License: Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 Unported license (CC BY 3.0)
When quoting this document, please refer to the following
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.CSL.2020.10
URN: urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-116532
Go to the corresponding LIPIcs Volume Portal

Bielous, Gili ; Kupferman, Orna

Coverage and Vacuity in Network Formation Games

LIPIcs-CSL-2020-10.pdf (0.6 MB)


The frameworks of coverage and vacuity in formal verification analyze the effect of mutations applied to systems or their specifications. We adopt these notions to network formation games, analyzing the effect of a change in the cost of a resource. We consider two measures to be affected: the cost of the Social Optimum and extremums of costs of Nash Equilibria. Our results offer a formal framework to the effect of mutations in network formation games and include a complexity analysis of related decision problems. They also tighten the relation between algorithmic game theory and formal verification, suggesting refined definitions of coverage and vacuity for the latter.

BibTeX - Entry

  author =	{Gili Bielous and Orna Kupferman},
  title =	{{Coverage and Vacuity in Network Formation Games}},
  booktitle =	{28th EACSL Annual Conference on Computer Science Logic (CSL 2020)},
  pages =	{10:1--10:18},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-132-0},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2020},
  volume =	{152},
  editor =	{Maribel Fern{\'a}ndez and Anca Muscholl},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl--Leibniz-Zentrum fuer Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-116532},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.CSL.2020.10},
  annote =	{Keywords: Network Formation Games, Vacuity, Coverage}

Keywords: Network Formation Games, Vacuity, Coverage
Collection: 28th EACSL Annual Conference on Computer Science Logic (CSL 2020)
Issue Date: 2020
Date of publication: 06.01.2020

DROPS-Home | Fulltext Search | Imprint | Privacy Published by LZI