License: Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International license (CC BY 4.0)
When quoting this document, please refer to the following
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.CONCUR.2021.9
URN: urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-143863
URL: http://dagstuhl.sunsite.rwth-aachen.de/volltexte/2021/14386/
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Balachander, Mrudula ; Guha, Shibashis ; Raskin, Jean-François

Fragility and Robustness in Mean-Payoff Adversarial Stackelberg Games

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LIPIcs-CONCUR-2021-9.pdf (0.8 MB)

Abstract

Two-player mean-payoff Stackelberg games are nonzero-sum infinite duration games played on a bi-weighted graph by Leader (Player 0) and Follower (Player 1). Such games are played sequentially: first, Leader announces her strategy, second, Follower chooses his best-response. If we cannot impose which best-response is chosen by Follower, we say that Follower, though strategic, is adversarial towards Leader. The maximal value that Leader can get in this nonzero-sum game is called the adversarial Stackelberg value (ASV) of the game.
We study the robustness of strategies for Leader in these games against two types of deviations: (i) Modeling imprecision - the weights on the edges of the game arena may not be exactly correct, they may be delta-away from the right one. (ii) Sub-optimal response - Follower may play epsilon-optimal best-responses instead of perfect best-responses. First, we show that if the game is zero-sum then robustness is guaranteed while in the nonzero-sum case, optimal strategies for ASV are fragile. Second, we provide a solution concept to obtain strategies for Leader that are robust to both modeling imprecision, and as well as to the epsilon-optimal responses of Follower, and study several properties and algorithmic problems related to this solution concept.

BibTeX - Entry

@InProceedings{balachander_et_al:LIPIcs.CONCUR.2021.9,
  author =	{Balachander, Mrudula and Guha, Shibashis and Raskin, Jean-Fran\c{c}ois},
  title =	{{Fragility and Robustness in Mean-Payoff Adversarial Stackelberg Games}},
  booktitle =	{32nd International Conference on Concurrency Theory (CONCUR 2021)},
  pages =	{9:1--9:17},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-203-7},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2021},
  volume =	{203},
  editor =	{Haddad, Serge and Varacca, Daniele},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2021/14386},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-143863},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.CONCUR.2021.9},
  annote =	{Keywords: mean-payoff, Stackelberg games, synthesis}
}

Keywords: mean-payoff, Stackelberg games, synthesis
Collection: 32nd International Conference on Concurrency Theory (CONCUR 2021)
Issue Date: 2021
Date of publication: 13.08.2021

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