License: Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International license (CC BY 4.0)
When quoting this document, please refer to the following
DOI: 10.4230/DagSemProc.07261.12
URN: urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-12256
URL: http://dagstuhl.sunsite.rwth-aachen.de/volltexte/2007/1225/
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Fiat, Amos ;
Levy, Meital ;
Kaplan, Haim ;
Olonetsky, Svetlana
Strong Price of Anarchy for Machine Load Balancing
Abstract
As defined by Aumann in 1959, a strong equilibrium is a Nash
equilibrium that is resilient to deviations by coalitions. We give
tight bounds on the strong price of anarchy for load balancing on
related machines. We also give tight bounds for $k$-strong
equilibria, where the size of a deviating coalition is at most
$k$, for unrelated machines.
BibTeX - Entry
@InProceedings{fiat_et_al:DagSemProc.07261.12,
author = {Fiat, Amos and Levy, Meital and Kaplan, Haim and Olonetsky, Svetlana},
title = {{Strong Price of Anarchy for Machine Load Balancing}},
booktitle = {Fair Division},
pages = {1--19},
series = {Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings (DagSemProc)},
ISSN = {1862-4405},
year = {2007},
volume = {7261},
editor = {Steven Brams and Kirk Pruhs and Gerhard Woeginger},
publisher = {Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
address = {Dagstuhl, Germany},
URL = {https://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2007/1225},
URN = {urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-12256},
doi = {10.4230/DagSemProc.07261.12},
annote = {Keywords: Game theory, Strong Nash equilibria, Load balancing, Price of Anarchy}
}
Keywords: |
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Game theory, Strong Nash equilibria, Load balancing, Price of Anarchy |
Collection: |
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07261 - Fair Division |
Issue Date: |
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2007 |
Date of publication: |
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26.11.2007 |