License: 
Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 Unported license (CC BY 3.0)
When quoting this document, please refer to the following
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2021.46
URN: urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-135851
URL: http://dagstuhl.sunsite.rwth-aachen.de/volltexte/2021/13585/
Ashlagi, Itai ;
Braverman, Mark ;
Saberi, Amin ;
Thomas, Clayton ;
Zhao, Geng
Tiered Random Matching Markets: Rank Is Proportional to Popularity
Abstract
We study the stable marriage problem in two-sided markets with randomly generated preferences. Agents on each side of the market are divided into a constant number of "soft" tiers, which capture agents' qualities. Specifically, every agent within a tier has the same public score, and agents on each side have preferences independently generated proportionally to the public scores of the other side.
We compute the expected average rank which agents in each tier have for their partners in the man-optimal stable matching, and prove concentration results for the average rank in asymptotically large markets. Furthermore, despite having a significant effect on ranks, public scores do not strongly influence the probability of an agent matching to a given tier of the other side. This generalizes the results by Pittel [Pittel, 1989], which analyzed markets with uniform preferences. The results quantitatively demonstrate the effect of competition due to the heterogeneous attractiveness of agents in the market.
BibTeX - Entry
@InProceedings{ashlagi_et_al:LIPIcs.ITCS.2021.46,
author = {Itai Ashlagi and Mark Braverman and Amin Saberi and Clayton Thomas and Geng Zhao},
title = {{Tiered Random Matching Markets: Rank Is Proportional to Popularity}},
booktitle = {12th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2021)},
pages = {46:1--46:16},
series = {Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
ISBN = {978-3-95977-177-1},
ISSN = {1868-8969},
year = {2021},
volume = {185},
editor = {James R. Lee},
publisher = {Schloss Dagstuhl--Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
address = {Dagstuhl, Germany},
URL = {https://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2021/13585},
URN = {urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-135851},
doi = {10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2021.46},
annote = {Keywords: Stable matching, stable marriage problem, tiered random markets, deferred acceptance}
}
|
Keywords: |
|
Stable matching, stable marriage problem, tiered random markets, deferred acceptance |
|
Collection: |
|
12th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2021) |
|
Issue Date: |
|
2021 |
|
Date of publication: |
|
04.02.2021 |
