License: Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International license (CC BY 4.0)
When quoting this document, please refer to the following
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.DISC.2023.1
URN: urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-191272
URL: http://dagstuhl.sunsite.rwth-aachen.de/volltexte/2023/19127/
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Abraham, Ittai ; Dolev, Danny ; Eyal, Ittay ; Halpern, Joseph Y.

Colordag: An Incentive-Compatible Blockchain

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LIPIcs-DISC-2023-1.pdf (0.7 MB)

Abstract

We present Colordag, a blockchain protocol where following the prescribed strategy is, with high probability, a best response as long as all miners have less than 1/2 of the mining power. We prove the correctness of Colordag even if there is an extremely powerful adversary who knows future actions of the scheduler: specifically, when agents will generate blocks and when messages will arrive. The state-of-the-art protocol, Fruitchain, is an ε-Nash equilibrium as long as all miners have less than 1/2 of the mining power. However, there is a simple deviation that guarantees that deviators are never worse off than they would be by following Fruitchain, and can sometimes do better. Thus, agents are motivated to deviate. Colordag implements a solution concept that we call ε-sure Nash equilibrium and does not suffer from this problem. Because it is an ε-sure Nash equilibrium, Colordag is an ε-Nash equilibrium and with probability 1-ε is a best response.

BibTeX - Entry

@InProceedings{abraham_et_al:LIPIcs.DISC.2023.1,
  author =	{Abraham, Ittai and Dolev, Danny and Eyal, Ittay and Halpern, Joseph Y.},
  title =	{{Colordag: An Incentive-Compatible Blockchain}},
  booktitle =	{37th International Symposium on Distributed Computing (DISC 2023)},
  pages =	{1:1--1:22},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-301-0},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2023},
  volume =	{281},
  editor =	{Oshman, Rotem},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2023/19127},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-191272},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.DISC.2023.1},
  annote =	{Keywords: Game theory, incentives, blockchain}
}

Keywords: Game theory, incentives, blockchain
Collection: 37th International Symposium on Distributed Computing (DISC 2023)
Issue Date: 2023
Date of publication: 05.10.2023

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