License: Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International license (CC BY 4.0)
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DOI: 10.4230/DagSemProc.05011.13
URN: urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-2038
URL: http://dagstuhl.sunsite.rwth-aachen.de/volltexte/2005/203/
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Gimpel, Henner

Reference-Dependent Preferences in Multi-Issue Bargaining

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Abstract

Game theoretic bargaining models usually assume parties to have exogenously given preferences from the beginning of a negotiation on. Preferences in these models do not depend on the history of offers made during a negotiation. This paper argues that preferences are based on issue-wise reference points changing during the bargaining process as result of the counterpartys offers.

BibTeX - Entry

@InProceedings{gimpel:DagSemProc.05011.13,
  author =	{Gimpel, Henner},
  title =	{{Reference-Dependent Preferences in Multi-Issue Bargaining}},
  booktitle =	{Computing and Markets},
  pages =	{1--5},
  series =	{Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings (DagSemProc)},
  ISSN =	{1862-4405},
  year =	{2005},
  volume =	{5011},
  editor =	{Daniel Lehmann and Rudolf M\"{u}ller and Tuomas Sandholm},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2005/203},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-2038},
  doi =		{10.4230/DagSemProc.05011.13},
  annote =	{Keywords: compact representation of games, congestion games, local-effect games, action-graph gamescomputational markets; auctions; bidding strategiesNegotiatio}
}

Keywords: compact representation of games, congestion games, local-effect games, action-graph gamescomputational markets; auctions; bidding strategiesNegotiatio
Collection: 05011 - Computing and Markets
Issue Date: 2005
Date of publication: 19.07.2005

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