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Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International license (CC BY 4.0)
When quoting this document, please refer to the following
DOI: 10.4230/DagSemProc.09031.8
URN: urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-19538
URL: http://dagstuhl.sunsite.rwth-aachen.de/volltexte/2009/1953/
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Canteaut, Anne ;
Naya-Plasencia, Maria
Internal collision attack on Maraca
Abstract
We present an internal collision attack against the new hash
function Maraca which has been submitted to the SHA-3 competition.
This attack requires 2^{237} calls to the round function and its complexity is
lower than the complexity of the generic collision attack when the length
of the message digest is greater than or equal to 512. It is shown that
this cryptanalysis mainly exploits some particular differential properties
of the inner permutation, which are in some sense in contradiction with
the usual security criterion which guarantees the resistance to differential
attacks.
BibTeX - Entry
@InProceedings{canteaut_et_al:DagSemProc.09031.8,
author = {Canteaut, Anne and Naya-Plasencia, Maria},
title = {{Internal collision attack on Maraca}},
booktitle = {Symmetric Cryptography},
pages = {1--15},
series = {Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings (DagSemProc)},
ISSN = {1862-4405},
year = {2009},
volume = {9031},
editor = {Helena Handschuh and Stefan Lucks and Bart Preneel and Phillip Rogaway},
publisher = {Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
address = {Dagstuhl, Germany},
URL = {https://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2009/1953},
URN = {urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-19538},
doi = {10.4230/DagSemProc.09031.8},
annote = {Keywords: Hash function, collision attack, differential cryptanalysis, Boolean function}
}
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Keywords: |
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Hash function, collision attack, differential cryptanalysis, Boolean function |
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Collection: |
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09031 - Symmetric Cryptography |
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Issue Date: |
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2009 |
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Date of publication: |
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30.03.2009 |
