Abstract
This paper provides a characterization of dominant strategy
mechanisms with quasi-linear utilities and multi-dimensional types
for a variety of preference domains. These characterizations are
in terms of a monotonicity property on the underlying allocation
rule.
BibTeX - Entry
@InProceedings{hongweigui_et_al:DagSemProc.05011.8,
author = {Hongwei Gui and M\"{u}ller, Rudolf and Vohra, Rakesh V.},
title = {{Dominant Strategy Mechanisms with Multidimensional Types}},
booktitle = {Computing and Markets},
pages = {1--23},
series = {Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings (DagSemProc)},
ISSN = {1862-4405},
year = {2005},
volume = {5011},
editor = {Daniel Lehmann and Rudolf M\"{u}ller and Tuomas Sandholm},
publisher = {Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
address = {Dagstuhl, Germany},
URL = {https://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2005/210},
URN = {urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-2107},
doi = {10.4230/DagSemProc.05011.8},
annote = {Keywords: Dominant Strategy, Farkas Lemma,}
}
Keywords: |
|
Dominant Strategy, Farkas Lemma, |
Collection: |
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05011 - Computing and Markets |
Issue Date: |
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2005 |
Date of publication: |
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19.07.2005 |