License: Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International license (CC BY 4.0)
When quoting this document, please refer to the following
DOI: 10.4230/DagSemProc.08461.5
URN: urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-18724
URL: http://dagstuhl.sunsite.rwth-aachen.de/volltexte/2009/1872/
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Mous, Lonneke ; Robu, Valentin ; La Poutre, Han

Using Options with Set Exercise Prices to Reduce Bidder Exposure in Sequential Auctions

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Abstract

The exposure problem appears whenever an agent with complementary valuations bids to acquire a bundle of items sold sequentially, in separate auctions. In this talk, we review a possible solution that can help solve this problem, which involves selling options for the items, instead of the items themselves. We provide a brief overview of the state of the art in this field and discuss, based on our recent results, under which conditions using option mechanisms would be desirable for both buyers and sellers, by comparison to direct auctioning of items. We conclude with a brief discussion of further research directions in this field, as well as the relation to other techniques proposed to address the problem, such as leveled commitment mechanisms.

BibTeX - Entry

@InProceedings{mous_et_al:DagSemProc.08461.5,
  author =	{Mous, Lonneke and Robu, Valentin and La Poutre, Han},
  title =	{{Using Options with Set Exercise Prices to Reduce Bidder Exposure in Sequential Auctions}},
  booktitle =	{Planning in Multiagent Systems},
  pages =	{1--35},
  series =	{Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings (DagSemProc)},
  ISSN =	{1862-4405},
  year =	{2009},
  volume =	{8461},
  editor =	{J\"{u}rgen Dix and Edmund H. Durfee and Cees Witteveen},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2009/1872},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-18724},
  doi =		{10.4230/DagSemProc.08461.5},
  annote =	{Keywords: Options, sequential auctions, multi-agent systems, exposure problem, bidding strategies, mechanism design, leveled commitment}
}

Keywords: Options, sequential auctions, multi-agent systems, exposure problem, bidding strategies, mechanism design, leveled commitment
Collection: 08461 - Planning in Multiagent Systems
Issue Date: 2009
Date of publication: 05.02.2009

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