Side Channel Analysis Using a Model Counting Constraint Solver and Symbolic Execution*

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Abstract

A crucial problem in software security is the detection of side-channels [5, 2, 7]. Information gained by observing non-functional properties of program executions (such as execution time or memory usage) can enable attackers to infer secret information (such as a password). In this talk, I will discuss how symbolic execution, combined with a model counting constraint solver, can be used for quantifying side-channel leakage in Java programs. In addition to computing information leakage for a single run of a program, I will also discuss computation of information leakage for multiple runs for a type of side channels called segmented oracles [3]. In segmented oracles, the attacker is able to explore each segment of a secret (for example each character of a password) independently. For segmented oracles, it is possible to compute information leakage for multiple runs using only the path constraints generated from a single run symbolic execution. These results have been implemented as an extension to the symbolic execution tool Symbolic Path Finder (SPF) [8] using the SMT solver Z3 [4] and two model counting constraint solvers LattE [6] and ABC [1].

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Category Invited Talk

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