceedings{wolfstetter_et_al:DagSemProc.07271.9,
author = {Wolfstetter, Elmar and Giebe, Thomas},
title = {{License Auctions with Royalty Contracts for (Winners and) Losers}},
booktitle = {Computational Social Systems and the Internet},
series = {Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings (DagSemProc)},
ISSN = {1862-4405},
year = {2007},
volume = {7271},
editor = {Peter Cramton and Rudolf M\"{u}ller and Eva Tardos and Moshe Tennenholtz},
publisher = {Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
address = {Dagstuhl, Germany},
URL = {https://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2007/1151},
URN = {urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-11514},
doi = {10.4230/DagSemProc.07271.9},
annote = {Keywords: Auctions, Patents, Licensing}
}
Keywords: |
|
Auctions, Patents, Licensing |
Collection: |
|
07271 - Computational Social Systems and the Internet |
Issue Date: |
|
2007 |
Date of publication: |
|
02.10.2007 |