# On Fault-Tolerant Scheduling of Time Sensitive Networks

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## Abstract

Time sensitive networking (TSN) is gaining attention in industrial automation networks since it brings essential real-time capabilities at the data link layer. Though it can provide deterministic latency under error free conditions, TSN still largely depends on space redundancy for improved reliability. In many scenarios, time redundancy could be an adequate as well as cost efficient alternative. Time redundancy in turn will have implications due to the need for over-provisions needed for timeliness guarantees. In this paper, we discuss how to embed fault-tolerance capability into TSN schedules and describe our approach using a simple example.

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## 1 Introduction

Time- and safety-critical control applications in the context of factories need real-time guarantees [26]. Commonly, such requirements are specified at design time and the system is expected to fulfil them during its entire operational life. This necessitates *guaranteed* and *bounded* latencies and low jitter for tasks/functions that are critical to safety (for the end-user) [24]. The design and development of distributed embedded systems driven by the Time-Triggered paradigm [17] has proven effective in a diversity of domains with stringent demands of determinism [7].

There has been a steady evolution from centralized control with the control logic embedded within a single controller to decentralized/distributed control where control is shared between multiple controllers. A key benefit of this is to provide greater robustness to failures. For instance, a distributed architecture is more conducive to safety, by ensuring critical functions have the possibility of being executed at multiple physical nodes and transported across multiple communication links (the basic notion of redundancy). However, from a network latency perspective, this may cause additional latencies due to multiple hops (when an alternate link or node is needed). When timeliness is of the essence, such an arrangement may not therefore be optimal in providing determinism.


In applications such as factory automation or automobiles, the systems could be subjected to high degrees of Electro Magnetic Interference (EMI) from the operational environment which can cause transmission errors. The common causes for such interference include cellular phones and other radio equipment inside the premises/vehicle, electrical devices like switches and relays, radio transmissions from external sources and lightning in the environment. Complete elimination of the effects of EMI is hard since exact characterization of all such interference defy comprehension. Though usage of an all-optical network could greatly eliminate EMI problems, it may not be favoured by many cost-conscious industries.

These interferences cause errors in the transmitted data, which could indirectly lead to catastrophic failures. To reduce the risks due to erroneous transmissions, designers usually provide elaborate error checking and error confinement features in the protocol (as in Controller Area Networks). Basic philosophy of these features is to identify an error as fast as possible and then re-transmit the affected message. This implies that in systems without spatial redundancy of communication medium/controllers, the fault-tolerance (FT) mechanism employed is time redundancy. On the other hand, time redundancy increases the latency of message sets; potentially leading to violation of timing requirements. Hence any reliability management approaches in critical systems needs to be a holistic one incorporating both space and time redundancy at the right levels based on the system characteristics, resource constraints, fault models and trade-offs from cost-performance perspectives.

The time sensitive networking (TSN) [11] is a set of evolving standards under the IEEE working group IEEE802.1, defining protocols that extend standard Ethernet to achieve real-time networking capabilities for industrial/factory automation application scenarios. The TSN standardization efforts consists of a number of (sub)standards that aim to achieve four key technological paradigms - clock synchronization (802.1ASrev), frame preemption (802.1Qbu), scheduled traffic (802.1Qbv), and redundancy management (802.1CB). These must work together at the Ethernet layer (L2) to ensure that safety functions are executed while meeting their respective deadlines and constraints.

The 802.1Qbv TSN standard provides scheduled traffic for time-triggered safety-critical data frames in a predetermined manner. However, in the presence of faults, a static schedule cannot satisfy system requirements particularly since the schedule has to be reconfigured.

Redundancy management in TSN (802.1CB) has been mainly focussing on space (link redundancy). It is typical to start with a simplified error model assumption that only singleton errors can occur in the systems and that they are separated at least by a known minimum interarrival time.

In this paper, our focus is on time redundancy and how to improve fault tolerance capability of the TSN schedule. The underlying assumptions and models in our work are in line with our previous work and also with that followed in [2] [1]. We extend our earlier works presented in [10] and adapt it to the context of TSN.

The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 introduces the reader to the concept of time sensitive networking. Section 3 describes our system model and outlines its basic components. In section 4 we detail the proposed approach. In section 5, we present an illustrative example for our approach. Section 6 discusses the research relevant and related to our work and finally we conclude with section 7 and briefly sketch our ongoing efforts.

## 2 Time Sensitive Networking

The TSN standard is composed of a number of sub-standards. The most relevant sub-standard for our use-case is 802.1Qbv - *scheduled traffic*. In this use-case, we assume that the 802.1Qbv protocol is implemented both in the TSN switch as well as the control nodes and robots. A fundamental principle behind TSN [11] is the time-triggered protocol (TTP)




**Figure 1** TSN 802.1Qbv-enabled switch.

[18]. In Figure 1, we have three ingress ports A, B, and C and a single egress port D. The safety frames (ES, KC) from control nodes are sent from ports A and B while port C sends best effort (BE) frames as shown. The Gate Control List (GCL) decides the exact times when the frames belonging to a specific priority queues will be allowed to pass through the egress port D. From a system safety perspective, ES and KC frames must be given higher priority than BE frames.

Such systems depend on redundant communication schedules that contain global time-based information of message transmissions with conflict-free paths through the switches. The static schedule of a time-triggered system maximizes predictability, while the schedule in an event-triggered network unfolds dynamically at run-time depending on the occurrence of events [18]. A time-triggered network ensures the partitioning of the system into a set of independent fault containment regions (FCR), which operate correctly regardless of an arbitrary fault outside the region.

## 3 System model

Having provided the background required for this use-case, the problem we tackle can be stated as follows:

*"How do you guarantee delivery of safety-critical data frames across a TSN enabled network in the presence of faults specified by a fault model?"*

In order to quantify relevant system parameters, we present a system model that is composed of sub-models that tackles each aspect of the system function.

### 3.1 System and error model

We assume a distributed real-time architecture consisting of sensors, actuators and processing nodes communicating over a time sensitive network. The communication is performed via a set of strict periodic messages, $\Gamma = \{M_1, M_2, \ldots\}$, with mixed criticality levels. The criticality of a message indicates the severity of the consequences caused by its failure and corresponds to the amount of resources allocated for error recovery in terms of guaranteed re-transmissions. The basic assumption here is that the effects of a large variety of transient and intermittent (hardware) faults can effectively be tolerated by a simple re-transmission of

the affected frames. We assume that a fault can adversely affect only one message frame at a time and is detected by all nodes in the network. $\Gamma_c$ represents the subset of critical messages out of the original message set and $\Gamma_{nc}$ represents the subset of non-critical messages, so that $\Gamma = \Gamma_c \cup \Gamma_{nc}$.

A message consists of $N$ frames, $N \geq 1$, and the network communication is assumed to be non-preemptive during the frame transmissions. Though sub-standard 802.1Qbu is introducing preemption of frames in TSN, for simplicity's sake we have not considered it in current work. Of course, messages composed of more than 2 frames can preempt each other at frame boundaries. Additionally, the non-preemptiveness of message frames may cause a higher priority message to be blocked by a lower priority message on the same link for at most one frame length. This priority inversion phenomenon can affect all messages except the lowest priority one, and only once per message period, before the transmission of the first message frame [9].

Each message $M_i$ is characterized by a 4-tuple $< T_i, D_i, N_i, R_i >$, where $T_i$ is the period, $D_i$ is the relative deadline, $N_i$ is the number of frames that form this message and $R_i$ is the fault tolerant requirement in terms of the number of re-transmissions the message needs to be able to execute upon faults. Hence, the total number of frames that need to be guaranteed for re-transmission $r_i$ is calculated by

$$r_i = \lceil N_i * R_i \rceil \tag{1}$$

Note that for non-critical messages $R_i = 0$. Additionally, rate constrained and best effort messages have a priority $P_i$.

In an error-free scenario, the worst case transmission time $C_i$ of message $M_i$ is

$$C_i = N_i * f * \tau_{bit} \tag{2}$$

where $f$ is the maximum frame size and $\tau_{bit}$ is the transmission time for a bit.

Each *message instance* $M_i^j$ is characterized by a *feasibility window* delimited by its earliest start time $est(M_i^j)$ and its deadline $D_i^j$.

Obviously, in order to be able to guarantee the specified fault tolerance requirements, the maximum network utilization of the critical messages together with their required re-transmissions can never exceed 100% of the bandwidth capacity. This will imply that, during the error recovery, non-critical message transmissions may need to be shed in order to avoid overload conditions.

## 3.2 Traffic model

Real-time traffic in control systems is highly regular and periodic. The schedules for such traffic can be statically synthesized during design phase. This plan may not only define the communication paths and bandwidth reservations, but also particular points in a network-wide reference time at which messages are to be transmitted. Such a plan that incorporates the time aspects is called a "communication schedule" and the execution of the schedule by the network obeys the time-triggered approach. Safety critical messages are usually transmitted through time-triggered (TT) class since bounded delivery latency is guaranteed [24].

A basic fault tolerance mechanism in the presence of faults is to re-transmit an alternate of the original message at a later time instant. This is suitable for single errors during message transmissions. It is also assumed that no errors affect the alternate message transmission. For simple cases one could consider the re-transmission of the original message itself, but the approach could as well cater to initiation of another alternate task leading to an alternate message (for example in critical scenarios warranting an "emergency stop").

## 4 Proposed approach

Our research objective is to provide efficient and fault-tolerant scheduling algorithms and mechanisms for TSN that ensure:

1. All safety critical messages (time triggered traffic) have guaranteed correct delivery within their deadlines under given fault assumptions
2. All non-critical traffic is given best-effort schedulability guarantees
3. The generated schedules also possess flexibility to incorporate evolving changes traffic patterns particularly in the absence of faults

We make the following assumptions to start with:

1. A fault can affect only one message at a time
2. A specified number of re-transmissions of the message is sufficient to overcome the effect of a transient or intermittent fault.
3. There exist sufficient fault detection capabilities (such as watchdog timers, CRC etc.) in the system so that a fault can be detected reliably within a specified short time interval.
4. There exist ARQ mechanisms so that the sender node is able to know within a specified time whether the message sent has reached the destination (or intermediate node) correctly.

Our ongoing research efforts aims at providing specific contributions in the following directions:

1. The use of phased re-transmissions that can achieve better bandwidth utilization than possible with the approach of Alvarez et. al. [1].
2. Combined scheduling of critical and non-critical messages using the concept of fault-tolerant windows and fault aware windows
3. Making more realistic fault model assumptions
4. Making our schemes more flexible to support evolution of systems
5. Suggesting mechanisms for implementation for induction into standards

The focus of current paper is only first two items above. Here we propose an approach to jointly schedule critical and non-critical messages as time triggered and rate constrained traffic in TSN. We propose to schedule critical messages with completely known attributes as time triggered traffic. Some critical messages, however, may have requirements that cannot be accommodated in an off-line schedule a-priori. These are, instead, scheduled as rate constrained (RC). It is essential, however, to schedule them at priority levels that guarantee their re-transmissions in case of faults. At the same time, we aim to provide the non-critical best effort traffic the best possible service in case the system is not overloaded due to faults.

The key concept in our proposed approach is the derivation of the feasibility windows for the message transmissions. Traditionally the feasibility window for a message is the time interval between its earliest start time (or release time) and its deadline. These parameters, however, do not typically express the fault tolerant requirements on the critical messages, e.g., a message transmission finishes just before its deadline, will not leave enough time for a feasible (before its deadline) re-transmission in case the message is hit by a fault. We propose the derivation of new feasibility windows for each message instance $M_i^j \in \Gamma$ that reflect the FT requirements.

While transmitting non-critical messages using a background priority band can be a safe and straightforward solution, our aim is to provide non-critical messages a better service than what can be achieved through background scheduling. Hence, depending on the criticality of the original set of messages, the new feasibility windows we are looking for differ as:

1. *Fault-Tolerant* (FT) feasibility windows for critical messages
2. *Fault-Aware* (FA) feasibility windows for non-critical messages




**Figure 2** Methodology overview.

While critical messages need to be entirely transmitted within their FT feasibility windows to be able to be feasibly re-transmitted upon an error, according to the reliability requirements, the derivation of FA feasibility windows has two purposes: 1) to prevent non-critical messages from interfering with critical ones thus causing a critical message to miss its deadline, while 2) enabling the transmission of the non-critical messages at high priority levels in error free situations.

The major steps of the proposed methodology are shown in Figure 2. The inputs to the method are message attributes, criticalities and fault model in terms of frequency of faults and fault-tolerance requirements.

Since the size of the FA feasibility windows depends on the size of the FT feasibility windows, in our approach we first derive FT-feasibility windows and then FA feasibility windows (as steps A and B Figure 2). Then, we assign time slots for TT traffic and priorities to rate constrained traffic to ensure the message transmissions within their newly derived feasibility windows.

Subsequently we generate an off-line schedule for the TT traffic (in step C) followed by assigning message identifiers (priorities) for the rate constrained traffic (in step D) that ensure the message transmissions within their new feasibility windows, thus, fulfilling the FT requirements. We generate an offline schedule for the TT messages, by using the Earliest Deadline First (EDF) heuristics and provisioning for the specified number of re-transmission upon faults. Then we identify the optimal priorities for the critical rate based traffic in order to ensure its coexistence with the TT traffic, as well as its FT requirements. At the same time, we derive the priorities for the non-critical messages that ensure their timeliness in the absence of faults. As the network utilisation will heavily increase due to the re-transmissions of the critical messages under faults, we assume that in these situations the non-critical messages are shed by their sending nodes.

In some cases, however, a fixed priority scheme cannot express all our assumed FT requirements and error assumptions on the rate constrained traffic. General FT requirements may require that instances of a given set of periodic messages needs to be transmitted in different order on different occasions. Obviously, there exists no valid fixed priority assignment that can achieve these different orders. Our approach proposes a priority allocation scheme based on EDF at message instance level that efficiently utilizes the resources while minimizing the priority levels. We use Integer Linear Programming (ILP) (Step E) to off-line analyze the interference between the message frames and to derive the minimum number of fixed priorities that guarantees the message transmissions within their FT/FA Feasibility Windows.

## 5 Discussions

We discuss our approach by resorting to a simple but instructive example detailed below.

A set of three messages *A,B,* and *C* are considered, wherein *A* and *C* are critical and *B* is non-critical with periods $T(A) = 4$, $T(B) = 8$, $T(C) = 16$ and transmission times, $C(A) = 1$, $C(B) = 4$, $C(C) = 3$. We assume the deadlines for the messages equal their periods. We re-transmit only critical messages when subject to a single fault per message instance. Figure 3 shows a feasible message transmission under the assumption of "no faults".

Our proposed approach is illustrated in a set of figures depicting various scenarios and schedules. As part of our motivation for the proposed fault tolerant windows based approach, we first show the Rate monotonic(RM) schedule for the message transmissions in Figure 3.




**Figure 3** RM-based schedule with no faults - but not an FT schedule.

Figure 4 shows the infeasibility of the critical message C in case 2 instances of A a hit by faults and need to be re-transmitted.




**Figure 4** Two faults on message A causing even primary of critical message C to miss deadline.

Figure 5 shows that that the critical message C cannot even tolerate a single fault.




**Figure 5** A single fault in message C prevents re-transmission possibilities.

A solution could be, however, to increase the priority of the critical message C above the priority of the non-critical message B. In this case, however, the first instance of B will always miss its deadline, even in a fault free scenario (Figure 6).




**Figure 6** Priority modification (non-RM) still causing B to miss deadline.

Figure 7 illustrates the derivation of the fault tolerant (FT) windows for critical messages A and C. The dashed boxes represent the re-transmissions that would be needed if the critical messages were to experience a single fault per instance.




**Figure 7** Derivation of FT windows for critical messages.

Figure 8 shows the derivation of fault aware (FA) windows for non-critical message (B). This is done after the fault tolerant windows for the critical messages have been calculated. Figure 9 shows a resulting schedule which would meet all deadlines under a fault free scenario.

Figure 10 illustrates the benefits provided by our approach. The critical message A is transmitted in a time-triggered (TT) manner while the other messages are assigned to the rate-constrained traffic class (RC). We have three faults occurring on the critical messages. Our scheduling approach ensures that all critical messages are scheduled in a fault tolerant manner while only one instance of the non-critical message fails to meet the deadline.




**Figure 8** Derivation of fault-aware windows for non-critical messages.




**Figure 9** Fault free messages with no deadline misses.




**Figure 10** Three faults with all critical messages scheduled and only one instance of non-critical message un-schedulable.

Finally, Figure 11 shows a scenario with 5 faults. Critical messages A and C still remain fault tolerant while the non-critical message B is prevented from execution. However, in the event that critical messages do not experience faults, the non-critical message B can still meet its deadline, thereby providing a better service than background scheduling.

In summary, the above example scenarios shows that:

- For a given message set A,B,C where A and C are critical, a RM priority assignment (A>B>C) will not guarantee the 100% FT (i.e. one re-transmission upon a potential fault per message instance). C will miss its deadline.
- A new priority ordering where the non-critical message has a lower priority than the critical message (A>C>B) will guarantee the 100% FT of the critical messages but B will miss its first deadline even in a fault free scenario




**Figure 11** Each critical message instance hit by a fault can be re-transmitted within its deadline.

What we propose is a new stream/message allocation and priority assignment that:

- Maximises the FT capability of critical messages in the presence of fault
- Maximises the service of the non-critical messages in the absence of faults

We derive FT feasibility windows and FA feasibility windows based on Chetto and Chetto [6] and further Aysan et al [4] that ensure the above. In the example, we put A in the TT traffic and B and C in the RC traffic with priorities derived by an ILP solver given the feasibility windows constraint.

## 6 Related work

For scheduling on time-triggered networks, Steiner [22] introduced a method to synthesize the time-triggered traffic using an SMT YICES solver. A common approach is to have a "recovery slack" in the schedule in order to accommodate time needed for re-executions in case of faults [10]. It has been shown that the time-triggered paradigm which forms a core part of the time sensitive network standard (as 802.1Qbv time-aware shaper [23]) ensures the *fail-silent semantics* whereby a packet is received only if correct or not received at all. Fault recovery studies such as [25] depend on a fast spanning tree reconfiguration algorithm to reduce the total fault recovery time, and a delayed link inactivation scheme that allows real-time connections which are not affected by the failed links/switches to continue to exist.

Recent approaches by Steiner et al [21][13] based on reconfiguration of GCL schedules at runtime for 802.1Qbv TSN discuss a configuration agent that is aware of the traffic conditions at each node in the network. The objective is to ensure that new traffic flows can be accommodated with use of as few queues in the switch ports as possible while maintaining a feasible schedule.

Proenza et al [5] [19] have proposed a *flexible* time triggered paradigm for distributed real time systems. Flexibility refers to the adaptation of the nodes to new and evolving hard real-time requirements such as periodic and sporadic messages and updating the parameters of such messages at run-time. Some recent studies on reconfiguration by means of spatial and temporal techniques are discussed in [2] [3]. Desai et al [8] discuss safety of industrial automation systems, although focused towards fog/edge paradigms. Pozo et al [20] have shown that schedules can be "repaired" to combat the presence of faults.

Recovery from a transient or permanent fault in a time triggered network implies a certain amount of flexibility in the mechanisms to ask for changes in real-time requirements at runtime to reconfigure nodes and switches according to a new schedule [12]. Gutiérrez et

al [14] and Raagard et al [21] discuss a configuration agent that can synthesize new schedules for TSN at runtime. Time synchronization aspects are also extremely crucial and addressed in works such as [16] and [15].

## 7 Conclusion and Ongoing Work

Scheduling of safety-critical data frames (and tasks) constitutes a fundamental design requirement. The principal limitation of the time-triggered approach is the inability to adapt to unanticipated changes in the system parameters such as traffic patterns or faults. This causes the schedule not to guarantee the transmission of all frames within their timing requirements. If the network does not contain a backup schedule predicting that specific change, the schedule needs to be synthesized again from scratch, which is computationally and time intensive.

With respect to 802.1Qbv, our goal is to ensure that the schedule offsets representing the opening and closing of the gates (the GCL table) for the TSN switches are recalculated first for the TT traffic while simultaneously meeting the timing requirements (deadlines) for message transmissions.

In this paper we saw how our FT/FA aware scheduling approach provides critical messages to meet their deadlines even when all instances of the critical messages experience single faults. Additionally, in case faults do not occur, we have the possibility for non-critical messages to be served in a better way (compared to background scheduling). We are currently in the process of performing detailed evaluation of the approach thorough simulations.

As part of ongoing work, we are focusing on transmitting critical messages as time-triggered traffic which will enforce a much stricter time assignment.

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