License: 
Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International license (CC BY 4.0)
When quoting this document, please refer to the following
DOI: 10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2022.7
URN: urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-184241
URL: http://dagstuhl.sunsite.rwth-aachen.de/volltexte/2023/18424/
Canidio, Andrea ;
Danos, Vincent
Commit-Reveal Schemes Against Front-Running Attacks (Extended Abstract)
Abstract
We provide a game-theoretic analysis of the problem of front-running attacks. We use it to study a simple commit-reveal protocol and discuss its properties. This protocol has costs because it requires two messages and imposes a delay. However, we show that it prevents the most severe front-running attacks ("bad MEV") while preserving legitimate competition between users, guaranteeing that the earliest transaction in a block belongs to the honest user who values it the most ("good MEV").
BibTeX - Entry
@InProceedings{canidio_et_al:OASIcs.Tokenomics.2022.7,
author = {Canidio, Andrea and Danos, Vincent},
title = {{Commit-Reveal Schemes Against Front-Running Attacks}},
booktitle = {4th International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols (Tokenomics 2022)},
pages = {7:1--7:5},
series = {Open Access Series in Informatics (OASIcs)},
ISBN = {978-3-95977-274-7},
ISSN = {2190-6807},
year = {2023},
volume = {110},
editor = {Amoussou-Guenou, Yackolley and Kiayias, Aggelos and Verdier, Marianne},
publisher = {Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
address = {Dagstuhl, Germany},
URL = {https://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2023/18424},
URN = {urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-184241},
doi = {10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2022.7},
annote = {Keywords: Front running, Game theory, MEV, Transactions reordering, commit-reveal}
}
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Keywords: |
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Front running, Game theory, MEV, Transactions reordering, commit-reveal |
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Collection: |
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4th International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols (Tokenomics 2022) |
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Issue Date: |
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2023 |
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Date of publication: |
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24.07.2023 |
