License: 
Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 Unported license (CC BY-NC-ND 3.0)
When quoting this document, please refer to the following
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.FSTTCS.2009.2330
URN: urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-23304
URL: http://dagstuhl.sunsite.rwth-aachen.de/volltexte/2009/2330/
Paul, Soumya ;
Simon, Sunil
Nash Equilibrium in Generalised Muller Games
Abstract
We suggest that extending Muller games with preference ordering for
players is a natural way to reason about unbounded duration games. In
this context, we look at the standard solution concept of Nash
equilibrium for non-zero sum games. We show that Nash equilibria
always exists for such generalised Muller games on finite graphs and
present a procedure to compute an equilibrium strategy profile. We
also give a procedure to compute a subgame perfect equilibrium when it
exists in such games.
BibTeX - Entry
@InProceedings{paul_et_al:LIPIcs:2009:2330,
author = {Soumya Paul and Sunil Simon},
title = {{Nash Equilibrium in Generalised Muller Games}},
booktitle = {IARCS Annual Conference on Foundations of Software Technology and Theoretical Computer Science},
pages = {335--346},
series = {Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
ISBN = {978-3-939897-13-2},
ISSN = {1868-8969},
year = {2009},
volume = {4},
editor = {Ravi Kannan and K. Narayan Kumar},
publisher = {Schloss Dagstuhl--Leibniz-Zentrum fuer Informatik},
address = {Dagstuhl, Germany},
URL = {http://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2009/2330},
URN = {urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-23304},
doi = {10.4230/LIPIcs.FSTTCS.2009.2330},
annote = {Keywords: Infinite games on graphs, Muller games, Nash equilibrium, subgame perfect equilibrium}
}
|
Keywords: |
|
Infinite games on graphs, Muller games, Nash equilibrium, subgame perfect equilibrium |
|
Collection: |
|
IARCS Annual Conference on Foundations of Software Technology and Theoretical Computer Science |
|
Issue Date: |
|
2009 |
|
Date of publication: |
|
14.12.2009 |
