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When quoting this document, please refer to the following
DOI: 10.4230/DagSemProc.07271.5
URN: urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-11579
URL: http://dagstuhl.sunsite.rwth-aachen.de/volltexte/2007/1157/
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Elmaghraby, Wedad ;
Larson, Nathan
Auction Design with Avoidable Fixed Costs: An Experimental Approach
Abstract
Advances in information technology and computational power have
opened the doors for auctioneers to explore a range of auction
formats by considering varying degrees of bid expressivity and
different payment rule, e.g., single price vs. discriminatory prices.
While it is clear that one can design more complicated auctions,
it is still not clear if should do so and which auction parameters
have the greatest impact on the performance on cost and efficiency.
The purpose of this paper is to gain some insight into this question, via analytical and experimental methods.
BibTeX - Entry
@InProceedings{elmaghraby_et_al:DagSemProc.07271.5,
author = {Elmaghraby, Wedad and Larson, Nathan},
title = {{Auction Design with Avoidable Fixed Costs: An Experimental Approach}},
booktitle = {Computational Social Systems and the Internet},
series = {Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings (DagSemProc)},
ISSN = {1862-4405},
year = {2007},
volume = {7271},
editor = {Peter Cramton and Rudolf M\"{u}ller and Eva Tardos and Moshe Tennenholtz},
publisher = {Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
address = {Dagstuhl, Germany},
URL = {https://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2007/1157},
URN = {urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-11579},
doi = {10.4230/DagSemProc.07271.5},
annote = {Keywords: Auctions, Experimental, Procurement, Synergies, Asymmetric Bidders}
}
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Keywords: |
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Auctions, Experimental, Procurement, Synergies, Asymmetric Bidders |
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Collection: |
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07271 - Computational Social Systems and the Internet |
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Issue Date: |
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2007 |
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Date of publication: |
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02.10.2007 |
