License: Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 Unported license (CC BY 3.0)
When quoting this document, please refer to the following
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.FSTTCS.2019.5
URN: urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-115678
URL: http://dagstuhl.sunsite.rwth-aachen.de/volltexte/2019/11567/
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Roughgarden, Tim

How Computer Science Informs Modern Auction Design (Invited Talk)

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LIPIcs-FSTTCS-2019-5.pdf (0.2 MB)


Abstract

Over the last twenty years, computer science has relied on concepts borrowed from game theory and economics to reason about applications ranging from internet routing to real-time auctions for online advertising. More recently, ideas have increasingly flowed in the opposite direction, with concepts and techniques from computer science beginning to influence economic theory and practice.
In this lecture, I will illustrate this point with a detailed case study of the 2016-2017 Federal Communications Commission incentive auction for repurposing wireless spectrum. Computer science techniques, ranging from algorithms for NP-hard problems to nondeterministic communication complexity, have played a critical role both in the design of the reverse auction (with the government procuring existing licenses from television broadcasters) and in the analysis of the forward auction (when the procured licenses sell to the highest bidder).

BibTeX - Entry

@InProceedings{roughgarden:LIPIcs:2019:11567,
  author =	{Tim Roughgarden},
  title =	{{How Computer Science Informs Modern Auction Design (Invited Talk)}},
  booktitle =	{39th IARCS Annual Conference on Foundations of Software Technology and Theoretical Computer Science (FSTTCS 2019)},
  pages =	{5:1--5:1},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-131-3},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2019},
  volume =	{150},
  editor =	{Arkadev Chattopadhyay and Paul Gastin},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl--Leibniz-Zentrum fuer Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2019/11567},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-115678},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.FSTTCS.2019.5},
  annote =	{Keywords: Game Theory, Auction Design, Algorithms}
}

Keywords: Game Theory, Auction Design, Algorithms
Collection: 39th IARCS Annual Conference on Foundations of Software Technology and Theoretical Computer Science (FSTTCS 2019)
Issue Date: 2019
Date of publication: 04.12.2019


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