License: Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 Unported license (CC BY 3.0)
When quoting this document, please refer to the following
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.SEA.2017.31
URN: urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-76249
URL: http://dagstuhl.sunsite.rwth-aachen.de/volltexte/2017/7624/
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Basilico, Nicola ; Coniglio, Stefano ; Gatti, Nicola ; Marchesi, Alberto

Bilevel Programming Approaches to the Computation of Optimistic and Pessimistic Single-Leader-Multi-Follower Equilibria

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Abstract

We study the problem of computing an equilibrium in leader-follower games with a single leader and multiple followers where, after the leader’s commitment to a mixed strategy, the followers play simultaneously in a noncooperative way, reaching a Nash equilibrium. We tackle the problem from a bilevel programming perspective. Since, given the leader’s strategy, the followers’ subgame may admit multiple Nash equilibria, we consider the cases where the followers play either the best (optimistic) or the worst (pessimistic) Nash equilibrium in terms of the leader’s utility. For the optimistic case, we propose three formulations which cast the problem into a single level mixed-integer nonconvex program. For the pessimistic case, which, as we show, may admit a supremum but not a maximum, we develop an ad hoc branch-and-bound algorithm. Computational results are reported and illustrated.

BibTeX - Entry

@InProceedings{basilico_et_al:LIPIcs:2017:7624,
  author =	{Nicola Basilico and Stefano Coniglio and Nicola Gatti and Alberto Marchesi},
  title =	{{Bilevel Programming Approaches to the Computation of Optimistic and Pessimistic Single-Leader-Multi-Follower Equilibria}},
  booktitle =	{16th International Symposium on Experimental Algorithms (SEA 2017)},
  pages =	{31:1--31:14},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-036-1},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2017},
  volume =	{75},
  editor =	{Costas S. Iliopoulos and Solon P. Pissis and Simon J. Puglisi and Rajeev Raman},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl--Leibniz-Zentrum fuer Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{http://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2017/7624},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-76249},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.SEA.2017.31},
  annote =	{Keywords: Stackelberg games; Nash equilibria; Game theory; Bilevel and nonlinear programming; Branch-and-bound}
}

Keywords: Stackelberg games; Nash equilibria; Game theory; Bilevel and nonlinear programming; Branch-and-bound
Collection: 16th International Symposium on Experimental Algorithms (SEA 2017)
Issue Date: 2017
Date of publication: 07.08.2017

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