License: Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International license (CC BY 4.0)
When quoting this document, please refer to the following
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.ITC.2021.23
URN: urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-143425
URL: http://dagstuhl.sunsite.rwth-aachen.de/volltexte/2021/14342/
Go to the corresponding LIPIcs Volume Portal

Li, Xinze ; Tang, Qiang ; Zhang, Zhenfeng

Fooling an Unbounded Adversary with a Short Key, Repeatedly: The Honey Encryption Perspective

pdf-format:
LIPIcs-ITC-2021-23.pdf (0.7 MB)

Abstract

This article is motivated by the classical results from Shannon that put the simple and elegant one-time pad away from practice: key length has to be as large as message length and the same key could not be used more than once. In particular, we consider encryption algorithm to be defined relative to specific message distributions in order to trade for unconditional security. Such a notion named honey encryption (HE) was originally proposed for achieving best possible security for password based encryption where secrete key may have very small amount of entropy.
Exploring message distributions as in HE indeed helps circumvent the classical restrictions on secret keys.We give a new and very simple honey encryption scheme satisfying the unconditional semantic security (for the targeted message distribution) in the standard model (all previous constructions are in the random oracle model, even for message recovery security only). Our new construction can be paired with an extremely simple yet "tighter" analysis, while all previous analyses (even for message recovery security only) were fairly complicated and require stronger assumptions. We also show a concrete instantiation further enables the secret key to be used for encrypting multiple messages.

BibTeX - Entry

@InProceedings{li_et_al:LIPIcs.ITC.2021.23,
  author =	{Li, Xinze and Tang, Qiang and Zhang, Zhenfeng},
  title =	{{Fooling an Unbounded Adversary with a Short Key, Repeatedly: The Honey Encryption Perspective}},
  booktitle =	{2nd Conference on Information-Theoretic Cryptography (ITC 2021)},
  pages =	{23:1--23:21},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-197-9},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2021},
  volume =	{199},
  editor =	{Tessaro, Stefano},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2021/14342},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-143425},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.ITC.2021.23},
  annote =	{Keywords: unconditional security, information theoretic encryption, honey encryption}
}

Keywords: unconditional security, information theoretic encryption, honey encryption
Collection: 2nd Conference on Information-Theoretic Cryptography (ITC 2021)
Issue Date: 2021
Date of publication: 19.07.2021

DROPS-Home | Fulltext Search | Imprint | Privacy Published by LZI