License: Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 Unported license (CC BY 3.0)
When quoting this document, please refer to the following
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.ICALP.2020.127
URN: urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-125348
URL: http://dagstuhl.sunsite.rwth-aachen.de/volltexte/2020/12534/
Filiot, Emmanuel ;
Gentilini, Raffaella ;
Raskin, Jean-François
The Adversarial Stackelberg Value in Quantitative Games
Abstract
In this paper, we study the notion of adversarial Stackelberg value for two-player non-zero sum games played on bi-weighted graphs with the mean-payoff and the discounted sum functions. The adversarial Stackelberg value of Player 0 is the largest value that Player 0 can obtain when announcing her strategy to Player 1 which in turn responds with any of his best response. For the mean-payoff function, we show that the adversarial Stackelberg value is not always achievable but ε-optimal strategies exist. We show how to compute this value and prove that the associated threshold problem is in NP. For the discounted sum payoff function, we draw a link with the target discounted sum problem which explains why the problem is difficult to solve for this payoff function. We also provide solutions to related gap problems.
BibTeX - Entry
@InProceedings{filiot_et_al:LIPIcs:2020:12534,
author = {Emmanuel Filiot and Raffaella Gentilini and Jean-Fran{\c{c}}ois Raskin},
title = {{The Adversarial Stackelberg Value in Quantitative Games}},
booktitle = {47th International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP 2020)},
pages = {127:1--127:18},
series = {Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
ISBN = {978-3-95977-138-2},
ISSN = {1868-8969},
year = {2020},
volume = {168},
editor = {Artur Czumaj and Anuj Dawar and Emanuela Merelli},
publisher = {Schloss Dagstuhl--Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
address = {Dagstuhl, Germany},
URL = {https://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2020/12534},
URN = {urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-125348},
doi = {10.4230/LIPIcs.ICALP.2020.127},
annote = {Keywords: Non-zero sum games, reactive synthesis, adversarial Stackelberg}
}
Keywords: |
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Non-zero sum games, reactive synthesis, adversarial Stackelberg |
Collection: |
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47th International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP 2020) |
Issue Date: |
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2020 |
Date of publication: |
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29.06.2020 |