License: 
Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 Unported license (CC BY 3.0)
When quoting this document, please refer to the following
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.FSTTCS.2015.543
URN: urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-56279
URL: http://dagstuhl.sunsite.rwth-aachen.de/volltexte/2015/5627/
Schulman, Leonard J. ;
Vazirani, Vijay V.
Allocation of Divisible Goods Under Lexicographic Preferences
Abstract
We present a simple and natural non-pricing mechanism for allocating divisible goods among strategic agents having lexicographic preferences. Our mechanism has favorable properties of strategy-proofness (incentive compatibility). In addition (and even when extended to the case of Leontief bundles) it enjoys Pareto efficiency, envy-freeness, and time efficiency.
BibTeX - Entry
@InProceedings{schulman_et_al:LIPIcs:2015:5627,
author = {Leonard J. Schulman and Vijay V. Vazirani},
title = {{Allocation of Divisible Goods Under Lexicographic Preferences}},
booktitle = {35th IARCS Annual Conference on Foundations of Software Technology and Theoretical Computer Science (FSTTCS 2015)},
pages = {543--559},
series = {Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
ISBN = {978-3-939897-97-2},
ISSN = {1868-8969},
year = {2015},
volume = {45},
editor = {Prahladh Harsha and G. Ramalingam},
publisher = {Schloss Dagstuhl--Leibniz-Zentrum fuer Informatik},
address = {Dagstuhl, Germany},
URL = {http://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2015/5627},
URN = {urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-56279},
doi = {10.4230/LIPIcs.FSTTCS.2015.543},
annote = {Keywords: Mechanism design, lexicographic preferences, strategyproof, Pareto optimal, incentive compatible}
}
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Keywords: |
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Mechanism design, lexicographic preferences, strategyproof, Pareto optimal, incentive compatible |
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Collection: |
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35th IARCS Annual Conference on Foundations of Software Technology and Theoretical Computer Science (FSTTCS 2015) |
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Issue Date: |
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2015 |
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Date of publication: |
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14.12.2015 |
