License: 
Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International license (CC BY 4.0)
When quoting this document, please refer to the following
DOI: 10.4230/OASIcs.FMBC.2022.2
URN: urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-171834
URL: http://dagstuhl.sunsite.rwth-aachen.de/volltexte/2022/17183/
Milo, Mikkel ;
Nielsen, Eske Hoy ;
Annenkov, Danil ;
Spitters, Bas
Finding Smart Contract Vulnerabilities with ConCert’s Property-Based Testing Framework
Abstract
We provide three detailed case studies of vulnerabilities in smart contracts, and show how property based testing would have found them: 1. the Dexter1 token exchange; 2. the iToken; 3. the ICO of Brave’s BAT token. The last example is, in fact, new, and was missed in the auditing process.
We have implemented this testing in ConCert, a general executable model/specification of smart contract execution in the Coq proof assistant. ConCert contracts can be used to generate verified smart contracts in Tezos' LIGO and Concordium’s rust language. We thus show the effectiveness of combining formal verification and property-based testing of smart contracts.
BibTeX - Entry
@InProceedings{milo_et_al:OASIcs.FMBC.2022.2,
author = {Milo, Mikkel and Nielsen, Eske Hoy and Annenkov, Danil and Spitters, Bas},
title = {{Finding Smart Contract Vulnerabilities with ConCert’s Property-Based Testing Framework}},
booktitle = {4th International Workshop on Formal Methods for Blockchains (FMBC 2022)},
pages = {2:1--2:13},
series = {Open Access Series in Informatics (OASIcs)},
ISBN = {978-3-95977-250-1},
ISSN = {2190-6807},
year = {2022},
volume = {105},
editor = {Dargaye, Zaynah and Schneidewind, Clara},
publisher = {Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
address = {Dagstuhl, Germany},
URL = {https://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2022/17183},
URN = {urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-171834},
doi = {10.4230/OASIcs.FMBC.2022.2},
annote = {Keywords: Smart Contracts, Formal Verification, Property-Based Testing, Coq}
}
