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Semantic Formalisms in Natural Language Processing

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The computation, representation and processing of semantic information is an important task in the development of natural language systems. There has been a noticeable convergence of ideas in recent years, centering on the use of contextual information and dynamic aspects of utterances on the one hand, and the need for structured information, which can be differentiated according to a specific domain of application, on the other hand. Several formalisms are available, which approach problems related to these ideas with different techniques and from different angles. The colloquium has contributed to clarifying the issues surrounding the use of these formalisms in semantics research both in theoretical semantics and in artificial intelligence.

Every day of the colloquium was devoted to one main theme:

- 23.02.93: Semantics Formalisms
- 24.02.93: Syntax-Interface / Underspecified Representations
- 25.02.93: Knowledge Processing and Semantics Formalisms
- 26.02.93: Non-monotonic Reasoning and Semantics Formalisms

Many well-known experts in semantics, logic, computational linguistics and computer science took part in the seminar, all of whom have made important contributions to research in these fields.

The interdisciplinary orientation of the seminar has made it possible

- to enhance the state of information in the relevant disciplines;
- to provide an overview of existing implementations and their power;
- to illuminate the theoretic status of different decisions in implementation;
- to improve our estimates of the practical potential of theoretical semantics formalisms.

Great emphasis was placed on the exchange of ideas between the different fields and discussions between the different approaches. Furthermore, a special working group examined a catalog of criteria for evaluating the different existing approaches. This work, and subsequent plenary discussion, isolated several parameters – pertaining to the realization state, the theoretical intentions, and the coverage – relative to which the systems differ to a great extent. Further careful planning will be necessary to arrive at meaningful comparative evaluations. A practical consequence of this has been an initiative to create a special interest group with the Association of Computational Linguistics on the topic of computational semantics. It was also agreed to cooperate on creating a database of representative examples of relevant natural language phenomena.

The participants felt that the colloquium was a very successful and stimulating event. In light of the importance of such research exchange, the next meeting is projected to take place in 1995. It is to be concerned specifically with the evaluation of formalisms which have been implemented and are used in applications.
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Session Summary
A Short Introduction to Dynamic Semantics

Real life language is built up of utterances, not sentences. An utterance is a sentence interpreted in its context—including both linguistic and non-linguistic components. The traditional way to formalize this is the use of a vector of indices. For example, the sentence

\( I \text{ see John walk in the park} \)

translates as \( \text{see}(i, \text{walk}(\text{john})) \). The interpretation of this in the context (i.e. the meaning of the utterance) is

\[ |\text{see}(i, \text{walk}(\text{john}))|_{t_{\text{now}}, \text{me}, \text{world}, \text{g}, \ldots} \]

Where the indices give all the information we need, including the utterance time (and place) \( t_{\text{now}} \), the speaker (me), the world, some way of giving values to variables (an assignment \( g \)), and anything else you might need to distinguish this utterance from any other utterance resulting from the same sentence.

The interpretation of a sentence \( \phi \) is a function \( E(\phi) : \mathbb{V} \to \Omega \) that gives a truth value for every vector of indices. We want this vector to give enough information to distinguish one utterance from every other. We need this, not only from some esoteric philosophical point of view, but also because earlier utterances are a major component of the context of interpretation of later sentences. The traditional way that indices are carried over in the recursive definition of the interpretation, of which the definition of the existential quantifier is probably the simplest example

\[ |\exists x \phi|^{\vec{g}} := \exists d|\phi|^{\vec{g}[x:=d]} \]

works well when defining, as we do here, the compositional construction of a formula out of its parts. But it is not very suited for the open ended conjunction of utterances. The change goes “into” the formula, but doesn’t “stay active” after the calculation.

Dynamic Semantics was developed\(^1\) to make this view of utterances compatible with the observation that at least part of the context-vector is dependent on earlier utterances.

\(^1\) As with any rational reconstruction, the real, historical, reasons are quite different. In the case of Dynamic Predicate Logic, for example, Groenendijk and Stokhof wanted to give a compositional, non-representational reformalization of Kamp's DRT.
This works as follows. Let $V$ be a context vector (with possible contributions from earlier utterances). Then $\llbracket \phi \rrbracket^V$ is defined as before. To this we add a function that “adds” the contribution of the utterance context $(\llbracket \phi \rrbracket^V)(\llbracket \psi \rrbracket^V(V))$ to the vector $V$: $\llbracket \phi \rrbracket(V)$. The next two steps contain the crucial observations. A sentence $\psi$ that follows the utterance $\phi$ contributes to the vector $V$: 

$$\llbracket \phi \rrbracket^V = \llbracket \phi \rrbracket^{\llbracket \psi \rrbracket(V)}, \quad \llbracket \psi \rrbracket^V(V) = \llbracket \psi \rrbracket(\llbracket \phi \rrbracket(V)).$$

But now we observe that the truth value part $(\llbracket \psi \rrbracket)$ is contained in the second, because we can always add a truth value component to the vector.

$$\llbracket \psi \rrbracket^{\llbracket \phi \rrbracket(V)} = \langle \alpha \cdot \llbracket \psi \rrbracket(V), \llbracket \psi \rrbracket(V) \rangle.$$  

From now on it is plain sailing. The interpretation of this (dynamic) conjunction can now easily calculated by applying (5) twice:

$$\llbracket \phi \land \psi \rrbracket^{\llbracket \phi \rrbracket(V)} = \langle \alpha \cdot \llbracket \phi \rrbracket^V, \llbracket \psi \rrbracket^{\llbracket \phi \rrbracket(V)}, \llbracket \psi \rrbracket(\llbracket \phi \rrbracket(V)) \rangle.$$  

Note that although this is a theory about utterances, not sentences, the way composite utterances combine is the same for all contexts. In other words, the conjunction can be defined as a function on the sentences. This probably explains the confusion that sometimes arise. It is sometimes suggested that dynamic semantics is about sentences, not utterances. We hope that the preceding discussion resolved this confusion. Dynamic Semantics is a theory about utterances, although it is a fortunate side effect of the formalism that we only need to talk about relations between sentences for our calculations.

A large number of components of the context vector can be changed by utterances. The point of reference might be changed by temporal adverbs or by modal verbs (modal sub-ordination changes the current world). Two major examples of dynamic semantics are Update Semantics, which deals with pragmatic aspects of the utterance and acts on the world indices, and Dynamic Predicate Logic, which deals with internal reference and acts on the assignment component. We will from now on concentrate on the latter. We will omit all components of the vector except the assignment to make the formulas not more cluttered up than they already are. Because the output might not be unique, we will interpret formulas as relations between assignments.

**Dynamic Predicate Logics**

In dynamic predicate logics, formulas are relations between assignments (for an assignment as input, they are true for output assignments that result from the formula being true). As shown by the discussion in the previous section, formulas have both a truth value and a dynamic effect that changes the context of interpretation. These two are at least partially independent. A formula $\phi$ is true for a given input $g$ if there is an output that witnesses this: $\exists k(g[\phi]k) = T$. It is false if there is nothing that makes it true (and, an extra demand needed below, something that makes it false).
in DPL the treatment of predicates causes a problem that percolates up through the whole of the logic. It does not allow for a negation that simply exchanges truth values (i.e. the complement). In DPL a destructive negation is defined that does not allow for dynamic binding from within its scope. By giving a definition in three-valued logic and using strict definitions for the logical constants, we arrive at a theory that is slightly more intuitive, and does allow for a less destructive negation.

**Definition 1 (DPL\*)** Partial Dynamic Predicate Logic (DPL\*) has a similar syntax to the original DPL (the negation is written as \(-\)) with new operators \((+, +\) and \(\&\)) the semantics:

\[(7) \quad g[P(x_1, \ldots, x_n)]h = \star \quad \text{if } g \neq h
\]
\[\quad \quad = T \quad \text{if } g = h \text{ and } |P(x_1, \ldots, x_n)|^g = T
\]
\[\quad \quad = \bot \quad \text{if } g = h \text{ and } |P(x_1, \ldots, x_n)|^g = \bot
\]

\[(8) \quad g[\phi \land \psi]h = \star \quad \text{if } \forall k(g[\phi]k = \star \text{ or } k[\psi]h = \star)
\]
\[\quad \quad = T \quad \text{if } \exists k(g[\phi]k = T \text{ and } k[\psi]h = T)
\]
\[\quad \quad = \bot \quad \text{otherwise (cf. footnote 2)}
\]

\[(9) \quad g[\varepsilon_x]h = \star \quad \text{if } g \neq_x h
\]
\[\quad \quad = T \quad \text{if } g \approx_x h
\]

\[(10) \quad g[-\phi]h = \star \quad \text{if } g[\phi]h = \star
\]
\[\quad \quad = T \quad \text{if } g[\phi]h = \bot
\]
\[\quad \quad = \bot \quad \text{if } g[\phi]h = T
\]

\[(11) \quad g[+\phi]h = \star \quad \text{if } g[\phi]h \neq T
\]
\[\quad \quad = T \quad \text{if } g[\phi]h = T
\]

\[(12) \quad g[\phi \& \psi]h = \star \quad \text{if } g[\phi]h = \star \text{ or } g[\psi]h = \star
\]
\[\quad \quad = T \quad \text{if } g[\phi]h = T \text{ and } g[\psi]h = T
\]
\[\quad \quad = \bot \quad \text{otherwise}
\]

Most of this definition is straightforward\(^2\), except maybe for the new operators \(+\), the presupposition operator, and \(\&\), the static conjunction. The presupposition operator is so called because \((-\phi \& \psi) = (+\phi \& -\psi)\). It can be used to force the truth of a formula whether or not it is embedded under one or more negations. The static form of conjunction could just as well have been defined in DPL, but was omitted since it was not relevant for the issues at hand. It can be used to express equivalence:

\(^2\)It may not be immediately obvious what the falsity conditions of the conjunction are. \(g[\phi \land \psi]h\) is false when two conditions hold. First there is the condition which is the same as in 2-valued logic: \(\forall k(g[\phi]k \neq T \text{ and } k[\psi]h \neq T)\). Second, there is a condition to make sure that both terms are defined. Either \(\exists k(g[\phi]k = T \text{ and } k[\psi]h = \bot)\) or \(\exists k(g[\phi]k = \bot \text{ and } k[\psi]h = T)\) or \(\exists k(g[\phi]k = \bot \text{ and } k[\psi]h = \bot)\).
(14) \( \phi \leftrightarrow \psi = (\phi \rightarrow \psi) \cap (\phi \leftarrow \psi) \).

We can also define disjunctions and a definedness operator.

(15) \( \phi \lor \psi = \neg(\neg \phi \land \neg \psi) \)
(16) \( \phi \land \psi = \neg(\neg \phi \land \neg \psi) \)
(17) \( \mathcal{D} \phi = \phi \lor \neg \phi \)

With these operators at hand, we have a logic that can express dynamic analogues to all static logic operators (In a way, \( -, +, \land, \lor \) are the only operators that can be reasonably defined independently of the structure of the states).

Note that closure, defined so easily in DPL by the double negation, needs an explicit definition in \( \text{DPL}^\Delta \). We can use it to define a static negation \( \neg \phi := -\neg \phi \) in \( \text{DPL}^\Delta \) that mirrors the effects of the normal negation (\( - \)) in in DPL. Written out the definition of \( \neg \) is:

(18) \( g[\neg \phi]h = T \) if \( g = h \) and \( \exists k \ g[\phi]k = T \)
    = \( \bot \) if \( g = h \) and \( \exists k \ g[\phi]k = T \)
    = * otherwise

If we would use \( - \) as our standard negation we would be in trouble because \( - (\varepsilon_x \land \phi) \) and \( (\varepsilon_x \land -\phi) \) are equivalent. Instead we use the definition of \( \neg \) and make that dynamic. We do this by replacing the two occurrences of \( g = h \) by a condition that the dynamic negation of the formula holds.

(19) \( g[\neg \phi]h = T \) if \( g[\neg \phi]h = T \land \exists k \ g[\phi]k = T \)
    = \( \bot \) if \( g[\neg \phi]h = T \land \exists k \ g[\phi]k = T \)
    = * otherwise

This results in a negation (the strong dynamic negation) that has the truth values of \( \neg \) and the dynamic effects if \( - \). Note that \( \neg \phi = + - (\neg \phi \land \neg \phi) \land -\phi \).

**Concluding Remarks**

The logic in this note is a very simple dynamic predicate logic. If we want to make this into something that is useful for linguistics we have to give some way of dealing with plurals and generalized quantifiers (cf. [vdBerg 93a,b]). Furthermore, logics only formalize the use of discourse referents, not their resolution. For this, we have to make it the semantical component of a discourse grammar that implements the resolution (cf. [Prüst 91a,b], which gives an example of the sort of grammar we have in mind. This grammar has a static logic as semantic component, but gives a good idea of how a discourse grammar looks.).
References


Using a Computational Situation Theoretic Language to investigate Contemporary Semantic Theories

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Abstract

One of the problems with contemporary semantic theories of natural language, such as Situation Semantics, Discourse Representation Theory and Dynamic Semantics, is that although they address similar semantic phenomena their widely differing syntax and semantics make it difficult to compare their treatments of similar natural language semantic phenomena. It would be useful to describe these different semantic theories in a common framework so they could be more easily compared, and in the long run allow cross-pollination of their various treatments.

In this extended abstract I will give a brief overview of a language called ASTL. ASTL is based on fundamental aspects of situation theory. It is designed to be used as a meta-language for describing aspects of natural language semantic theories, offering a common framework for the description of semantic theories. Because ASTL has an implementation, descriptions in ASTL can be used directly to derive semantic translations of the theories they describe. Also because ASTL is given a situation theoretic semantics it offers a semantics for any description written in it, which allows closer comparison of treatments in a theory.

Apart from the advantages of close comparison of theories (e.g. DRT and Dynamic Semantics) that ASTL allows, we will also discuss what makes ASTL suitable as a framework and how it compares with other possible semantic meta-theories (e.g. Prolog, feature systems, etc.).

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1 Motivation

Although, in the field of computational semantics, we have the same ultimate goal of providing a computational treatment of natural language semantics, many different theories
have been proposed as possible solutions. These theories although often addressing the
same semantic phenomena may have apparently quite different solutions. The difference
in syntax and semantics of theories can be clearly illustrated just by looking at three
semantic translations of the same simple sentence. Given the simple sentence “A man
walks” three contemporary theories would give something like the following translations.

Situation Semantics  \[ S \models \langle \text{man}, X; 1 \rangle \]
\[ S \models \langle \text{walk}, X; 1 \rangle \]

Dynamic Logic  \[ \exists x [\text{man}(x)] \land \text{walk}(x) \]

DRT

\[
\begin{array}{c}
\text{man}(X) \\
\text{walk}(X)
\end{array}
\]

Note that only the dynamic logic representation has an explicit existential quantifier but
even it differs from standard first order logic. The semantics of dynamic logic is such that
the \( x \) in \( \text{walk}(x) \) actually does fall within the scope of the preceding existential.

Given the above three apparently different treatments it would be useful if we could
offer a framework in which they could be described such that a close comparison could
more easily be made. This is exactly the work that is more fully presented in [Black 93].

There is an analogy here with what happened around ten years ago in the field of
computational syntax. PATR-II ([Shieber 84]) offered a language in which contemporary
syntactic theories could be specified. PATR-II descriptions could then be directly executed.
PATR-II was not proposed as a syntactic theory itself but only as a mechanism in which
theories could be described. Even though syntactic theories were never fully defined in
PATR-II, descriptions of key aspects of theories lead to a greater understanding of them
and later theories of natural language syntax have benefited from the close comparison
that was possible in PATR-II.

Here we will give a brief overview of the computational situation theoretic language
\textit{ASTL} which is designed to allow executable specifications of aspects of natural language
semantic theories such as Situation Semantics, Discourse Representation Theory and Dy­
namic Logic. The specification of a theory is sufficient to allow translations to be given
to natural language utterances. Furthermore because such descriptions are in the same
framework a much closer comparison of the semantic treatments is made possible.

\section{ASTL}

\textit{ASTL} is designed as a computational language which will act in some way like a meta-
language suitable for describing aspects of natural language semantic theories. \textit{ASTL} is
based on fundamental aspects of situation theory and is given a formal syntax and seman­
tics within a situation theoretic model. \textit{ASTL} offers a representation for: individuals,
parameters, variables, relations, facts, situations, situation types and constraints. In addition
to these static objects a set of inference rules (and interpreter) is provided in order that
new propositions may be derived from a basic description of situations and constraints. The main purpose of the language is to allow a semantic theory to be described, such that given an utterance it is possible to derive its semantic translation.

Although language processing (particularly deriving semantic translations from utterances) is an important aspect of ASTL, we do not want to exclude the possibility of using the translations derived from the description of a theory within ASTL for more general inference. Although that has not been exploited in [Black 93] it does seem to be a reasonable possibility.

Rather than present the formal aspects of the language, the following simple example will help illustrate the basic operation of the language.

| Individuals | {h,t} |
| Relations   | {happy/1, smiles/1} |
| Parameters  | {S} |
| Variables   | {*S, *T, *Y} |

**Situations**

;; Basic situations -- i.e. who smiles where

(SIT1 :: [S != <<smiles,h,1>>
S != <<smiles,t,1>>])
(SIT2 :: [S != <<smiles,t,1>>])

**Constraints**

;; if they smile they are happy

*S : [S != <<happy,*Y,1>>]
<=
*S : [S != <<smiles,*Y,1>>].

Variables in ASTL are conventionally written as atoms prefixed with * (although the initial declarations actually define which atoms are variables, individuals, etc.). In the above ASTL description we have defined two basic situations, (SIT1 and SIT2). In SIT1 we know two facts, that h ("Hanako") smiles and that t ("Taro") smiles while in SIT2 we only know that t ("Taro") smiles. In general constraints, which are between situations, state that in all ways that the right hand side of the constraint is true the left hand side is true also. So in this particular example we are stating that if something smiles in a situation then it is also happy, in that same situation. The variable *S at each side of the <= operator ensures that we are talking about the very same situation.

Given the above simple description we can ask simple queries about the system of situations and constraint. For example we can ask.

\[\text{astl}\text{> query *T:}[S != <<happy,t,1>>].\]

This can be glossed as: is there a situation in which t ("Taro") is happy? The implementation rather than simply answering “yes” or “unknown” will display any situations for which the query proposition is true thus the answer will be given as
The output in ASTL is typically shown as boxes based on the situation theoretic notations of EKN ([Barwise & Cooper 93]). This box notation which is different from ASTL's basic linear form gives a much better display of what a situation supports, especially when a situation supports facts that have situations as arguments.

A major aspect which distinguishes ASTL from a simple logic programming language is that ASTL treats situations as first class objects (as is the case in situation theory). Situations can be used as arguments to facts. Self-reference is not a problem. The use of situations as objects allows inference to be local to situations. It also allows situations not mentioned in the initial declaration to be derived thus offering a powerful descriptive language.

Using ideas from Situation Theoretic Grammar (STG) [Cooper 89] we can use the basic aspects of ASTL to offer a framework for natural language syntax and hence lead to a method for describing the construction of natural language semantic translations for utterances. If we take the general view that the utterance of a piece of natural language can be represented by a situation we can easily use ASTL to represent the syntax of utterances. More specifically when I utter the noun phrase “Hanako” we can talk about the situation in which I uttered it. It has a time and a place. We can also attribute various syntactic properties to that situation. For example

```
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sit123</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>happy(h)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>smiles(h)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>happy(t)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>smiles(t)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
```

Given this treatment of utterances if such a situation is “next to” one in which I say “walks” we can infer that there is also a sentence situation covering the two words. In ASTL terms we can capture this with a constraint of the form

```
*S: [S ! S ! = <<cat,S,Sentence,1>>
S ! = <<start,S,*Start,1>>
S ! = <<end,S,*End,1>> ] <=
*NP: [NP ! NP ! = <<cat,NP,NounPhrase,1>>
NP ! = <<start,NP,*Start,1>>
NP ! = <<end,NP,*Mid,1>>],
*VP: [VP ! VP ! = <<cat,VP,VerbPhrase,1>>
```

Given this treatment of utterances if such a situation is “next to” one in which I say “walks” we can infer that there is also a sentence situation covering the two words. In ASTL terms we can capture this with a constraint of the form
Because one of ASTL's major uses is in language processing we have included a special form of constraint specifically to deal with grammar rules, and hence the start and end point need not be made explicit in a special grammar rule form of constraint. However this special form may be completely defined in terms of the basic ASTL constraints—this is analogous to the relationship between Prolog's Definite Clause Grammar (DCG) rules and basic Prolog rules.

3 Using ASTL for describing theories

As the ultimate goal of computational semantic theories is to provide a computational treatment of the semantics of natural language it seems useful if not necessary that theories are specified in enough detail so that they can actually be used. Descriptions in ASTL are intended to be executable specifications of theories. The idea being that a description contains a formalisation of a semantic theory that is specific enough to allow the construction of semantic translations of natural language utterances.

In [Black 93] three such descriptions are given: Situation Theoretic Grammar [Cooper 89], Discourse Representation Theory [Kamp 81], and a form of dynamic semantics (based on DPL [Groenendijk & Stokhof 91]). Each of these descriptions are given with respect to the same language fragment which is sufficient for simple sentences and discourses including inter-sentential anaphora and donkey anaphora.

It should be added that ASTL is not a general implementation language for large natural language processing systems. It may develop that way in the future but the current implementation is only really suitable for smaller investigations of contemporary semantic theories. The present work has concentrated on both the representation of the theories' semantic translation and the construction of that form. As yet little work has been done on drawing inferences from the generated semantic translation of utterances, although ASTL does seem to have the basic capabilities to act in that capacity.

One possible representation for DRSs in ASTL is as parametric situation types. That is a DRS is effectively the type of a situation where it is true—with respect to a set of anchors for each free parameter (i.e. discourse marker), and of course appropriate conditions for quantifiers. DRSs are threaded through the basic syntactic structure in a way similar to the threading in the DRT description in [Johnson & Klein 86]. Given a set of words that are to be uttered and the description of DRT in ASTL the implementation can derive the syntactic structure of the utterance as the DRSs at each stage in the discourse. The outgoing DRSs for "a man walks" is

![Diagram](image)
Notably there is no explicit domain in the representation of the DRS. A useful consequence of the ASTL representation of DRSs is that it is a (parametric) situation type and has a natural interpretation within the model. This shows that key aspects of DRT can be encoded within a situation theoretic model and that the encoding is in no way contrived.

## 4 Properties of ASTL

ASTL has sufficient expressive power for describing at least the core aspects of the three semantic theories mentioned above. It is interesting to step back and try to identify which properties of ASTL make it suitable as a meta-language for the formal specification of executable specifications of semantic theories. We can identify three main aspects:

The ability to represent complex structured objects and allow general relations between them.

The ability to have constraints between general objects and draw inferences from them.

A mechanism for reasoning about “variables” in the object language (as distinct from variables in the meta-language) and be able to describe binding mechanisms for these object language variables.

There is perhaps another property which is discussed as a possible extension to ASTL which is not currently included. That property is some form of abstraction, application and reduction which seems to be a basic property of some natural language semantic theories. However simple aspects of this can be modelled in the current version of ASTL.

With respect to situation theory the above three properties are core aspects of the theory. We can identify each of the properties with well accepted key parts of situation theory:

- situation, abstractions and types
- constraints
- parameters and anchoring

However we do not say that situation theory is therefore the only possible base for a general semantic meta-language. The above aspects are also found in other frameworks. It seems quite possible to define an attribute logic (of the general form as described in, for example [Johnson 88]) with exactly those properties. Feature logics are very expressive and a wide selection of constructs are available which can be included in a logic. But arguably we could say that even if such a logic were defined it seems reasonable to claim that any implementation of that logic would equally be an implementation of ASTL as it would have exactly those properties which are fundamental to ASTL. We could also build such properties within Prolog. Although Prolog has only one “situation” it is easy to encode structured objects like situations in Prolog in fact some other logic programming languages already do this. Another area where we might also find such properties is the framework of object-oriented programming currently popular in computer science. The conclusion we wish to draw from this is that the essential properties of ASTL as stated above are not
uncommon in other frameworks but as they are fundamental properties of situation theory it seems not unreasonable to present them within a situation theoretic framework. Also because we are working in the area of computational semantics it seems good that we can find the abstract properties we require in an already existing semantic theory.

5 Conclusion

ASTL offers both a method for formalisation of key aspects of contemporary semantic theories and because ASTL is a computational systems the formalisations in ASTL are directly executable. Once theories have been described in ASTL much closer comparisons can be made. The descriptions of DRT and dynamic semantics in ASTL given in [Black 93] seems to show that these theories differ only at some low level information content of expressions rather than any predictive or functional level. Also once descriptions are given in the same framework we can start to re-use treatments in one theory within another (e.g. adding a DRT like treatment of pronouns to a simple situation semantic treatment of language). This second aspect depends on there being at least some basic commonality between the theories but as we are interested in semantic theories that are describing similar phenomena this will often be the case.

In conclusion ASTL is a simple tool which does seem to help solve our original problem—how can we compare contemporary theories when they are presented with such different syntax and semantics. Although there is lots more to be done, ASTL seems to be a good start.

References


Towards a general semantic framework*

ABSTRACT
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0 Introduction

I believe that if we are to develop general semantic formalisms for use in computational semantics, we should only do this on the basis of a deep understanding of the relationships between the various semantic theories on offer. In fact, I think it is more important that we develop a general semantic framework with associated algorithms and computational techniques which offers the opportunity to define reusable theory independent semantic modules than to define a formalism as such. There may indeed be a single canonical formalism but it may also be the case that there is a family of formalisms all based on the same framework which are suitable for different applications. In this paper I shall offer a few introductory remarks on what such a semantic framework might be and then focus on a contribution that might be made by one mathematical tool recently developed by Peter Aczel and Rachel Lunnin.

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1 What is a semantic framework?

A semantic framework should be a formal system which abstracts core notions which are shared by the various approaches to natural language semantics which are on offer. At the same time the framework should be rich enough to specify the particular proposals of the individual approaches so that it becomes clear in formal terms exactly where the approaches differ. The computational advantages of such a framework are that it enables the implementation of modules relating to the core notions, perhaps parameterized in order to account for differences in the different approaches. This means that there will be some general computational techniques available which can be used no matter which theory you choose to base your implementation on. Also, it means that implementations need not be restricted to one particular theory. It should give us the opportunity to mix and match analyses cast within various approaches. The fact that everything is embedded in a general framework should enable us determine which analyses from the different approaches are compatible.

There are three strategies for creating such a framework which might be pursued and I feel that they should ultimately complement each other:

**semantic operators** This is the approach introduced by Johnson and Kay (1990). It involves abstracting out various operators such as APPLY, NEW_INDEX, CONJOIN and interpreting these operators differently for different semantic theories such as Montague semantics, discourse representation theory and situation semantics.

**formal specification** This would involve the application of specification techniques developed in computer science as described, for example, in work on algebraic specification (Sannella and Tarlecki, 1992) and in research on the Logical Framework (Harper, Honsell and Plotkin, 1987).

**semantic metatheory** This involves the development of a general theory in which the various individual semantic theories can be cast.

In this paper I want to develop an example relating to the last of these options, since I feel that making progress on this front would contribute to the aims of the other two strategies.

2 Aczel-Lunnon abstraction in situation theory

I am going to concentrate on the notion of abstraction and try to argue that the particular kind of abstraction proposed by Aczel and Lunnon (1991) and Lunnon (1991) in connection with situation theory gives us a view of how Montague’s semantics and discourse
representation theory could be comprehended within a single metatheory which makes the two approaches interact and blend in an interesting way. For the sake of concreteness, I will use situation theory as the metatheory. While this gives us the additional advantage of drawing some parallels with situation semantics, I think it should become clear that Aczel-Lunnon abstraction is independent of situation theory\(^1\) and that ultimately one may wish to consider a general semantic metatheory which is more general than situation theory but includes Aczel-Lunnon abstraction. Aczel and Lunnon developed their notion of abstraction originally in order to provide a model of abstraction as it had been described in informal accounts of situation theory. The idea is that abstracts are a particular kind of object in a structured universe. This contrasts with the standard\(^2\) view of abstracts received from Montague’s semantics as functions or rather \(\lambda\)-expressions which are interpreted as functions. While this will be important for what we are going to do there are two other features of this kind of abstraction which I would like to emphasize:

**simultaneous abstraction** Any number of parameters in a parametric object may be abstracted over simultaneously. While in standard \(\lambda\)-notations one may have expressions such as

\[
\lambda x, y, z[\phi(x, y, z)]
\]

this is to be construed as an abbreviation for

\[
\lambda x[\lambda y[\lambda z[\phi(x, y, z)]]]
\]

In Aczel-Lunnon abstraction, however, it is the set which is abstracted over. Thus arguments to the abstract can be supplied simultaneously and there is no required order.

**indexing** This feature is closely related to the previous one. Since abstraction over parameters results in an object in which those parameters do not occur\(^3\), we have to have some way of determining how arguments are to be assigned to the abstract in the case where more than one parameter has been abstracted over. Aczel and Lunnon achieve this by defining the abstraction operation in terms of indexed sets of parameters, i.e. one-one mappings from some domain ("the indices") to the parameters being abstracted over. An important aspect of this for us is that we can use any objects in the universe as the indices.

In the remaining sections of this paper I shall sketch the following results:

\(^1\)Certainly current presentations of Aczel-Lunnon abstraction are not in terms of situation theory but generalized set theory, set theory with the addition of abstracts as non-sets. See Lunnon(1992).

\(^2\)at least for formal semanticists

\(^3\)This is important in order to achieve \(\alpha\)-equivalence, i.e. \(\lambda x[\phi(x)] = \lambda y[\phi(y)]\)
• Montague's combinatory techniques using abstraction can be recaptured using Aczel-Lunnon abstraction in a straightforward and unsurprising way since Montague only requires unary rather than simultaneous abstraction.

• Embedding this in situation theory gives us an interesting perspective on partial Montague grammar and the problem of identity of logically equivalent propositions. Essentially it shows that it is hard to recreate this classical problem in a structured universe even if you think of propositions as abstracts over possible worlds rather than situations.

• We can use Aczel-Lunnon abstraction to model Kamp’s discourse representation structures by reconstructing them as predicates and exploiting the fact that we have simultaneous abstraction with indexing. This gives us an interesting perspective on discourse representation theory and allows its integration with Montague’s combinatory techniques.

• The feature of non-selective binding so important to classical discourse representation theory is captured by introducing quantification over simultaneous abstracts, in a manner similar to the introduction of quantification in the standard λ-calculus.

• Discourse anaphora can be achieved by exploiting the fact that arbitrary indices are used in the abstracts. While the parameters are bound within an abstract the indices are freely available and can be used to encode discourse anaphoric relations. A predicate (DRS) corresponding to the discourse so far can be combined with a predicate corresponding to the current sentence in a way that merges the roles in the two abstracts which have the same index.

In the full paper I will give an outline of the techniques used to achieve this.

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22
Experiences with the Framework of Situation Schemata

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On one view of natural language comprehension one recognizes two modules, the computational (i.e. Grammatical Space) and the conceptual (i.e. Semantic Space). A candidate for the representational link between the two is an algebraic theory of signs (in particular, lexical signs, but also, more generally, phrasal signs) in the form of a suitable class of (possibly typed) feature structures (examples: LFG, Situation Schemata, HPSG; theory: unification systems).

Much is known about possible structures for grammatical space; less attention has been paid to the structure of semantic space (but there is much insight to be derived from applied systems building). In the lecture I first discuss some standard approaches based on (partial) model theory and review some “experiences” such as the question-answering systems developed by Espen Vestre, the translation system PONS studied by Helge Dyvik, and the theory of locative prepositional phrases developed by Erik Colban. This work is based on the particular relational theory of meaning for situation schemata developed in Fenstad et al., *Situations, Language and Logic* (1987). As a language for semantic representation, use was also made of the particular logic system L3, which is a two-sorted first order language based on the partial format

\[ \text{in } s: \text{at l: } r, a_1, a_2, ..., a_n; i \]

of situation semantics.

In all of these examples semantic space is roughly equated with some theory of databases. And, one may argue, the partial logic L3 may be of interest in connection with the theory of deductive databases. But the theory of semantic space needs more structure, and we discuss in the lecture the notion of Conceptual Space (P. Gärdenfors), where the ideas of distance and convexity play an important role (natural kinds, prototype theory). In this connection we also discuss the limits of “algorithmic Logic” and pointed out the need for more “geometric modes of reasoning” (e.g. in the style of the theory of Mental Spaces by Johnson-Laird, and in the work of Barwise and Etchemendy).

Towards the end of the lecture we speculate a bit on how semantic space can be seen as the “phase space” of an underlying dynamics, which would be a theory of how concepts emerge and which also could account for certain types of non-monotonic reasoning in connection with lexical signs (see P. Smolensky and P. Gärdenfors). This ties in with different processing paradigms, e.g. the recent work of Kempen and Vosse on incremental...
syntax tree formation (note in this connection the "compatibility" with Dennett's metaphor of "multiple drafts" and Kosslyn's work on sentence monitoring and programming).
Situated Dialog

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Abstract

When we communicate through (natural) language, we do not explicitly say everything. Rather, both the speaker and the hearer utilize information supported by the utterance situation, which includes the mental states of the speaker and the hearer. Extreme and interesting cases are observed in the use of Japanese (in dialogue situations). Syntactic (or configurational) constraint of Japanese is weaker than those of English, in the sense that the speaker may omit almost any element in a sentence.

In this paper we present a model of the hearer in the light of situated reasoning and show how the missing information can be supplied from the situation.

1 Introduction

When we communicate through (natural) language, we do not explicitly say everything. Rather, both the speaker and the hearer utilize information supported by the utterance situation. For example, if we say “it is four o’clock” in Japan, it means “it is four o’clock in Japan”. “In Japan” part is not made explicit in the utterance because it is obvious from the situation. More extreme and interesting cases are observed in the use of Japanese (in dialogue situations). Syntactic (or configurational) constraint of Japanese is weaker than those of English, in the sense that the speaker may omit almost any element in a sentence.

It is not correct to say that the information that are not made explicit are omitted because they are obvious. In many cases, we are not even aware that those pieces of information are important part of our communication. Our thought/inference itself is situated and thus makes certain aspect of information concealed from the outside manipulation and this fact is reflected in our use of language.

Situation Semantics[BP83] formalizes the relation between the situation (called discourse situation or DU) and the meaning of the utterance. However, its main purpose is to describe mappings from uttered elements of sentences and their “meanings”. The formalism cannot be used to describe, for example, “how the listener identified the referent”.

We will extend the formalism of Situation Semantics to cover mental activities of the speaker and the listener.

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2 Situated Inference

If we are in a situation about which we are reasoning, we should have some, possibly partial, information about the situation. We further assume that the information is represented as a set of infons [Dev91] about the situation. Infons are used to represent some properties of the situation.

A situation is characterized by the infons which the situation supports. Note that it is impossible to fully describe an actual situation by a finite number of infons. We will rather treat situation types each of which is defined by a finite set of infons. For more details of the formalism, see [NT91] and [NOK91].

Let us consider the proposition "birds fly" as an example of inference using an abstract situation. We propose to write this as information about an abstract situation, bird as follows:

\[ \text{bird} \models \{ \{ \text{fly} \} \} . \]

The above expression expresses that the infon \{ \{ \text{fly} \} \} holds in the situation bird. To understand it, one should imagine an abstract situation in which only the properties of birds are in question. In those situations, since any infon is about birds, there is no need to explicitly state it. In this paper we assume that any \( n \)-ary relation on birds can be represented as an \( n \)-ary relation.

3 Example Dialogs

Since Japanese is a pro-drop language, we encounter numerous cases of subjectless sentences in naturally occurring conversations. But the speakers of Japanese usually find little difficulty in interpreting those utterances appropriately, although in certain circumstances, misunderstandings do occur. Identification of intended subject, however, is not a simple matter.

For instance, if you utter a one word assertion "Hungry," you would very likely be understood as saying that you are hungry. On the other hand, one word question such as "Hungry?" would be interpreted as asking if the hearer is hungry. Where does the different supply for the missing argument come from?

4 Our Formalism

Here is our conjecture. Usually, missing information should be supplied from the hearer/reader's situation. It is quite natural since the hearer/reader does not have full access to the speaker writer's situation. It is easier for the hearer to obtain information from his/her own supply. Queries and orders (note that the instruction sited above is a kind of order) fall into this category.

 Assertions are special and not natural in this respect. When the hearer gets an information \{ \{ \text{hungry} \} \} (s)he stores it in the model of the speaker. On the other hand, (s)he will supply "the hearer" or "me" if (s)he hears
because (s)he has the contradicting information that the speaker is not red-eyed. Contradictory or already existing information will be passed on to the outer situation, which is the hearer's. This will explain that all of the following information go into the hearer's model rather than the speaker's.

Orders such as «run» always go outside because the hearer has no direct control over what the speaker does.

Queries are handled in a similar manner. If we have the information in the speaker's model we will answer the query using it. But we will pass on to another situation if we don't have the information to answer. The alternative situation is determined by the history of the dialog. The detailed mechanism follows.

There are

• The current (mental) situation, called the C(urrent)-sit, on which attention is focused.
• A list of situations, called Default-sits.

If there is no other cue, C-sit is the top item of D-sits.

The procedure:

1. Linguistically obtained information is stored in C-sit.
2. Conflict checking is achieved locally on C-sit.
3. If there is no conflicts detected, then end.
4. If there is a conflict, determine which information to move.
5. The lost information is moved to the element of D-sits. The new element is set to C-sit and repeat from step 2.

5 Analysis

Because of the limitation on space, we show the result of the analysis only for "hungry" with some of the situations.

Situations:

A: Speaker looking into the mirror.

C-sit is the mirror. Since there is only one person in the mirror, being hungry is attributed to the person: SPEAKER.

B: Speaker and Hearer looking into the mirror.

C-sit is the mirror. Since there are two persons in the mirror, C-sit doesn't give the hearer enough information. Another cue must be searched. SPEAKER/HEARER.
C: Speaker and Hearer looking at each other.
The interpretation depends on the previous history of the dialog. If C-sit includes only either of the speaker and the hearer, the information is attributed to the person. If C-sit includes both or none, another cue must be used.

Since, no visual information is available in this case (or, at least let us assume so), it is unlikely that the speaker says “hungry” without any focus of attention. He must have been guiding the hearer by C-sit.

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Constraints on Unification-Based Semantics

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Unification yields an efficient tool for grammar writing. In particular, one does not have to decide which part of a sentence which contributes a certain feature, e.g., number may come from the verb, the subject noun phrase, or both. Furthermore, a unification grammar computes an output structure, a feature structure which may be used for encoding the semantics of the sentence. Unification has been claimed to be particular suitable for this purpose, not only may several parts of the utterance contribute to the same part of the semantic description, but different modules, like syntax and prosody, may contribute to the meaning and constrain each other in a mutual and non-directional way (Fenstad et al. 1987), and “a sign need not even have an isolable component that can be identified as its interpretation,” (Pollard 1989).

This may be convenient for sub-phrases of the sentence. But if the feature structure associated with the full sentence shall represent a semantic content, a minimal constraint must be that it is possible to decide whether the feature structure represents a semantic content, and if it does, what this content is. A further possible constraint would be that the feature structure of each well-formed sentence actually contains a representation of a semantic content, a property we will follow Halvorsen (1983) and call completeness of the semantic interpretation.

Most fragments in the unification-based tradition associating sentences with semantics satisfy both constraints (e.g., Fenstad et al. 1987, Pollard and Sag, 1988), but are not based on principles which guarantee that so will be the case for extensions to the fragments. But if our aim is broad coverage and compatibility between different approaches, such principles are necessary.

Technically, the picture is this. There are three domains, $L$, the set of strings, $F$, the set of feature structures, $O$, the set of semantic objects. A grammar $G$ is a relation on $L \times F$ and a semantic interpretation $S$ is a relation on $F \times O$.

**Minimal Constraint:** There is a primitive recursive function

$$s : F \rightarrow 2^O$$

such that $S = \{(f, o) : o \in s(f)\}$.

**Completeness Constraint:** $\text{Dom}(S) \subseteq \text{Range}(F)$.

As a first example, we can consider Montague grammar in this picture — even though it is not a unification grammar. It is natural to consider the disambiguated syntactic
structures (derivation histories) as the representations. Each such structure has a unique, well-defined, computable interpretation, i.e., both constraints are satisfied.

1 Lexical-Functional Grammar

1.1 Description by analysis

In the first approach to semantic interpretation in Lexical Functional-Grammar (LFG) (Halvorsen 1983)—later called description by analysis (Halvorsen and Kaplan 1988)—a string was first associated with a complete and coherent f-structure. Then a semantic interpretation was derived from the f-structure. The strategy for deriving a semantic representation \( \sigma \) from a string \( w \) can be summarized as a three-step procedure:

1. Try to find an f-structure \( f \) which matches \( w \).
2. Check \( f \) for completeness and coherence.
3. Derive a semantic representation \( \sigma \) from \( f \).

The minimal constraint amounts to a well-defined procedure for step 3. The procedure is complete if the third step succeeds whenever the first two succeed.

Completeness is not integral to LFG as such, but may be obtained by constraining the grammar format and the semantic interpretation. Halvorsen (1983) proposes a set of such constraints cf. Reyle 1988, too). In particular, grammatical categories and functions were associated with types, like (simplified)

\[
\begin{align*}
NP & \rightarrow \langle (e,t), t \rangle \\
S & \rightarrow p \\
PRED(\uparrow \text{SUBJ})(\uparrow \text{VCOMP}) & \rightarrow \langle \langle (e,t), t \rangle, (p,t) \rangle
\end{align*}
\]

But this presupposes a correspondence between syntactic category and syntactic function which is not always assumed in LFG. For example, if something of category \( S \) may be a subject, we may expect correspondence between category and type, but not between syntactic function and type. A verb requiring a subject of category \( S \) may have a well-defined, coherent and complete f-structure when combined with a NP-subject, but the semantic interpretation may fail.

There are two possibilities. Either admit that step 3 in the procedure will not always succeed, semantics is an additional filter on well-formedness. Or restrict the grammars such that step 3 will always succeed. The latter can be obtained by restricting the class of LFGs or by enriching the functional structures by percolating the type information down into the f-structures, e.g., under the name of theta roles.

1.2 Co-description

In later proposals (Fenstad et. al. 1987, Halvorsen and Kaplan 1988), a structure representing the semantic content is computed alongside with the f-structure during parsing, changing the procedure into:

\[
\begin{align*}
NP & \rightarrow \langle (e,t), t \rangle \\
S & \rightarrow p \\
PRED(\uparrow \text{SUBJ})(\uparrow \text{VCOMP}) & \rightarrow \langle \langle (e,t), t \rangle, (p,t) \rangle
\end{align*}
\]
1. Try to find an f-structure $f$ and a possible semantic structure $\sigma$ which matches $w$.

2. Check $f$ for completeness and coherence.

If $f$ is not complete and coherent, $\sigma$ cannot be expected to represent a semantic content. As with the description by analysis approach, whether completeness and coherence is sufficient will depend on which further constraints are put on the grammar.

## 2 Type-driven unification grammar

### 2.1 Categorial grammar in a unification setting

To obtain completeness in a pure unification setting, say PATR (Shieber 1985), one can associate grammatical categories and types, and induce constraints on the grammars such that an empty subcategorization list always yields a feature structure which contains a representation of a well-defined semantic object. A way to achieve this is by starting by a recast of the simple categorial grammars (CGs) in a PATR-style unification grammar, and proceed to extend and alter the grammar in a controlled way which retains completeness.

As a CG, with a semantic component, associates a string with a category and a logical term of the type corresponding to the category, we must represent the category and the term in a feature structure. The cancellation schema with its associated semantics

\[
\begin{align*}
X/Z & \quad Z \Rightarrow X \\
\{f, t, f(t)\} & \Rightarrow f(t)
\end{align*}
\]

can be expressed as a PATR-rule:

\[
X \rightarrow Y \ Z \\
\langle X \ CAT \rangle = \langle Y \ CAT \ RES \rangle \\
\langle Z \ CAT \rangle = \langle Y \ CAT \ ARG \rangle \\
\langle X \ SEM \ FUN \rangle = \langle Y \ SEM \rangle \\
\langle X \ SEM \ ARC \rangle = \langle Z \ SEM \rangle \\
\langle Y \ CAT \ DIR \rangle = R
\]

and similarly with $Z \ Z \ X \Rightarrow X$.

This is nothing but a faithful implementation of the Ajdukewicz-Bar-Hillel CGs. But we may extend and modify the format. First, we may add other features than CAT and SEM, say for agreement, and as rules take rules which has one of the cancellation schemata as a backbone and in addition equations with the new features. Call these grammars Type Unification Grammars (TUG). This will extend the (weak and strong) generative power, but will not disturb the completeness of the semantic interpretation procedure.

Second, we may introduce rules from flexible categorial grammars where the correspondence between category/type and interpretation is retained, as in $A/B \Rightarrow (A/C)/(B/C)$ with semantics: $f \Rightarrow \lambda G(\lambda x(f(G(x))))$ (R5 from Moortgaat 1988). This may be expressed as:
Similarly, all rules proposed in the literature could be expressed in this setting, e.g. the rules R1-R6 from Moortgat (1988).

2.2 Lambda reduction

The format so far may construct semantic representations of λ-terms which are not fully reduced. One way to get simpler representations is to, instead of rule (1) above, implement the basic cancellation schemata as follows (Lambda-reduced Unification Grammars, LUG).

\[
\begin{align*}
X & \rightarrow Y \\
\langle X \text{ TYPE ARG ARG} \rangle & = \langle X \text{ TYPE RES ARG} \rangle \\
\langle X \text{ TYPE ARG RES} \rangle & = \langle Y \text{ TYPE ARG} \rangle \\
\langle X \text{ TYPE RES RES} \rangle & = \langle Y \text{ TYPE RES} \rangle \\
\langle X \text{ SEM LAM} \rangle & = \langle X \text{ SEM SCOPE SCOPE ARG FUN} \rangle \\
\langle X \text{ SEM SCOPE LAM} \rangle & = \langle X \text{ SEM SCOPE SCOPE ARG ARG} \rangle \\
\langle X \text{ SEM SCOPE SCOPE FUN} \rangle & = \langle Y \text{ SEM} \rangle \\
+\text{additional equations for direction and possible other features.}
\end{align*}
\]

For this to work, the semantics of the functor must have a LAM-feature and a SEM-feature. One can define a normal form of lambda terms and show that each term is equivalent to a term in this form. There might be a problem if the feature structure represents a term containing a variable with several unrelated occurrences, as \( \lambda x[\text{every} (\lambda z[\text{man}(x)]) (\lambda y[\text{lose}(x)(y)])] \). Moreover, we cannot avoid such terms altogether, as e.g., the application of \( \lambda X[R(X)(X)] \) to \( \lambda y[\psi] \) yields \( R(\lambda y[\psi])(\lambda y[\psi]) \). What we can do is to define a certain normal form of representations of the normal form terms which is restricted with respect to how parts of the structures may be shared, which we will call good structures, and show that for such structures the new rule format works.

2.3 Partially evaluated β-reductions

One lambda reduction is in general not enough; the end result may contain beta-redexes. One way to get a simpler result is to partially evaluate lambda-reductions in the lexicon. This sort of partial evaluation has been used and discussed by Pereira and Shieber (1987), Reyle (1988), and Moore (1989). It is well known that there are cases when it does not work, in particular (type-raised) NP-conjunction. Reyle showed that partial evaluation was always possible when each lambda binds at most one variable occurrence. We extend this and based on the concept of good representations we show that partial evaluation is possible in certain cases where more than one variable occurrence is bound by a lambda.
This will allow the most natural treatment of control verbs, e.g. in the representation of the semantics of “persuade” as \( \lambda g[ \lambda m[ \lambda j[ \text{persuade}(g(m))(m)(j) ]] \), \( g \) may be partially evaluated with respect to \( m \).

### 2.4 Flexible categorial grammar and partial evaluation

The flexible categorial rules cannot be added to LUG as simply as they were to TUG, as they will not in general result in the proper normal forms. With partial evaluation, there is another option. (R5) can be implemented as

\[
X \rightarrow Y \\
\langle X \text{ TYPE ARG ARG} \rangle = \langle X \text{ TYPE RES ARG} \rangle \\
\langle X \text{ TYPE ARG RES} \rangle = \langle Y \text{ TYPE ARG} \rangle \\
\langle X \text{ TYPE RES RES} \rangle = \langle Y \text{ TYPE RES} \rangle \\
\langle X \text{ SEM LAM LAM} \rangle = \langle X \text{ SEM SCOPE LAM} \rangle \\
\langle X \text{ SEM LAM SCOPE} \rangle = \langle Y \text{ SEM LAM} \rangle \\
\langle X \text{ SEM SCOPE SCOPE} \rangle = \langle Y \text{ SEM SCOPE} \rangle \\
+{\text{additional equations for direction and possible other features.}}
\]

Similar versions can be given for the rules R1–R6; call them L1–L6. These implementations can be shown to be correct: If one of L3–L6 is applied to a (partially evaluated) representation of a term, \( t \), the result will be a legally partially evaluated representation of the term \( s \), which is the result of applying the corresponding R-rule to \( t \). Similarly, if \( R1 \) or \( R2 \) are applied to two signs, in which case some \( \beta \)-reductions may be executed in addition.

There are still differences between this approach and the most common practise in unification-based semantic interpretations, but observe that in L1–L6, all the type equations and semantic equations are parallel. This opens for an alternative architecture where types and semantics are mixed, and in the next round for an architecture where syntactic features are mixed with the types and semantics as in Categorial Unification Grammars (Karttunen 1986, Uszkoreit 1986). Unification Categorial Grammar (Zeevat et. al. 1987). This will be quite similar to the use of subcategorization in HPSG. We claim these approaches are complete because their semantic component can be derived from a categorial one by partial evaluations.

### 3 Conclusions

We have considered two different approaches to the syntax-semantics interface in unification-based grammars, the direct type-driven approach and the indirect LFG-approach where the second stage, from the representations to the interpretations is type-driven. What is common to both approaches is that the way to impose completeness is a link between subcategorization and semantic types. The difference between the two is in the way subcategorization is carried out.
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Linking One Semantic Interpretation System to Different Syntactic Formalisms

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Summary

We propose a model of syntax-semantics interaction, in which an autonomous semantic module accesses syntactic information via abstract interface predicates. The details of the syntactic representation are hidden in the grammar-specific formulation of the interface. This approach makes semantics largely neutral with respect to different grammar formalisms. The paper outlines the concept of the semantic core component, and describes interfaces to GB, HPSG, and LFG grammar systems.

1 Integrated and Modular Syntax-Semantics Interfaces

Different models for the interaction of syntax and semantics have evolved out of work in different grammar formalism. In the HPSG ([PS92]) approach, which we call an "integrated" approach, syntactic and semantic representations are encoded in the same data structure (called a "sign"). Crucially, semantically relevant parts may be spread out over the entire sign, and some parts of a sign may have both a syntactic and semantic function. The approach allows strong interactions between the different parts of a sign because information on all levels is present to every principle of grammar. This overall organization of the theory blurs the notion of what a semantic object is and of what a semantic operation consists in. As a consequence, it is difficult to ensure that intermediate semantic representations, and operations on such representations, make clear semantic sense. Also, the role of syntactic information in semantic processing is never explicitly described. A practical disadvantage is that distributed development of large NL-systems becomes difficult.

We follow an approach in which the syntax does not contain semantic information nor instructions to build semantic representations. We have implemented a semantic interpretation system (called "SCOLD") which builds semantic representations while recursing over syntactic structures, inspecting the syntax to extract certain kinds of information. This method is generally known under the label of "description-by-analysis". The essential point, however, is that we have defined a core semantics which is largely independent of the grammar formalism used in the syntax. We have achieved this by providing a set of abstract syntax interface predicates, which are differently defined for each grammar formalism. The point of abstractness is to specify the functional role of syntax in the process of building semantic representations, hiding the details of how the requisite information is realized in a separate interface component. On the one hand, the

1 "SCOLD" is an acronym for "Syntax-sensitive Computation of Logical Descriptions".
system is very flexible: It is possible to extract arbitrary information from syntax. But on the other hand, this happens in a controlled way in the interface, not on an ad-hoc basis directly in the formulation of semantic interpretation rules.

We use a semantic representation language which we call "\(\lambda\)-DRT". Among the most important distinguishing features of \(\lambda\)-DRT are the use of discourse markers (as in standard DRT, [Kamp84]) and the use of abstraction (as in the \(\lambda\)-calculus). It is type-driven, declarative and unification-based, using partially evaluated \(\lambda\)-expressions in the style of [PS87]. Our system constructs semantic representations bottom-up using a small set of semantic operators. The most important basic operation is a non-standard version of functional composition. The choice of functional composition (as opposed to application) allows a straightforward analysis of many problematic constructions, e.g. those involving quantifying into term phrases (cf. [Roo85]). The semantic operators correspond to basic semantic notions, and thus at each step the outcome of a semantic operation will be model-theoretically interpretable. Also, our operators allow a general formulation of semantic interpretation independent of the notation for the semantic representations. The particular choice of semantics formalism is not essential with regard to our concept of the syntax-semantics interface.

2 Linking SCOLD to GB, HPSG, and LFG

Semantic operators work on semantic objects which are associated with particular syntactic objects, e.g. nodes in a phrase structure tree in GB ([Cho81]), values of certain syntactic features in HPSG ([PS92]), or parts of f-structure in LFG ([KB82]). The application of the semantic operators to their arguments is sensitive to the particular syntactic environment of the associated node. For example, there are three basic semantic operators called compose, predication, and abstract, which suffice for local semantic interpretation. Semantic interpretation proceeds by collecting the meanings of some set of nodes (the current "local domain") and freely applying the operators to them. In this process, the operators "consume" their arguments and "produce" a result, until only one semantic object is left, which is then assigned to some node. The local domain is given by the syntax-interface predicate local-domain*. The final result will be associated with the root of the domain, if this is a compatible_type_assignment* to that node. A syntactic node may be compatible with a range of types.

Non-local semantic phenomena like quantifier scope or anaphora are also treated. Scope readings are generated by a version of Nested Cooper Storage ([Kel88]): There are semantic constructors store and quantify-in and interface predicates non-locally-interpretable*, quant-in-permissible*, and constraints-on-scope*. The meaning of any constituent declared as non-locally interpretable may be stored, and later quantified into a meaning associated with a node where this is permissible, provided that the scope constraints hold. Anaphoric binding is implemented as the unification of discourse markers in semantic structure, provided that the nodes from where the markers originate fulfill constraints-on-binding*.

The Semantic Interpretation Algorithm

In a nutshell, semantic interpretation simply consists in a recursive postorder traversal of the root domain and assignment of the result of the evaluation to the root, followed by enumerating binding possibilities.4

The GB Interface

The GB-interface is written so as to enable direct interpretation of S-structure. In GB the local domain contains the immediate subconstituents of a node, and as a consequence, the operators can

\[\text{In the following, we will simply say "node", instead of "syntactic object".}\]

\[\text{Predicates from the syntax interface are in cursive font and marked by the diacritic '*'.}\]

\[\text{Binding relations can also be left unresolved until later stages of processing. The evaluation procedure returns an underspecified representation of possible bindings. The mechanism is described elsewhere.}\]
only apply to semantic objects associated with sister nodes. We assume binary branching trees in GB and non-deterministically select one element from the domain as the functor, the other as the argument, returning an empty rest domain. Complements have raised type, so that normally complements are functors over heads, with the exception of empty functional heads. Because the algorithm is type-driven, only one of the combinations is possible in each case. The result of composing functor and argument will be assigned to the mother node. An application of the move-α transformation (leaving behind a co-indexed trace) will correlate in the semantics with an abstraction operation: When a moved functor is composed with an argument, first the argument is abstracted over with the referential index of the functor.5 Referential indices in the syntax correspond to semantic variables, so that syntactic co-indexing guarantees that the correct variable is abstracted. In order to implement this, we expect the syntax to know when it has moved a constituent. For the treatment of quantifier scope, we provide a definition of scope-taking elements in syntactic terms and say that every element that takes scope may go in storage. As for retrieval, specifying both IP and NP as nodes that can be quantified in automatically takes care of quantifying into term phrases. We assume that the constraint on scoping uses subjacency. As for binding, the nodes from which pronoun and antecedent originate must agree in certain features, and one must c-command the other.6 In order to implement these relations, every semantic object bears a pointer to its home syntactic node. The syntactic tests involved are the same as those used in syntax, there is no duplication of syntactic information for semantic purposes.

The HPSG Interface

The local domain of interpretation in HPSG is not the set of all daughters, as in GB, but the set of all daughters except the filler-daughter.7 Fillers are reconstructed by HPSG into their D-structure (or NP-structure) position, either by postulating a trace, or by transforming the lexical semantics of the verb. Therefore, we never interpret them in their surface position. Complements are type-raised in semantics, and because of the absence of empty functional heads in our HPSG grammar, complements and adjuncts alike are uniformly treated as functors over heads. As a further difference to GB, we allow multiply branching structures. HPSG does not employ movement rules.8 This is expressed in the syntax-interface in the most succinct manner possible, by specifying theta-governed* as trivially true and not-theta-governed* as trivially false. The interface predicates for generating different scopings are the same as in GB, except that we do not assume any syntactic constraint on the extraction domain9 and that the non-configurational notion of c-command replaces the tree-based notion of c-command. For the purpose of computing o-command, every semantic object again bears a pointer to its origin, which in this case is a position on a SUBCAT-value.

The LFG Interface

The idea for an LFG-interface is to decompose f-structures into their constituent parts. The local domain is the union of all grammatical functions except non-thematic functions governed by the PRED-value, where set-valued functions contribute all the elements in the set. We then reduce this domain non-deterministically, relying on the types of the semantic objects to drive the composition. The result is assigned to the f-structure as a whole. However, there is one additional complication: In order to ensure that semantic representations for the complements of a head are applied in the correct order, the semantic objects in the domain will be indexed by grammatical function. Subcategorized functions must be applied first, and in the order in which they appear in the semantic value of the PRED function. Quantifier scope will be treated analogously to GB; binding will work with the notion of f-command. It remains to be determined how the relative "flatness" of

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5 Referential indices themselves are also accessed by an interface function.
6 Our implementation adopts the constraint from [Rei83], with the revisions in [Pi91].
7 Note that we can recurse over the set of daughters, because it contains signs, but could not recurse over sets of SYNSEM values found on SUBCAT lists.
8 The HPSG analysis of long-distance dependencies does not have the effect of semantically relevant movement, as explained above.
9 No plausible analysis for syntactic constraints on quantifier scope in HPSG is known to the authors.
Characterizing the Dependence of Semantics on Syntax

We have designed a semantic interpretation module so that it can be adapted to be used with different grammar formalisms (or grammatical theories) by re-defining only the syntax-interface. However, complete neutrality with respect to the syntax formalism will probably be impossible to attain. It is therefore important to delimit the features of a grammar formalism which make it suitable to work in tandem with a separate, syntax-sensitive semantics module. In our work on SCOLD, we have encountered several problems which must be addressed by any model for a portable semantic interpretation system.

- The syntactic analysis of some particular phenomenon may be radically different in the various syntax formalisms. For example, in control constructions GB theory postulates an empty element PRO in an embedded clause, whereas HPSG embeds an unsaturated verbal complement. The crucial difference is that in HPSG, a semantically relevant object occurs outside the domain of recursion. In order to accommodate the HPSG analysis to a semantic framework where control verbs take propositions as arguments, one would have to add a "domain-completion rule" to the HPSG interface. Adding special rules of this kind works just fine. But while in the one case a semantic analysis follows naturally from a syntactic decision, in the other case an additional stipulation has to be made.

- A formalism may simply not provide the syntactic information necessary to implement some constraint on interpretation. The difficulty may be "accidental" – there is no essential reason why HPSG should not be able to come up with a constraint on quantifier scope, for example. But the difficulty may also be fundamental, as is the case with raising in HPSG. HPSG makes use of a meta-logical principle to control the interpretation of raising construction. The reason is that HPSG has no thematic roles in the syntax, but considers semantic roles alone. Thus, from the perspective of a modular semantics, HPSG seems deficient in the kind of syntactic information it provides.

- Our system currently assumes a monostratal syntactic analysis. In the GB case, we can straightforwardly adapt the interface to interpret LF instead of S-structure (all quantifiers are interpreted in situ), but we cannot presently exploit syntactic information on several levels of representation simultaneously. This might be considered a sensible constraint on syntactic theory, but must also be recognized as a major limitation for our system.

4 Implementation

The coverage of our semantics system currently includes head-complement structures of German and English, relative clauses, sentential adjuncts, and adjectival constructions. Several constructions which require a complex interaction between syntactic and semantic constraints have been treated successfully in SCOLD linked to GB. One example is the so-called "donkey anaphora". We have implemented a working model for the theoretical description (in [Pi91]) of the integration of the basic c-command constraint on binding ([Rei83]) with semantic considerations. Another, semantically much more complex example is the analysis of predicative and attributive comparative constructions of German and English. The analysis heavily relies on functional composition, especially quantifying into term phrases (cf. [LP92]).

5 Conclusion

We have designed a modular system in which semantics can interact with syntax by accessing syntactic information flexibly, but in a controlled way. We have made the semantic interpretation system relatively independent of the grammar formalism used in syntax by giving a theory-neutral formulation of the semantics and providing specific syntax-interfaces for different grammar formalisms. This improves the theoretical perspicuity of the semantic interpretation process and the syntax-semantics interaction, facilitates porting of the semantics to different grammar systems, and supports the distributed development of large NL-systems. While the independence and theory-
neutrality of semantics cannot be perfect, we have demonstrated that a poly-theoretic approach can get considerable mileage. We have implemented a prototype of our system.

Among the issues to be addressed by future work are the following:

- Representations in alternative semantic target formalisms will be built using the semantic operators in a theory-neutral way.
- The sequential architecture of the current system will be made more flexible. In particular, we will investigate a co-routining approach.
- We will investigate conditions that delimit the range of syntax formalisms and syntactic theories compatible with our approach in a more systematic way.

6 References

ASSIGNING A SEMANTIC SCOPE TO OPERATORS
Extended Abstract for the Dagstuhl Workshop

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Because new ways of obtaining distinct interpretations for sentences are continuously discovered, coming to grips with ambiguity is becoming more and more of a necessity for developers of natural language processing systems, linguists and psychologists alike. Two distinct questions have to be answered: how can listeners (and how should machines) deal with the combinatorial explosion of readings? Do we really use the brute-force strategy of considering all of the available readings, and then choose among them? And, if we do choose among several readings, how is that done? Among the various sorts of ambiguity, the scopal ambiguity of operators,\(^1\) in particular, has recently become again the focus of much interest [Alshawi and Crouch, 1992; Deemter, 1991; Fenstad et al., 1987; Poesio, 1991; Reyle, 1991].

I believe that in order to develop systems which interact with humans we need to solve the problem of combinatorial explosion, and to do that we need a plausible theory about the process by which people arrive at a preferred interpretation for scopally ambiguous sentences. I am not aware of any non-heuristical solutions to the problem of how to choose one reading in the natural language processing literature.\(^2\) Several linguistic and psycholinguistic proposals exist, but none of the principles proposed in this literature appears to be applicable in all contexts and, furthermore, they appear to interact in ways which are largely unexplained, as shown by Kurtzman and MacDonald’s work [1992] on experimentally verifying the validity of these principles.

Kurtzman and MacDonald’s most important findings were as follows:

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\(^1\)I use here the term *operator* as it is used by Heim [1982], i.e., to mean either quantifier or modal/tense operator.

1. A preference for the subject in active sentences to take wide scope was indeed observed; interestingly, however, this preference was stronger when the quantified phrase was of the form a $P \text{R}'ed$ $every\ Q$ than when it had the form $every\ P\ \text{R}'ed\ a\ Q$. (Contrary to what a weight heuristic would predict.)

2. In the case of passive sentences, no significant preference for the subject taking wide scope was observed.

3. Most interestingly, a preference was observed for the embedded NP in a complex NP to take wide scope: for example, in (1), “an admiral” would tend to take wide scope.

(1) Each daughter of an admiral married a captain.

This result is not predicted by any of the principles tested by Kurtzman and MacDonald. Kurtzman and MacDonald’s results, while not conclusive, do serve to constrain the range of possible proposals. The most interesting observation is that none of the principles proposed in the literature can account for all the observed effects, and actually we have counterexamples to all of them, including the lexical preferences. In particular, no evidence for a Left-to-Right processing principle of the sort proposed by Lakoff [1971] was found. The facts about complex NP do seem to suggest that structural factors play a role, contrary to the view suggested in [Katz, 1980] according to which preferences can be explained entirely at a pragmatic level ([1992], p.42). Kurtzman and MacDonald also hypothesize that “...processes that are not strictly dedicated to the interpretation of scope relations may nonetheless influence the interpretation of quantifier scope ambiguities.” ([1992], p.22). Finally, Kurtzman and MacDonald conclude that “...the results leave open the question of whether the building and selection of representations of scope are mandatory processes” ([1992], p.45).

The hypothesis I present in the paper is based on Kurtzman and MacDonald’s results, as well as on my study of transcripts of actual conversations in which people have to accomplish a task, thus focusing on cases in which people have strong intuitions about the scope of the operators, and avoiding artificially sounding utterances or utterances that people find difficult to understand.

My hypothesis about the process by which operators are assigned their scope in our dialogues can be summarized as follows:

The operators in a sentence get assigned their scope as a side effect of the process of interpretation which builds up a model of the situation represented by the sentence. This model is constructed by applying ‘model construction rules’ to the initial interpretation of the sentence, assumed to be a tree isomorphic to
the surface structure of the sentence, with lexical items replaced by their semantic interpretation. A model construction rule exists for each operator, which is applied when the contextual aspects of the operators’ interpretation have been resolved—in the case of quantifiers, for example, the contextual parameter in question is the ‘resource situation’ of the quantifier. The relative scope of operators thus depends on the order in which these contextual factors are determined, and scope relations are determined by the relations of dependency among the contextual factors—e.g., by informational inclusion relations between the ‘resource situations’ that an agent already knows, or may assume to exist.

To those familiar with DRT the relation between this proposal and the interpretation method proposed in DRT—the DRS construction algorithm—should be apparent. In this paper, the model of an utterance is represented as a DRS, and the ‘model construction rules’ are DRS rules. What I am proposing, then, is that the interpretation of each operator has a contextual aspect, and that the DRS construction rules for that operator are only applied when the contextual aspect is resolved (by independent processes of pragmatic reasoning).

Consider (2), for example. What I am proposing is that whether “every kid” or “a tree” takes wide scope depends on where the listener ‘starts’ from when building a model of the sentence: if she starts by first identifying the group of kids that “every” is quantifying over, and then proceeds to ‘build’ identify for each of these kids a situation which contains a tree the kid is climbing, then “every kid” will take wide scope. In DRT terms, this is like saying that which operator takes wide scope depends on whether the DRS construction rule for universals or that for indefinites applies first, and this depends on whether the construction of the model is started by adding a group of kids to the root DRS or by adding a tree.

(2) Every kid climbed a tree.

(3) a. We professors believe that bringing the students in contact with nature is essential both for their personal growth and their physical well-being, so we often organize little outings.

b. This morning, for example, we went with the class to explore the woods near Cayuga Lake.
Every school sent the principal to the meeting.

I am always tired at the end of the semester.

Because subjects are often the topic of sentences in English, it seems plausible to stipulate that listeners learn a ‘weak’ default rule suggesting that, when no context is available, the NP in subject position is the topic of the sentence. The preference for subjects to take wide scope could then be explained in terms of the hypothesis presented above as well. (This possibility needs to be explored in more detail.)

Consider now the case of the other disambiguation factor proposed by Loup, the lexically encoded preference for certain operators to take wide scope. Definite descriptions are the paradigmatic case of operator that tends to take wide scope; this preference is the strongest disambiguation effect to be observed in our dialogues. The hypothesis presented above can account for this preference as well: because the choice of a resource situation for definite descriptions is restricted by the constraint that this resource situation be shared among the conversational participants, a definite description may take narrow scope with respect to another operator only if the resource situation of this other operator can be assumed to be shared. In practice, this rarely happens; the known cases of other operators taking wide scope over definites, such as (4) and (5), are all cases in which the definite has to be interpreted relative to the resource situation of another operator, and this relation is specified by generic knowledge that can be assumed to be shared:

(4) Every school sent the principal to the meeting.
(5) I am always tired at the end of the semester.

(In our dialogues the resource situation for definite descriptions is, in most cases, the current visual scene.) More in general, my hypothesis predicts that those operators whose resource situation has to be identified independently from the resource situations of other operators should tend to take wider scope.

In order to make the hypothesis just presented more precise, we need (i) to describe the process of disambiguation in more detail, and (ii) to study the procedures by which the resource situations of different kinds of operators get identified. In this paper, I concentrate on the first part of the task, and I present a proposal about the input to the process of scope disambiguation and the connection between this process and other processes of discourse interpretation. A description of my work on providing a detailed account of the process of definite description interpretation, and, in particular, the processes by which the resource situation of definite descriptions are identified, is in [Poesio, 1993]. I am currently working with M. Kameyama and R. Passonneau to provide an account of the process by which the resource situation for tense gets identified [Kameyama et al., 1993].
I propose that the input to scope disambiguation, as well as to the other discourse interpretation processes, is an intermediate representation called logical form (LF). The logical form is structurally identical to the parse tree, except that lexical items have been replaced by their semantic interpretation; neither the scope of operators nor the interpretation of anaphoric expressions have been interpreted yet.\(^5\) The logical form is the interface between the parser and lexical interpretation modules on the one side, and the ‘pragmatic processor’ on the other side. The idea of a ‘logical form level’ as a way for splitting up the work between context-dependent and context-independent aspects of natural language interpretation has a long history both in NLP [Webber, 1978; Woods, 1978; Schubert and Pelletier, 1982; Fenstad et al., 1987; Alshawi, 1992] and in linguistics, especially in the generative framework [Chomsky, 1977; May, 1977; May, 1985]. What is new in my proposal is that, first of all, the LF I use has a model-theoretic interpretation, so that a notion of compatible disambiguation can be defined. Secondly, I insist for preserving in the logical form the information about surface structure. There are two reasons for this: first of all, I believe that part of the explanation for the scope puzzle is that constraints—like the Scope Constraint [Heim, 1982] or the constraints on the scope of polarity items [Ladusaw, 1977]—greatly reduce the number of available interpretations.\(^6\) Similar, well-known constraints also affect other discourse interpretation processes, such as the choice of an interpretation for pronouns. Both kinds of constraints are usually assumed to be structural. Secondly, structural notions such as parallelism play an important role also in suggesting preferred interpretations (e.g., for pronouns: cfr. Kameyama’s ‘property sharing’ effects in centering [Kameyama, 1985]).

The production of the Logical Form initiates a process consisting of repeated phases of hypothesis generation, verification, comparison with other hypotheses and, possibly, acceptance, much as in, say, Hurum’s proposal [1988] or the proposals based on abduction [Charniak and Goldman, 1988; Hobbs et al., 1988]. The main distinguishing feature of my theory is that it comes with a proposal about the kind of information used for generating hypotheses about the relative scope of quantifiers—which allows me, for example, to make predictions about how difficult it will be to interpret certain sentences. A second difference is that I propose to formalize the process of hypothesis formation and selection in terms of operations on a mental state structured as in Asher and Kamp’s proposals [Kamp, 1990]. The idea is that the ‘perceptual event’ of obtaining a logical form for an utterance results in adding to the current mental state a verbal experience—a mental object of a particular type whose content is the logical form. This mental event triggers additional operations, among

\(^5\)This should not be interpreted as meaning that I assume the parser to build a complete interpretation for an utterance prior to the intervention of pragmatic reasoning. On the contrary, the assumption in TRAINS is that the parser ships ‘chunks’ of interpretation to the modules which follow. I will leave this issue aside in this paper.

\(^6\)A disambiguation factor which plays an important role in our dialogues and, to the best of my knowledge, can only be explained in structural terms is the fact, discussed among others by Heim in [Heim, 1987], that indefinites in there-insertion sequences like (6) take narrow scope with respect to tense.

(6) There is an engine at Avon.
which ones which produce hypotheses about the model of the sentence, and are basically modified versions of the DRS construction rules.

References


Quasi-Logical Form

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Quasi-logical form (QLF) is a type of natural-language-oriented higher order logic extended with constructs for representing the meanings of contextually specified items like referring noun phrases, ellipsis, underspecified relations (e.g. possessives) and other similar phenomena. In interpretation, a sentence is analysed into one or more QLFs via compositional syntactic and semantic rules. The resolution of contextually specified information is represented via the monotonic addition of information to the QLF. This has the effect of narrowing down the range of possible interpretations possible: a fully resolved logical form is, roughly, a proposition. However, unresolved QLFs are also coherent logical objects, with a denotation that reflects their partiality.

The process of resolving QLFs, being monotonic, is fully reversible. This has substantial practical advantages, enabling the same grammar to be used to generate sentences from QLFs at different degrees of resolution. For example, the sentence corresponding to a resolved QLF will make explicit the choice of contextual elements that were made in interpreting the unresolved version. The Core Language Engine developed at SRI Cambridge implements this functionality.

The paper presents several examples of the use of QLF in linguistic analysis, in several different applications: in particular, database query and transfer-based translation. We also sketch a formal semantics in terms of supervaluations for a first order version of QLF (due to Alshawi and Crouch).
Dealing with Ambiguities by Underspecification: Construction, Representation and Deduction.

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Utterance interpretation is based on a relation between the linguistic form of the utterance and its meaning. Current approaches to natural language understanding assume that the linguistic form of an utterance is given by some syntactic analysis and that the relation between this form and its meaning is characterised by a translation process into some semantic representation structure. In almost all cases this relation is not functional. Whenever semantical ambiguities arise there is a set of meanings associated with a single form. To decide whether some other sentence logically follows from this form it has to be shown that it follows from each of these associated meanings. It is, therefore, the notion of disjunction on which such a theory of meaning relies.

In this paper we develop a theory of language meaning that represents scope ambiguities by underspecified structures. The translation into semantic form will thus be functional. The way ambiguities will be represented does not correspond to any of the usual concepts of formalizing ambiguities by means of disjunctions (of completely specified structures). A proof theory is provided that relates these structures directly, without considering cases. Consider the following argument.

(1) Many a problem about the environment preoccupies every politician. Every politician who many a problem about the environment preoccupies proposes a solution.

Every politician proposes a solution.

The first sentence, \( P_1 \), of (1) has two readings. The first reading, \( P^1_1 \), is the one where the scope relation of its two NPs corresponds to their linear order; the other reading, \( P^2_1 \), gives every politician wide scope over many a problem about the environment. In the second sentence, \( P_2 \), many a problem about the environment cannot have wide scope over every politician, because the scope of (proper) quantifiers is bound to their local domain – in this case to the relative clause. So, its ambiguity depends only on the way the indefinite a solution is interpreted: either as specific indefinite, or as dependent on every politician. Therefore the second sentence has two readings, call them \( P^1_2 \) and \( P^2_2 \). Also for the same reason the conclusion, \( G \), of (1) is two times ambiguous. Thus there are four possible readings of the premiss set of (1), and two readings of the conclusion, \( G^1 \) and \( G^2 \).

How are we going to relate these two readings of the conclusion to the set of readings of the premisses? What are the inferential properties of ambiguous representations? And can they be characterized by one and only one notion of logical consequence?
We already emphasized that we will not present a theory that represents the meaning of ambiguous sentences or texts by the disjunction of their meanings. Thus we will not represent the meaning of the premiss set of (1) by

\[(2) \quad (P_1 \land P_2) \lor (P_1 \land P_2) \lor (P_2 \land P_2) \lor (P_1 \land P_2)\]

but by \(P_1 \land P_2\), where \(P_1\) and \(P_2\) are the underspecified representations of the meanings of \(P_1\) and \(P_2\), respectively. The truth conditions that our theory assigns to these underspecified representations will, however, guarantee that \(P_1 \land P_2\) is true just in case (2) is. And the deduction rules will be such that no recursion to the four cases in (2) is necessary. Our approach thus has not only the advantage to provide a solution to the combinatorial explosion that goes off in any proof that uses (2) as premiss. It also provides a solution to what is called mapping problem by [Kempson/Cormack]: \(P_1 \land P_2\) is a representation that comes quite close to the combination of the syntactic structures of \(P_1\) and \(P_2\), which clearly isn’t the case for (2).

We consider an ambiguous sentence to be true in a model if and only if one of its disambiguations is. And we say that \(P_1 \land P_2\) \(\models\) \(G\) if every model of \(P_1 \land P_2\) is also a model of \(G\). To see that \(\models\) is indeed a proper consequence relation the reader easily convinces himself that it satisfies the basic properties a consequence relation should obey, namely reflexivity, transitivity and monotonicity.

One might consider other possibilities as well. For example one may abandon the policy to reckon with the worst as regards the premises and accept the argument one has to prove already if its conclusion follows from some of the readings of its premises, and not necessarily all of them. Or one may define the consequence relation in such a way that the conclusion follows if each – and not only one – of its readings is true in the models that satisfy the premises. We reject both options (i) because they violate reflexivity and (ii) because we think that a possible deviance from the consequence relation as we defined it is the result of interpretative principles which rely on some definition of coherency of discourses or dialogues. We are not in the position to touch the matter in this paper. We think, however, that if such a definition were available then its effect would be simply to eliminate readings that otherwise were available. Thus the task of drawing inferences will not be affected and so will our consequence relation.

How are we going to represent the meaning of sentences without specifying the scope relations between their quantifiers? There are quite a few proposals in the literature. (See for example [Schubert/Pelletier], [Fenstad et al.], [Hobbs/Shieber], [Nerbonne].) What all these proposals have in common is the idea of deriving unscoped representations which then may be transformed algorithmically into sets of corresponding disambiguated representations. If the algorithm is simple and effective, there is certainly a benefit to all these approaches. But effective as the algorithm might be, it has the disadvantage of being obligatory. Even though there is an unscoped representation for (1), it has to be translated into a representation of the form

\(^1\text{See [Gabbay 91].}\)
for the purpose of deductive manipulation. As a consequence each of the representations \( P_1, \ldots, P_n \) of the different readings of the premise set overspecifies its meaning – and this overspecification has then to be compensated for by taking the disjunction (2) of all possible combinations.

But there is a further disadvantage of the mentioned representations. Consider the sentence

\[
(4) \quad \text{Every professor who recommends a book is admired.}
\]

which we may represent à la [Schubert/Pelletier] by

\[
(5) \quad \text{admired}(\forall x(\text{professor}(x) \land \text{recommend}(x, \exists y \text{book}(y))))
\]

What the papers cited have in common is that they do not have a dynamic representation of the meaning of the indefinite a book which accounts for the fact that it is interpreted as universally quantified if it has narrow scope with respect to every professor and that the other reading assigns it an existentially quantified meaning. This means that the disambiguation algorithm must deal with the problem of choosing the correct quantification type when creating the different meanings.²

Thus in the framework of unscoped representations, sentences such as (4) cause the same problem as donkey sentences do. The problem is that the indefinite article is regarded as expressing existence. In DRT, this problem does not occur because the existential import of the indefinite in the cases where it has wide scope in (4) is not a consequence of the meaning of the NP as such, but rather of the way truth is characterized.

The base for our unscoped representations is the separation of information about the structure of a semantic form and of the content of the information bits the semantic form combines. Consider the language of DRSs. DRT represents meaning as the result of an interpretation process in a way that also suits the interpretation of subsequent input. It encodes the semantic connections between successive pieces of sentences or texts – such as, for instance, those produced by pronouns whose anaphoric antecedents occur in earlier sentences – which are largely responsible for the cohesion that distinguishes genuine texts from mere successions of unconnected sentences. The task of establishing the set of semantic connections for a given text relies heavily on the structure of DRSs. In the case of two pieces of discourse being anaphorically linked, for example, the set of possible antecedents is restricted by this structure. Note that the structural information is exploited only when the construction of the meaning representation of that piece of text in which the antecedent occurs has already been accomplished. The constraints that restrict the possible semantic

²In [Fenstad et. al.] the problem is approached from a somewhat different perspective: In order to get the non-specific reading of a book they analyze the NP Every professor who recommends a book as binary quantifier.
connections are metalevel constraints. I.e., they are not part of the meaning of linguistic entities, but are used to restrict the set of wellformed DRSs. The language of underspecified DRSs will allow us to express such constraints in the object language. We will, therefore, be able to associate structural constraints declaratively with lexical entries. This does not only apply to constraints that govern anaphoric linkage, but also to constraints that restrict scope ambiguities.

In order to achieve this we express structural information by a language with one predicate \( \leq \) that relates individual constants \( l \), called labels. The constants are names for DRSs. They are also used to position DRS-conditions at the right place in the hierarchy. This is done by writing \( l \gamma \) for an occurrence of a DRS-condition \( \gamma \) in a DRS named \( l \).

Given such a separation of structural information and purely linguistic content we are able to indicate that, for example, proper names always end up in the top-level DRS. Assume that the label of the top-level DRS is \( l_0 \), then we can specify the target position of any proper name \( \pi \) in the lexicon by writing \( l_0 \pi \). The scope potential of indefinite descriptions – like a book in (4) – is also dealt with in the lexicon: suppose that the meaning component of the indefinite is given by (a set of conditions of the form) \( P \gamma \); then we can express the fact that the indefinite may take arbitrarily wide scope by adding a \( l \leq l_0 \), where \( l \) represents the minimal position \( l_0 \) can occupy.

The construction of meaning representation for a given sentence will then consist in relating names that show up in conditions associated with the phrases to be combined. To say that, for example, the subject of a sentence has to have wide scope over its object we enrich the structural information built up so far by the additional formula \( l_0 \leq l \), where \( l \) is the label associated with the meaning of the subject and \( l_0 \) is the label associated with the object. This process of enrichment is characteristic for the construction of meaning representation: information from different sources (syntactic and semantic knowledge as well as knowledge about the world) may be added in a monotonic manner to narrow down the possible range of readings.

The main advantage of this approach is that it comes closer to a representation of meaning that has been thought desirable by scholars from different areas especially from the field of cognitive science. From a cognitive perspective it seems plausible that the recipient of an ambiguous sentence often forms a representation of it that is underspecified with respect to its scope relationships.

References


RELATION OF SYNTAX AND SEMANTICS IN CCG

(EXTENDED ABSTRACT)

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§1 COMBINATORY PROSODY

In [12] and [13], I have argued that the notion of intonational structure formalised by Pierrehumbert, Selkirk, and others, can be subsumed under a rather different notion of syntactic surface structure, that emerges from the “Combinatory Categorial” theory of grammar. This theory engenders surface structure constituents corresponding directly to phonological phrase structure. Moreover, the grammar assigns to these constituents interpretations that directly correspond to what is here called “information structure” – that is, the aspects of discourse-meaning that have variously been termed “topic” and “comment”, “theme” and “rheme”, “given” and “new” information, and/or “presupposition” and “focus”.

Certain syntactic categories and constructions, such as particles like only and even also “associate with focus” in the sense that they conspire with intonation in utterances like the following to yield a fixed information structure, carrying presuppositions about the background context.

(1) Harry only introduced MARY to Alice.

Here the effect is not only to make Mary “focus” or the center of attention, and the fact that Harry introduced someone to Alice the background, but also, as Rooth [9] and von Stechow [11] have pointed out, to entail that Harry did not introduce anyone else to Alice. The present paper reviews the intonational theory and examines its applications to this problem. The claim is that CCG offers an account of surface structure that is more directly related to a compositional semantics for these particles than more traditional alternatives.

§1.1 THE PROBLEM

Consider the prosody of the sentence Mary admires corduroy in the following pair of discourse settings, which are adapted from Jackendoff [4, pp. 260]:

(Q: Well, what about the CORduroy? Who admires THAT?

A: (MARy ) (admires CORduroy).

H* L  L+H* LH%
(3Q): Well, what about MARy? What does SHE admire?

A: (MARy admires) (CORduroy).
L+H* LH% H* LL%

In these contexts, the main stressed syllables on both Mary and corduroy receive a pitch accent, but a different one. In the former example, 2, there is a prosodic phrase on Mary made up of the pitch accent which Pierrehumbert calls H*, immediately followed by an L boundary. There is another prosodic phrase having the pitch accent called L+II* on corduroy, preceded by null or interpolated tone on the words admires, and immediately followed by a boundary which is written LH%. (I base these annotations on Pierrehumbert and Hirschberg's [7, ex. 33] discussion of a similar example.)

In the second example 3 above, the two tunes are reversed: this time the tune with pitch accent L+H* LH% is spread across a prosodic phrase Mary admires, while the other tune with pitch accent H* and boundary LL% is carried by the prosodic phrase corduroy (again starting with an interpolated or null tone).

The meaning that these tunes convey in these contexts is intuitively very obvious. As Pierrehumbert and Hirschberg point out, the latter tune seems to be used to mark some or all of that part of the sentence expressing information that the speaker believes to be novel to the hearer. In traditional terms, it marks the “comment” – more precisely, what Halliday called the “rheme”. In contrast, the L+H* LH% tune seems to be used to mark some or all of that part of the sentence which expresses information which in traditional terms is the “topic” – in Halliday’s terms, the “theme”. For present purposes, a theme can be thought of as conveying what the speaker assumes to be the subject of mutual interest, and this particular tune marks a theme as novel to the hearer.

Thus in 3, the L+H* LH% phrase including this accent is spread across the phrase Mary admires. Similarly, in 2, the same tune is confined to the object of the open proposition admires corduroy, because the intonation of the original question indicates that admiring corduroy as opposed to some other stuff is the new topic or theme.

It follows that the position of the pitch accent in the phrase has to do with a further orthogonal dimension of information structure within both theme and rheme, corresponding to the interesting bit of either information unit. This is what Halliday called “new” infor-

1 We continue to gloss over Pierrehumbert’s distinction between “intermediate” and “intonational” phrases.

2 The reason for notating the latter boundary as LL%, rather than L is again to do with the distinction between intonational and intermediate phrases.

3 I do not of course intend to claim that these are the only meanings that these tunes can convey.

4 Here I depart slightly from Halliday’s definition. The present proposal also follows Lyons [6] in rejecting Hallidays’ claim that the theme must necessarily be sentence-initial.

5 An alternative prosody, in which the contrastive tune is confined to Mary, seems equally coherent, and may be the one intended by Jackendoff. I believe that this alternative is informationally distinct, and arises from an ambiguity as to whether the topic of this discourse is Mary or What Mary admires. It too is accepted by the rules below.
mation, in contrast to the “given” information accompanied by the null tone. However, the term “new” is an unfortunate one, since the information in question may, if it is part of the theme, have been mentioned before. I shall use the term “focus”, which stands in contrast to “background”. This usage is illustrated in the following example:

(4) Q: I know that Mary’s first degree is in physics. But what is the subject of her doctorate?
   A: (Mary’s doctorate) (is in chemistry)

Here the theme is Mary’s doctorate, where the head noun is emphasised because it stands in contrast to another of her qualifications. The rheme is that it is in chemistry, where chemistry is emphasised in contrast to another subject.

1.2 Constituency and Intonation.

CCG was originally devised as an account of coordinate phenomena such as Right Node Raising, as in the following sentence:

(5) Mary admires, but I detest, corduroy

According to CCG, simple sentences like Mary admires corduroy have not only the traditional surface structure (b), but also the non-standard surface structure (a):

(6) a. Mary admires corduroy
   b. Mary admires corduroy

In fact more complex sentences may have very many alternative non-standard derivations, in addition to the standard one, for each sense-semantic reading. However, all such derivations are guaranteed to deliver an interpretation expressing identical function-argument relations.

It is therefore immediately tempting to equate the two intonational structures exhibited in 2 and 3 with the alternative CCG surface structures exhibited in 6. The earlier papers show how CCG can be made sensitive to prosodic information, so that when prosodic boundaries are present (which of course is frequently not the case), then only one of the two alternatives will be present. The papers also show that the modified grammar correctly associates interpretations corresponding to the theme and the rheme with the major constituents of the derivation, and that the account generalises to the (more ambiguous
and more frequent) cases in which the discourse-infomational partition is not explicitly marked.

§2 INFORMATION STRUCTURE AND “FOCUS”

The incorporation into the domain of grammar proper of the distinction between theme and rheme, together with the finer distinction between background and focus, means we are in a position to address a wider range of questions in discourse information that have been identified with the notion of “focus” (cf. Jackendoff [4]; Chomsky [1]; [9]). In particular, we are in a position to ask whether this grammar captures phenomena of “focus” that have been identified in semantic accounts of the focussing particles. The paper will investigate the predictions that CCG makes concerning sentences like the following:

(7) a. (John only introduced)(BILL to Sue)
   b. = (John introduced)(only BILL to Sue)
   c. (John only introduced Bill)(to SUE)
   d. (John only introduced)(BILL to SUE)

The paper also examines some apparent counterexamples noted by Rooth, where it appears that information structure of this kind can violate some well-known constraints on syntactic structure, thus threatening the CCG claim of isomorphism between syntax, intonation structure and information structure. These apparent counterexamples concern sentences like the following:

(8) They only asked whether you knew the woman who chairs the ZONING board.

The presupposition here seems to be that they only asked whether you knew the woman who chairs something. However, this cannot be a constituent of syntax, because it is in violation of the complex NP constraint:

(9) *Which board did they ask whether you knew the woman who chairs?

Such examples were used by Roth to argue against a “movement” account of focus. However, it looks at first glance as though they are equally telling against the present theory of discourse information.

It is certainly the case that the present theory does not allow the sentence to be split into the zoning board as rheme and the rest of the sentence as theme. If it did, then the following intonation, in which this illegal constituent is marked as theme by the theme tune would wrongly be allowed:

(10) *(They only asked whether you know the woman who chairs)(the ZONING board)

The paper will argue that the present theory already accounts correctly for 8. The theory implies there are actually two backgrounds involved, one belonging to the open proposition
or theme, and one stemming from its complement, the rheme. Both backgrounds are marked (or rather, unmarked) by the null tone. Both are presupposed, and therefore affect the p-set, or set of related propositions that are denied. The following example is in fact only one of the information structures that the grammar given earlier will permit.

(11) (They only asked whether you knew)(the woman who chairs the ZONING board).

The evidence is as follows. First, we know that only does not simply associate with the zoning board, because it does not mean the same as the following:

(12) They asked whether you knew the woman who chaired only the ZONING board.

That is, it does not entail that they did not ask whether you knew the woman who chaired the zoning board and the parking permit committee, as this analysis would imply. In contrast, it can mean the same as the following example, which is provided with a contextual question motivating the division concerned:

(13) Which women did they ask whether I knew?

(The woman who chairs the ZONING board)

We can tell that this is so by marking part of the theme hypothesised in 11 as focus, using the theme tune L+H* LH%:

(14) (They only asked whether you (KNEW)L+H* LH%)(the woman who chairs the ZONING board).

In both cases, the p-set or set of negative entailments includes the following, just as it would if the grammar were able to build a monolithic open proposition *They asked whether you knew the woman who chaired . . . :

(15) a. They didn't ask whether you knew the woman who chairs the Parks Committee.
   b. They didn't ask whether you knew the man who (co-)chairs the Zoning Board.
   (etc.)

The difference is that part each of the entailment stems from the open proposition or theme, and part of it stems from the rheme.

In the longer version of this paper I shall provide a more complete grammar than in earlier papers, together with a semantics for the particles incorporating Mats Rooth's notion of a binary denotation for clauses. The theory generalises to certain cases of "multiple focus" considered by Krifka [5], and exemplified by sentences like the following:

(16) Even HARRY drank only WATER.
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Session Summary

Robert C. Moore

Wednesday morning, 24-02-93

The three talks in this session were tied together by a common focus on the problem of quantifier scope; the first two presenting representations in which scope could be underspecified, and the third dealing with the factors that resolve scope ambiguity.

The first talk of the day was a presentation on underspecification in quasi-logical forms (QLFs) as used in the Core Language Engine (CLE) at SRI Cambridge, given by Stephen Pulman. This talk was in place of "Monotonic Semantics and Vague Logic" by Illyan Alshawi, who was unable to attend the Seminar. The discussion of Pulman’s presentation focussed on the ability of QLFs to represent various kinds of underspecification of interpretation of natural language utterances. While QLFs did seem to be weaker in this regard than some other formalisms with apparently similar goals, Pulman made the point that many of the types of constraints that were being asked about would be expressed in resolution rules in the CLE, rather than in the QLFs themselves.

The next talk was by Uwe Reyle of the University of Stuttgart on "Underspecification: Construction, Representation and Deduction." In this talk, an approach to underspecification in discourse representation structures was presented, along with a proof system for the underspecified forms. Much of the discussion focussed on the proper definition of logical consequence for such a system. Richmond Thomason expressed reservations about Reyle’s definition that for every true interpretation of the premises there was some true interpretation of the conclusion, on the grounds that if a speaker or hearer has in mind a different interpretation of the conclusion, the inference may not be valid. Reyle responded that there were several formal possibilities for the notion of logical consequence in his system, but the one he chose was the only one that possessed the three abstract properties of reflexivity, transitivity, and monotonicity held to be characteristic of a consequence relation.

The final talk of the morning session was by Massimo Poesio of the University of Rochester on "Inferring the Semantic Scope of Operators," which presented an approach based on the hypothesis that operators get assigned their scope as the result of establishing relations of informational inclusion between the "resource situations" containing the objects quantified over by the operators. The discussion focussed mainly on the interplay of structural and pragmatic factors in determining scope.

The morning ended with a general discussion of some topics that seemed to connect the papers. All the papers dealt with issues of scope, but Reyle’s paper was quite explicit in assuming that scope could remain unresolved all the way through the process of reasoning with underspecified interpretations, while Poesio dealt with how to resolve such underspecifications. Pulman’s talk could be viewed as offering a middle ground, in that like Poesio
be viewed interpretation as including the resolution of scope, but like Reyle, his formalism permitted semantically well-defined expressions in which scope is not fully resolved. Another issue raised by both Pulman’s and Reyle’s talk was that of compositionality. While in both systems the representations for complete utterances were semantically well-defined, it was not clear that all well-formed phrases within an utterance had well-defined semantic interpretations. Finally, there was some discussion of the question of whether the type of underspecification allowed by Pulman and Reyle should be thought of as ambiguity or vaugence (i.e., disjunction). Some traditional tests for this distinction were recalled that seemed to indicate that these were ambiguities.
We discuss the conflicting design goals of Semantic Representation Languages (SL) and Knowledge Representation Languages (KL). A KL supports the representation of conceptual knowledge and world knowledge, the retrieval of knowledge (i.e., the efficient indexing of large sets of knowledge units), knowledge acquisition (i.e., inductive inference and learning techniques), various inference services such as classification, subsumption, realisation, forward/backward deduction, abduction, temporal projection and default reasoning; updates and revisions, and the construction of vision systems, expert systems, learning systems, NL systems and robots.

On the other hand, an SL supports the representation of the meaning of an utterance in the discourse context, semantic construction (i.e., getting from a parse to the meaning representation), semantic evaluation (i.e., inferences to resolve ambiguities, anaphoric references and ellipsis, check presuppositions, compute implicatures), the use as a target language for parsing NL, the use as a source language for the production of NL, layered representations of intermediate processing levels (underspecification, unscoped operators), paraphrase generation, incremental analysis and generation, and the construction of NL dialog, text understanding and translation systems.

In this context, we analyse SLs, like DRT, EKN, DPL, US and SS as semantic frameworks and concrete languages like NLL, QLF and EL. We suggest that typed feature structures are an adequate format for both SR and KR. We show that it is not possible to design a single representation language that supports the need of KR and SR at the same time.
Discourse Representation Theory as a Knowledge Representation Formalism

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This talk gives an overview of the different representation languages that have been developed within DRT. Although the primary domain of DRT is the semantics of natural language, the semantic representation languages which have been proposed within this approach for originally strictly NL semantic purposes can also be looked at as representation formalisms tout court, which can be used for the representation of non-linguistic as well as linguistic information. The talk gives a survey of the three formalisms, focusing on their formal semantics (model theory) and their meta-mathematical properties (axiomatizability, decidability, complexity).
Meeting the interlocking needs of LF-computation, deindexing, and inference: An organic approach to general NLU
(Extended Abstract)

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The Organism Awaits: A Manifesto

We report here on an approach to theoretical and practical NLU that aspires to be complete and comprehensive, with respect to all the major syntactic, semantic, and pragmatic phenomena encountered in NL texts. Language understanding, on our view, is a highly organic phenomenon, in the sense that each facet is strongly dependent on the others. If surface form determines logical form, and logical form determines the ultimate meaning representation, and the ultimate meaning representation determines further conversational (and other) behavior — and if all of these transductions are mediated by inferential use of world knowledge and by a shifting context of salient features of the discourse situation — then surely there is a point where study of isolated features of this organic whole becomes less profitable than an attempt to see it in its entirety.

We think that the need for integration and a global perspective is especially pressing in computational linguistics, since most facets of our problem do not even have a clearly discernible shape independently of their relation to other facets. Even syntactic structure, the most accessible aspect of language, is moot, and logical form, semantic representation, knowledge representation, context, and inferential operations are utterly hypothetical, and tightly interlocked. Thus, work done on one issue while simplifying or ignoring the rest is almost certain to go off in quite different directions than work which attempts to keep in mind all constraints and desiderata at once.

Compared to the 70’s and 80’s, present prospects for principled, integrated NLU are greatly improved. Considerable strides have been taken in our understanding of all aspects of language processing: e.g., grammar, parsing, theories of intention, speech acts and discourse structure, etc. And most importantly from our perspective, new logical frameworks such as DRT, situation semantics, and type and property theories have been developed to address various long-standing semantic conundrums, such as the semantics of attitudes, anaphora, kinds, substances and collections, properties, propositions, events, and tense and aspect.

How, then, do we propose to go about “putting it all together”? For good reason, the centerpiece of our effort has turned out to be the semantic representation/knowledge
representation, called episodic logic (EL). After all, it is the choice of representation which determines how easily we can derive content from surface form, how fully we can capture the semantic nuances of NL text, and how readily we can perform needed inferences.

EL is a first-order logic that is very expressive, formally interpretable, and easily derived from surface utterances, yet allows efficient inference. It is based on a Montague-style coupling between syntactic form and logical form, while incorporating from situation semantics the idea that sentences describe situations (events, states, episodes, eventualities, etc.). Moreover, all of this is implemented in at least a preliminary way. The EPILOG system [11], the computer implementation of EL, makes quite complex inferences, e.g., with utterances from the TRAINS domain [1], telex reports for aircraft mechanical problems in the ARMS project [10], and excerpts from Little Red Riding Hood story [12]. These experiments show that the inference chain is straight-forward, despite the richness of the logic, and that the knowledge it is based on is uncontrived (it corresponds quite directly to English sentences, and each individual piece of knowledge arguably is formulated at a maximally general level, rather than being particularized to the needs of a specific story).

We now briefly review EL and its role in a comprehensive, modular approach to NLU. We first describe semantic representation and inference rules in EL, and then explain how one can get episodic logical form from English input. For formal semantics of the logic, see [6, 7].

The Episodic Logical Form

Among the most important features of EL are its liberal ontology and NL-like expressiveness. These features make it easy to derive EL-translations of English sentences, while also providing a basis for concise, easily understood inferences. EL syntax allows lambda abstraction, restricted quantifiers, modal operators and propositional attitudes, predicate modifiers, kind forming operators, nominalization operators, action abstraction, DRT-like anaphoric variables, generic conditionals, and other non-standard constructs. Most importantly, however, it makes use of episodic (situational) variables in the representation of episodic sentences, making implicit temporal and causal relationships between situations explicit.

To give an idea of the syntax, we show below an ELF representation of the sentence “An object bumped into the left wing of the airplane, causing it to get a crack” (with certain simplifications).  

\[(x: [x \text{ airplane}])\]
\[(y: [(y (\text{attr left wing}) \land [y \text{ part-of } z])]]\]
\[(x: [e_1 \text{ before Nowl}] \land ([\exists w: [w \text{ object}] [w \text{ bump-into } y]) \land e_1] )\]
\[(x: [e_1 \text{ cause-of } e_2] ([\exists z: [z \text{ crack}] [y \text{ get } z]) \land e_2]))\]

This sentence introduces two episodes: \(e_1\), an episode of “some object bumping into the left wing \(y\),” and \(e_2\), an episode of “wing \(y\) getting a crack.” Note the clause \([e_1 \text{ cause-of } e_2]\)

\(^{1}\)Nowl in the following formula is a term that will be replaced with an appropriate nonindexical term (possibly a clock time) at the deindexing stage. \text{attr} is an operator that transforms a predicate into an attributive predicate modifier. Also, note that we use infix notation for readability and restricted quantification of the form \((Q \alpha: \Phi \Psi)\), where \(Q\) is a quantifier, \(\alpha\) is a variable, and \(\Phi\) and \(\Psi\) are formulas. Readers are referred to [6] for details of EL syntax.
which shows the causal relationship between the two episodes. \([\Phi \Rightarrow \eta]\) means formula \(\Phi\) characterizes (or, completely describes) episode \(\eta\). A weaker form of this modal operator is \(\Rightarrow\). \([\Phi \Rightarrow \eta]\) means that \(\Phi\) partially describes (or, is true in) \(\eta\). This is similar to the \(\models\) ("support") relation of situation semantics [2, 3], except that we are relating sentence intensions (partial mappings from situations to truth values), rather than "infons," to situations.

The following example illustrates attitude predicates and kind abstraction. That, \(K\), and \(Ka\) below are nominalization operators that form a proposition from a sentence intension, a kind of property from a predicate, and a kind of action from an action predicate, respectively.

(2) \((\exists e_1 : [e_1 \text{ at-about } Now_2]) \) 
\[
[\text{Mary believes (That } (\exists e_2 : [e_2 \text{ before } e_1]) \text{ [([K swim) prevent-from Mary (Ka (gain (K weight)))] } \Rightarrow e_2].
\]

Mary believes that swimming prevented her from gaining weight.

There is also a nominalization operator \(Ke\) that forms a kind of event from a sentence intension.

Next shown is an example of probabilistic conditionals, i.e., extensional generic conditionals (with some simplifications).

(3) \((\exists x : [x \text{ aircraft }] \land [(\text{age } x \text{ year }) < 3]) (\exists y : [y \text{ crack}][y \text{ located-on } x])\) 
\[\rightarrow_{x,y,s} \neg [y \text{ due-to (K corrosion)}]\]

If an aircraft that is less than 3 years old has a crack, usually the crack is not due to corrosion.

The rule says, roughly, that in at least 80% of the situations in which the antecedent is true, the consequent will also be true \((x, y\) are controlled variables). Note the DRT-like treatment of indefinites in the rule; that is, existential variable \(y\) occurs outside its quantifier scope. This is allowed in EL thanks to the parameter mechanism that carries the variable binding beyond the scope of variables. (The interpretation of such free variables is done much as in DRT [8].)

Space limitations prevent a discussion of semantics, but we should remark that unlike situation semantics, EL is based on an ontology that allows possible situations. These are much like "partial possible worlds," in that symbols are assigned partial extensions (and antiextensions) relative to them.

**Inference Rules in Episodic Logic**

The main inference rules we have developed are *Rule Instantiation* (RI) and its dual *Goal Chaining* (GC), which resemble forward and backward chaining rules in expert systems. These rules are formally stated below.

**Rule Instantiation (RI)**
Rule instantiation, which is heavily used in input driven inference, allows arbitrarily many minor premises to be matched against arbitrarily deeply embedded subformulas of a rule. It subsumes modus ponens and modus tollens, but can also instantiate generic conditionals. In the unit probability version, with just one minor premise ("fact"), the RI rules are:

\[
\frac{R^+ (\Phi), F^+(\Psi)}{R^\sigma_0 (\neg(F^+ (\bot)))} \quad \frac{R^+ (\Phi), F^+(\Psi)}{F^+_\sigma (R^\sigma_0 (T))}
\]

where \( \sigma \) unifies \( \Phi, \Psi \). \( R \) stands for 'Rule', and \( F \) for 'Fact'. \( T \) and \( \bot \) are truth and falsity respectively. The + and - signs are intended to indicate positive and negative occurrence of the embedded \( \Phi, \Psi \) formulas being unified. Unification is defined in a way that allows substitution for explicitly quantified, "matchable" variables. A variable in a rule or fact is matchable if it is bound by a positively occurring universal quantifier or negatively occurring existential quantifier. The first rule is sound if \( \Psi \) contains no unmatchable free variables which are bound in \( F \) as a whole. The second rule is sound if \( \Phi \) contains no unmatchable free variables which are bound in \( R \) as a whole. So in particular, the first rule is sound if \( F \) contains only constants and top-level universal (hence matchable) variables. The rules work similarly for generic conditionals.

Goal Chaining (GC)

Goal chaining, which dominates goal-driven inference, is a pair of very general chaining rules. Chaining from rule consequents to antecedents is a special case. The following are the GC rules in the unit probability case:

\[
\frac{R^+ (\Phi), ?G^+(\Psi)}{?G^+_\sigma (\neg(R^+ (\bot)))} \quad \frac{R^+ (\Phi), ?G^+(\Psi)}{\neg(R^\sigma_0 (\neg(G^+_\sigma (T))))}
\]

where \( \sigma^0 \) "antiunifies" \( \Phi, \Psi \) (i.e., with positive existentials and negative universals in \( G \) regarded as matchable). \( R \) stands for 'Rule', and \( G \) for 'Goal'. The first rule is sound if \( \Phi \) contains no unmatchable free variables which are bound in \( R \) as a whole. The second rule is sound if \( \Psi \) contains no unmatchable (e.g., top-level universal) variables which are bound in \( G \) as a whole.

The general version of GC allows arbitrarily many subsidiary knowledge base facts to be invoked in the process of chaining from the given goal to a subgoal. There is also another class of goal-directed methods that consists of standard natural deduction rules such as proving a conditional by assuming the antecedent and deriving the consequent, or proving a universal by proving an arbitrary instance of it.

These rules are partially implemented in the EPILOG system [11], a hybrid reasoning system combining efficient storage and access mechanism, forward and backward chaining, agenda-driven control structure, and multiple "specialists" for taxonomies, temporal reasoning, etc.
Computing Episodic Logical Form

A crucial feature of EL with respect to the goal of building general NLU systems is the ease with which EL-representations are derived from surface syntax. The initial translation from phrase structure to the preliminary indexical logical form (LF) is accomplished with GPSG-like syntactic and semantic rules; the final nonindexical episodic logical form (ELF) is obtained by simple recursive deindexing rules. Such a transformation is essential because, to be useful for inference, a situational logic must be nonindexical. Our deindexing algorithm uniformly handles tense, aspect, and many temporal adverbials and their interaction, and brings the context information into the logical form, removing context dependency.

For example, the logical form of sentence

"A mechanic repaired Crack8 yesterday"

is easily computed using the following (somewhat simplified) lexical and phrase structure rules, annotated with corresponding semantic rules.

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{DET}[\text{index}] & \leftarrow a ; \exists \\
N & \leftarrow \text{mechanic} ; \text{mechanic} \\
\text{NP} & \leftarrow \text{DET} \text{N} ; < \text{DET}^0 \text{N}^0 > \\
\text{NP} & \leftarrow \text{Crack8} ; \text{Crack8} \\
\text{VP}[\text{past}] & \leftarrow \text{repaired} ; < \text{past repair} > \\
\text{VP}[\text{trans}] & \leftarrow \text{V} \text{NP} ; (\text{V}^0 \text{NP}^0) \\
\text{ADV}[\text{ep-mod}] & \leftarrow \text{yesterday} ; (\text{during Yesterday}) \\
\text{ADV}[\text{post-mod}] & \leftarrow \text{ADV}[\text{ep-mod}] ; \lambda \text{P} x ((\text{adv-e ADV}^0) [x P]) \\
\text{VP} & \leftarrow \text{VP} \text{ADV}[\text{post-mod}] ; (\text{ADV}^0 \text{VP}^0) \\
\text{S} & \leftarrow \text{NP} \text{VP} ; (\text{NP}^0 \text{VP}^0)
\end{align*}
\]

As mentioned, angle brackets indicate unscoped expressions. Applying these rules gives us the initial, unscoped logical form ULF (a) below, which will then be scoped as LF (b). Yesterday is an indexical term, and past is an indexical sentence operator. After the deindexing step which introduces an episodic variable through tense operator past, we get ELF (c) below (with some simplifications).

(a) \( ((\text{adv-e (during Yesterday)}) [< \exists \text{mechanic}> \text{past repair} \text{Crack8}]) \)

(b) \( (\text{past ((adv-e (during Yesterday))) (\exists x_1:[x_1 \text{mechanic}|x_1 \text{repair Crack8}]))) \)

(c) \( (\exists e_1:[e_1 \text{before Now3}]
\quad (((\text{adv-e (during (date (1993 2 23))))}
\quad \quad [((\exists x_1:[x_1 \text{mechanic}|x_1 \text{repair Crack8}])^* e_1)) \)

The transformation from (b) to (c) is carried out by the tense-aspect deindexing rules of EL that use tense trees as components of discourse contexts. The mechanism is compositional in that operators past, fut, perf, etc., contribute separately and uniformly to the meanings of their operand formulas, driving the generation and traversal of tense trees in deindexing. As an example, we show the Past-rule below.
Past: \((\text{past } \Phi)_\tau \leftrightarrow (\exists \epsilon_\tau: [\epsilon_\tau \text{ before } \text{Embr}_\tau] \land [\text{Last}_\tau, \tau \text{ orients } \epsilon_\tau]) [\Phi \circ \tau \ast \epsilon_\tau])

Tree transform: \(\text{(past } \Phi) \cdot T = -((\Phi \cdot (\circ \setminus T))

\(T\) denotes a tense tree; \(\epsilon_\tau\) a "new" episode symbol. \(\text{Embr}_\tau, \text{Last}_\tau, \vee \setminus T, \setminus \circ T, \text{etc.}\), are easily computed functions on the tense tree \(T\) (see [5, 13] for details). The recursively deindexed \(\Phi\) is taken to characterize the new episode \(\epsilon_\tau\), which is predicated to be before the embedding episode, \(e.g., \) utterance episode. Tense trees also provide the "points of orientation" (cf., [9]), such as the reference point for a perfect episode or the immediately preceding past episode in a succession of simple past-tensed sentences, and the "orients" predication captures this.

By meaning postulates, we can get from (c) the following (skolemizing \(E_7/e_1\)):

- \([E_7 \text{ before } \text{Now}_3]\)
- \([E_7 \text{ during (date 1993 2 23)}]\)
- \([((3x_1: [x_1 \text{ mechanic}] [x_1 \text{ repair Crack8}]) \ast E_7]\)

This shows that the information in the past operator and in the time adverbial ("yesterday") are essentially interpreted conjunctively, much as in Dowty's system [4]. However, Dowty's system is not able to identify orienting episodes, and its final LFs still involve indexical operators like past while our ELFs are completely deindexed.

**Conclusion**

We think there is cause for optimism about the possibility of constructing theoretical and computational frameworks for full NLU. Our own efforts in that direction have led to a rather well-integrated conception of syntax, LF, knowledge representation, context, and inference, and of the interfaces linking these into an organic whole. The conception is not yet complete or fully "debugged," but it is sufficiently far along to have provided a basis for diverse start-up implementations. Unlike most past implemented NLU and inference systems, these implementations strenuously avoid cutting corners in syntax, LF computation, and most of all, knowledge representation and inference. Thus, we have reason to regard the theoretical framework and the implementations as a solid and extensible basis for further work toward the ultimate goal of general NLU.

**References**


Natural Language Semantics and Compiler Technology

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Precis Semantic representation languages (SRLs) and programming languages (PLs) share design goals: first, in both cases we seek modules in which not only conventional surface representations (print form) but also underlying data structures are important. Here we need general tools allowing the printing and reading of expressions. Second, these modules need to cooperate extensively with foreign modules, so that the importance of interface technology (compilation) is paramount; and third, both PL compilers and semantic modules need "inferential" facilities for transforming (simplifying) complex expressions in order to ease subsequent processing.

But the most important parallel is the need in both fields for tools which are useful in combination with a variety of concrete languages—general purpose parsers, printers, simplifiers (transformation facilities) and compilers. This arises in PL technology from (among other things) the need for experimentation in language design, which is again parallel to the case of SRLs.

Using a PL-based approach, we have implemented NLL, a public domain software package for computational natural language semantics. Several interfaces exist for both grammar modules and applications, using a variety of interface technologies, including especially compilation.

1 Introduction: Design Goals

The focus of this paper is the design and implementation of semantic representation languages (SRLs). Given the need of such modules to represent natural language meanings, we assume that they should apply linguistic semantics, the specialized study of natural language meaning. But because of the focus on design and implementation, we examine quite generally the uses to which such modules may be put, abstracting away from details which distinguish such superficially distinct approaches as generalized quantifier theory (GQT), discourse representation theory (DRT), situation theory, or dynamic logic.

The appropriate design for any module can only be determined by close analysis of the uses to which it is to be put. We do not consider applications for semantics in providing test tools for linguistic hypotheses or in adding constraints to recognition tasks ([YHW+89]), because these provide less clear design criteria. But the numerically most important group of applications, that of understanding and generation, give rise to fairly clear requirements. Independent semantics modules are used with these applications for semantic representation, inference, and in order to support meaning-related processing—disambiguation, resolution, and speech act management. The importance of these points
confirms the good sense of current practice in the field—that of viewing the main task of
the semantic module as the implementation of a linguistic semantic theory (with selected
AI enhancements for resolution and disambiguation). But we suggest that insufficient
attention is paid to the following four goals, which we focus on below:

- modularity—indeedence from syntax and application
- modifiability—for experimentation
- interface support—for mapping into and out of module
- support for independent use (reader, printer, tracer)

These prompt us to a comparison to programming language technology and compiler con-
struction.

2 Analogy to Programming Languages

It is axiomatic that modern PLs should meet the last four goals listed in the design goals
for SRLs. Standard introductions ([ASU86]) detail how a programming language syntax
is specified in definitions independent of specific machines and environments (modularity)
which are, moreover, easily modifiable given tools for parsing (parser-generators) and
printing. The parsers automatically created from language specifications take well-formed
strings as input and produce abstract syntax trees (like linguistic parse trees) as output.
Modern tools also provide printers (unparsers) which reverse the process: given an abstract
syntax tree, they produce a print form ([FWI92], 85ff).

Just as a modular SRL must interface to more than one application, a programming lan-
guage needs to be able to run on different machines. In the latter case, this is accomplished
by compiling: the abstract syntax trees produced by the PL’s parser are transformed into
(the abstract syntax trees representing) expressions of another lower-level language (often
a machine-specific assembler language). While it is obvious how this scheme enables gen-
erality vis-à-vis translation targets, it may not be as immediately apparent that the level
of abstract syntax likewise facilitates generality toward translations sources: in the case of
a PL such as C, we not only compile FROM C into various assembler languages on the basis
of transformations of abstract syntax, but we likewise compile other (normally more spe-
cialized languages) INTO C. The SRL correspondence is the use of compiler technology to
translate into SRLs, viz., in syntax/semantics interfaces (in NLU) or application/semantics
interfaces (in generation). Further details below.

Some of the transformations performed by compilers are not simple translations into
target languages, but rather transformations to alternative structures in the source lan-
guage (cf. [ASU86], 592ff), or immediate evaluation of parse structures (cf. “translation
during parsing” [ASU86], 293-301). The use of these techniques suggests an implementa-
tion for some inference facilities for SRLs—those arising from equivalence rules.

Our core thesis: PL technology may profitably be applied to the design of SRL software.
Figure 1 summarizes the points at which immediate borrowings from PL technology seem
apt means to SRL goals. We turn now to a brief description of NCL, an SRL implemented
using PL technology. We then illustrate how SRLs profit from this approach using a con-
crete and fully implemented example.
substantial modifications of the language become interesting. In addition to syntax rules, a set of arguments. Cf. [Ner92] for formal development.

shipping situation. An advantage of identifying arguments via roles rather than positions is found. These specifications are easily modified in case extensions, variations or even NEC is an SRL which borrows heavily from linguistic semantics in order to provide representational adequacy, using, e.g., on the one hand work from generalized quantifier theory and on the other from the logic of plurals. [LN91] and [Ner92] present an overview of NEC and the background linguistic and model-theoretic ideas, which will not be repeated here. For the sake of understanding examples below, we note that atomic formulas in NEC are composed of a predicate together with a set of role-argument pairs, e.g.

\[ \text{`Anterist ships to Hamburg'} \quad \text{ship(source:a goal:h)} \]

The NEC formula may also be read: `a' plays the role of agent and `h' that of goal in some shipping situation. An advantage of identifying arguments via roles rather than positions (as is customary in predicate logic) is that one can sensibly use the same predicate, e.g., `ship', with various numbers of arguments; thus even though something must also play a `theme' role in this situation (what is shipped), it need not be expressed in the role-coded set of arguments. Cf. [Ner92] for formal development.

3.1 Data Structures and Basic Tools

Following the PL lead, we begin with a formal syntactic specification of NEC in a form usable by a parser-generator.1 We use Zebu ([Lau92b]), a public-domain tool in Common LISP.2

Zebu grammar specifications consist of a set of RULES, each of which specifies a SYNTAX for a grammatical category and an ACTION to be taken by the parser when the category is found. These specifications are easily modified in case extensions, variations or even substantial modifications of the language become interesting. In addition to syntax rules,  

---

1We are concentrating here on the more recent NEC implementation; an earlier implementation in REFINES ([LN91]) is no longer the focus of our efforts, even though we continue to maintain it for its usefulness in rapid prototyping. REFINES is a trademark of Reasoning Systems, Palo Alto.

2Zebu was originally developed in Scheme by William Wells.
Zebu grammars may also contain lexical restrictions ([Lau92b],15) needed for generating a lexical analyzer (which, however, is not used in \( \mathcal{NL} \)). From the \( \mathcal{NL} \) grammar, Zebu generates an LALR(1) parser ([ASU86],§ 4), which is the \( \mathcal{NL} \) reader. The reader immediately supports experiments with the semantics module by easing the creation of semantic data structures. The Zebu grammar compilation process detects any inconsistencies or ambiguities in the grammar definition.

Zebu goes beyond the capabilities of parser-generators such as UNIX yacc in further optionally generating (automatically) the definition of a domain, a hierarchy of data structures (LISP structures) for abstract syntax. If this option is chosen, then Zebu defines a structure type for each expression type; the structure for a given expression has as many fields as the expression has subexpressions (e.g., Predicate and Role-Argument-Pairs). On the basis of the domain Zebu then also generates an “unparser”, in this case the \( \mathcal{NL} \) printer (which in turn may be called by the LISP printer).

At this point we have implemented a representational system with thorough dual-access: we may process its elements through manipulations of either surface or abstract syntax. For example, \( \mathcal{NL} \) structures are created either from strings or from constructor functions (and occasionally in a mixture of approaches); similarly, one could specify logical inference rules or operations such as substitution either as a string operation or as an operation on LISP structures (or both). Important processing submodules have been implemented using both surface and abstract levels. We examine these now.

### 3.2 Interfaces and Compilations

As noted in § 1, an important SRL task is communication with a variety of NLP modules, including at least syntax, context (resolution), dialogue management, and application system. How can the PL approach to SRL design support interface construction?

The dual access provided by the PL approach already allows an interesting degree of freedom. For example, the opportunity to create \( \mathcal{NL} \) via constructor functions allows the implementation of a syntax-semantics interface of the sort suggested by [JK90]—in which the syntax/semantics interface is constituted by a set of generic constructor functions attached to syntactic rules (and therefore nonterminal nodes). \( \mathcal{NL} \) has been employed this way in a syntax/semantics interface in an extensive NLP system ([NP87]). This is appropriate when relatively complex structures are created in a series of simple increments. Alternatively, one may invoke the \( \mathcal{NL} \) reader to create \( \mathcal{NL} \), and an interface from the COSMA appointment manager (cf. below) to \( \mathcal{NL} \) (for generation) invokes the reader extensively. This made the single-step creation of complex structures much simpler.

But given the relatively easy access to abstract syntax trees provided by the Zebu reader, the construction of interfaces through genuine compilation (transformation based on abstract syntax) is also feasible. \( \mathcal{NL} \)’s basic scheme of compilation is tree rewriting ([ASU86],572ff). An abstract syntax tree is traversed, and at each node, each of a sequence of rewrite rules is applied. A rewrite rule abstractly takes the form:

\[R \rightarrow L\]

\[R \rightarrow L\]

---

3In the Refine implementation of \( \mathcal{NL} \), rules are also concretely of this form (cf. [Rea90],§§ 3.7.5-3.7.7). In current work we are trying to incorporate abstract specifications of \( \mathcal{NL} \) rewrite rules in the Zebu-based version. In the current implementation, rewrite rules are LISP functions.
A rewrite rule checks whether a meta-syntactic-pattern is satisfied at the current node, and returns the replacement node together with a boolean flag indicating whether the rule has fired: \((\text{replacement-node}, \delta? \text{bool})\). In case we are translating from one abstract syntax to another, then the meta-syntactic-pattern describes a node in the source language, while the replacement node belongs to the translation target language. The traversal routine replaces the current node with the replacement-node in case the rule has fired.

The top-down tree-rewriting algorithm \textsc{Preorder-Transform} inputs a tree \(t\) and a sequence \((r_1 \ldots r_n)\) of rewrite rules. It then traverses the tree in preorder ([AHU83], 78-9), and at each node, attempts to rewrite using each of the rules \(r_i\). If any rule in the sequence fires, then the entire sequence is tried again, until no rules fire. Then the traversal continues, until the leaf nodes of the tree. The algorithm is attractive because it reduces the tree-transformation problem to the specification of transformations on local subtrees.

An analogous \textsc{Postorder-Transform} invokes sequences of rewrite rules in a bottom-up traversal of the abstract syntax tree.

In addition to optimized control routines for tree-transformation \(\mathcal{NLL}\) provides a library of access and manipulation functions (for substitution, construction, simplification) to support the transformation process. [Lau92a] reports on the required transformations for \(\mathcal{NLL}\) compilers to SQL and to the New Wave task language, and [Oep93] presents transformations needed in COSMA, a distributed system for appointment management ([NOeS92]). Cf. Figure 2 for a further example of a compilation to \(\mathcal{NLL}(\mathbb{NLL2FS})\), this time to feature description languages.

Compilation is normally an effective translation technique because it abstracts away from irrelevant details of the concrete syntaxes of target and source languages. It is especially appropriate: (i) when communication between modules is limited (e.g., when modules run on separate machines or in separate processes, so that communication is limited to strings); (ii) when the nature of target data structures is unknown or unspecified; or (iii) when there is minor variability in targets (e.g., different versions of the same programming language or query language).

### 3.3 Inference Rules

In § 3.2 above, we applied rewrite rules of the following form to compilation:

\[
\text{meta-syntactic-pattern} \Rightarrow \text{replacement-node}
\]

where meta-syntactic-pattern describes a source language node, and replacement node a translation target language structure. But we may also formulate rewrite rules where both the metasyntactic pattern and replacement node refer to \(\mathcal{NLL}\) structures, yielding inference rules for \(\mathcal{NLL}\).

For example n-ary conjunctions are normalized according to the following patterns.

- **flatten**
  \[
  \text{AND}\{p \text{ AND}\{q \text{ AND}\{r\}}\} \rightarrow \text{AND}\{p \text{ AND}\{r\}}
  \]

- **identity element**
  \[
  \text{AND}\{p \text{ true}\} \rightarrow \text{AND}\{p\}
  \]

- **constant**
  \[
  \text{AND}\{p \text{ false}\} \rightarrow \text{false}
  \]

- **single element**
  \[
  \text{AND}\{p\} \rightarrow p
  \]
Figure 2: Compiler-based approach to semantics modularity. In order to employ NLL not only in the ASL speech understanding project (cf. Görz 1992) but also in the COSMA dialogue application (cf. Oepen 1993)—involving both different NL parsers and different feature description languages (ASL and UDiNc)—FS2NLL, a compiler from feature structure (fs) languages to NLL was developed. The two fs languages were parsed into the same abstract syntax, which was filtered and transformed into NLL abstract syntax, which is “unparsed” in a final step. A further borrowing from compiler technology, a symbol table, was needed to manage coreferences in the fs language (‘#1,#1’). Diagne and Nerbonne 1992 report on the ASL interface. Several components FS2NLL are useful for reverse translation, and NLL2FS was implemented to provide semantic feedback to parsing and search in the ASL speech understanding system and for generation in the COSMA dialogue system. NLL2FS has just completed implementation.

Of course, as we indicated in § 3.2 above, these are not specified declaratively in the Zebu implementation, but instead implemented as LISP functions. A declarative (and easier to use) specification is the subject of ongoing work. [Lau89] presents many more inferences rules as these were used in a database interface from NLL. There is no further inference mechanism in NLL, so that the inference system is weak. [ENP92] sketches more powerful rewrite systems which proceed from the same basis, perhaps a direction for future work.

3.4 Compiling into NLL

The examples of compilation above all involve compiling FROM NLL into another language; but it is natural to apply the same techniques when translating INTO NLL, and similar advantages accrue here. Compilation is particularly cost-effective when one wishes to construct interfaces to several modules with similar representations. In this case relatively minor modifications in grammar specifications may be all that is required to obtain further interfaces. Cf. Figure 2 for an example in which two feature description languages were compiled into NLL. These were used in different systems with a minimum of system-specific modification.
4 Conclusions and Prospects

In addition to the benefits noted above, the PL approach to SRLs enables relatively easy reverse translations, which are needed between components in dialogue systems, and which are useful in architectures emphasizing component feedback ([G92]). The ability to define interfaces on the basis of strings allows not only the tighter definition of interfaces noted above, but also flexibility in architectures—e.g., no assumptions need to be made about whether SRL modules run in the same address space or even on the same machine as their clients. (It even proves useful for modules in the same LISP image because it eliminates some packaging sensitivities.)

Perhaps the most interesting benefit has come in the ability to implement and therefore compare alternative SRLs relatively easily, and we have been able to conduct practical experiments compiling a language of situation semantics ([GP90], 20)—which incorporates a mechanism for representing indefinites with scope (like DRT) but underspecified quantificational force, into the language of generalized quantifiers (from GQT, cf. [BC81]).

The focus of our current work is the provision of a declarative (and easier) specification for transformation rules, both as a term-rewriting and as a general transformation system.

References


E-theory as a semantic tool for natural language reconstruction and processing

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Much of the reconstruction of NL in logic terms is beyond conventional model-theoretic semantics. Using $\epsilon$-structures and $\epsilon$-logic (first order logic with two binary relations $\epsilon$ and $=$) a much richer model theory can be give. Namely it allows for non-wellfounded sets, the representation of circular phenomena naturally appearing in NL, such as self-application, self-reference, and self-similarity. Using $\epsilon$-structures, model-theoretic semantics can be given to powerful type theoretic disciplines. In this way a uniform description technique using type propositions of the form $\alpha: \lambda$ together with model-theoretic semantics can be established.

The talk introduces the framework of $\epsilon$-theory, discusses the construction of $\lambda$-models, the expressiveness and model-construction of $\epsilon\tau$-logic (first order logic within intensional equality and truth predicates for propositions, formulas are the individual terms), and self-similar models with NLR and NLP applications. Finally, the question is raised to what extent the approach applies to NL.
Belief Revision:  
Applications in NLP  
and  
Formal Properties

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The theory of belief revision is concerned with the following problem: If a given body of information $K$ is given, and $\phi$ is a new piece of knowledge that is in conflict with $K$, how can we change $K$ in order to incorporate $\phi$?

Belief Revision has at least two applications in natural language processing. The most obvious application comes from the need to revise the knowledge base(s) of a natural language system. But Belief Revision may also be used to define the semantics of certain sentences.

Gärdenfors ([Gärdenfors 78], [Gärdenfors 88]) suggests a model where each $K$ is a theory (closed under logical consequence). He then defines the semantics for conditionals through the “Ramsey Test”:

$$A > B \in K \iff B \in K \ast A$$

In [Hansson 89] it is argued that $K$ should rather be a base of a theory. The advantage of using bases are twofold. First, representing and manipulating theory bases is much easier than doing this on logically closed theories. Second, it becomes possible to distinguish between basic and derived beliefs. Take, for instance, the two bases $B_1 = \{a\}$ and $B_2 = \{a, a \lor b\}$. Although these bases are logically equivalent, i.e., they represent the same theory, base revision will usually lead different results. Revising the bases with $\neg a$ will lead to $\{-a\}$ for $B_1$ and to $\{-a, a \lor b\}$ for $B_2$ (under most base revision schemes).

A semantics for counterfactuals based on base revisions was introduced by [Veltman 76] and [Kratzer 79] and is known as Premise Semantics. A premise semantics is based on a premise function $P$, a function which for every possible world $w$ gives a set of propositions (i.e., a base) $P(w)$. In belief revision terminology Premise Semantics can be reformulated in the following way:

$$i \in [A > B] \iff \text{the Simple Base Revision of } P(i) \text{ with } A \text{ implies } B$$

[Ginsberg 86] reinvented this semantics in a syntactic version, but failed to define the acceptance criterions for formulas with embedded counterfactuals.

In natural language processing—and, more generally, in a computational context—base revision seems to be the more reasonable way to model belief revision. First of all, it
seems to be more tractable from a computational point of view. Second, it has the above mentioned advantage that one can represent the difference between basic and derived beliefs. However, it has been argued that belief revision shall be an syntax-independent operation, i.e., not dependent on the syntactic form of the representation of the beliefs [Winslett 88, Katsuno and Mendelzon 89]. It is possible, however, to draw a very tight connection between base revision and theory revision [Nebel 92]. It can be shown that every base revision operation generates a theory revision operation. Further, these theory revision operations satisfy most of the rationality postulates that have been formulated for such operations [Alchourron et al.85, Gärdenfors 88].

As has been argued, base revision is computationally more tractable than theory revision, since we do not have to take into account all derived propositions. Nevertheless, there is the question of how much costs we have to pay. As has been shown [Nebel 92, Eiter and Gottlob 92], even in the propositional case, base revision (in many forms) is more expensive than ordinary propositional derivability. In the general, the problem of solving whether a given proposition is derivable from a revised belief base is complete for $\Pi_2^p$, i.e., it is located on the second level of the polynomial hierarchy. This means that the problem contains two interacting sources of computational complexity, namely, propositional derivability and the problem of finding out whether a proposition is in one (or all) candidate solutions. Hence, special cases that can be solved in polynomial time (assuming $P\neq NP$) can only be obtained if both sources are eliminated, e.g., by restricting the logic to Horn logic and by simplifying the “identification” problem [Nebel 92, Eiter and Gottlob 92].

References


PSYCHOLOGICAL INVESTIGATIONS INTO DEFAULT LOGIC
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I. Introduction

1.1 Background

Default reasoning occurs whenever the evidence available to the reasoner does not guarantee the truth of the conclusion being drawn; that is, does not deductively force the reasoner to draw the conclusion under consideration. ('Force' in the sense of being required to do it if the reasoner is to be logically correct). For example, from the statements 'Linguists typically speak more than three languages' and 'Kim is a linguist', one might draw the conclusion, by default, 'Kim speaks more than three languages'. What is meant by the phrase 'by default' is that we are justified in making this inference because we have no information which would make us doubt that Kim was covered by the generalization concerning linguists or would make us think that Kim was an abnormal linguist in this regard. Of course, the inference is not deductively valid; it is possible that the premises could be true and the conclusion false. So, one is not forced to draw this conclusion in order to be logically correct. Rather, it is a conclusion that we draw "by default"—the type of conclusion we draw in the ordinary world and ordinary circumstances in which we find ourselves.

Formally speaking, the term 'non-monotonic reasoning' refers to argumentation in which one uses certain information (the premises of the argument) to reach a conclusion, but where it is possible that later adding some further information to those very same premises (i.e., adding another premise to the existing premises of the argument) could make one want to retract the original conclusion. (Sometimes this might even make us wish to conclude the opposite of the original conclusion). Symbolically, it is a case of non-monotonic reasoning if one is willing to make the inference \( \{P_1,P_2,...,P_n\} \Rightarrow C \) but is unwilling to make the inference \( \{P_1,P_2,...,P_n,P_{n+1}\} \Rightarrow C \). The catch-phrase of non-monotonic reasoning is "that new information makes one withdraw previously-made inferences without withdrawing any background premises".

It is easily seen that the informal notion of default reasoning manifests a type of non-monotonic reasoning. In the above example, for instance, we concluded that Kim spoke at least three languages. But were we to add to our list of premises the further fact that Kim graduated from NewWave University, which we know has revoked all language requirements, we then would wish to withdraw the earlier conclusion. Thus, default reasoning is a species of non-monotonic reasoning.

1.2: Default Reasoning in Artificial Intelligence

A certain trend in artificial intelligence (AI) has been to investigate the construction of "knowledge bases"—which is envisaged as a type of database, but where there is somehow a lot of common-sense reasoning ability built in. (See Reiter 1987 for a summary). The analogy being pursued by such investigators is with actual human information storage. In humans, not all of our information about the world is stored in an explicit form in our minds; instead much of it is implicit in that it is a consequence of, or follows from, other information which is stored explicitly. And we can "call it up" by performing inferences on what we have explicitly stored. One of the ways we infer these implicit pieces of knowledge is by default reasoning. Most researchers in this area think this is the most pervasive form of reasoning in our everyday life. In AI there are two general schools of thought as to how to characterize formally this default reasoning. (i) Our background information is associated with a "likelihood" parameter and our new conclusions are modulated accordingly. The most common version of this type is to assign our beliefs or information states a "probability", and to draw conclusions in accord with a probabilistic logic. Another version of this type employs "fuzzy logic." (ii) Our background information is characterized as being "typically true", and we draw
conclusions that are treated as 'true', or 'true in the absence of information to the contrary'. The difference between the two versions of default reasoning amounts to whether we explicitly represent our lack of deductive conclusiveness in some quantitative way, always attaching some evaluation to each of our beliefs and propagating evaluations to our newly-drawn conclusions. Method (i) enjoins us to do so; whereas method (ii) instead tells us to treat each belief as qualitatively true but to be prepared to withdraw conclusions in the face of new information.

In the AI literature, drawing conclusions in accordance with method (i) is usually called "uncertain inference", whereas drawing them in accordance with method (ii) is usually called "nonmonotonic reasoning". Uncertain Inference has been quite thoroughly studied in Philosophy, Psychology, and Management Science, both as a theory and as an account of the extent to which people actually follow those inferences claimed to be correct by the theory. The same cannot be said about the qualitative method (ii), nonmonotonic reasoning. Here the theoretical foundations have been investigated mostly in Computer Science, but without a consensus on what is the correct underlying logical structure. Indeed, there is even much doubt as to which inferences ought to be sanctioned and which ought to be disallowed.

1.3: The Non-Monotonic Benchmark Problems

To ameliorate the problem of not knowing which non-monotonic inferences should be considered valid, Lifschitz (1989) published a list of 25 "Nonmonotonic Benchmark Problems" which gave the answers generally accepted by researchers in the area. All future formal accounts of nonmonotonic reasoning were supposed to be able to yield these answers. There are different types of Benchmark Problems in Lifschitz’s list, corresponding to the different areas in which default reasoning is seen as useful to the AI community. In this paper we will report results of our empirical investigation of one group of these problems, the “Basic Default Inference” problems; and will mention some pilot data surrounding a second group of problems, the “Inheritance Inference” problems.

1.4: The Justification of Non-Monotonic Formalisms in AI

Non-monotonic theoreticians believe that it is correct to make default inferences. It is not a mistake on people’s part, nor is it a matter of “having to do something, anything, in the face of insufficient information.” Rather, it is right and proper to make such inferences: not only is this what people in fact do, but it is what people (and computer simulations of them) ought to do.

Indeed, much of the initial motivation for investigating non-monotonic reasoning was to characterize more accurately how people in fact reason. The background idea was that people use their reasoning abilities “to get along in the world” very well; if computers could only emulate people in this regard they too would be able to live up to their promise. Here is a typical quotation from the non-monotonic reasoning literature on this viewpoint:

In everyday life, it seems clear that we, human beings, draw sensible conclusions from what we know and that, on the face of new information, we often have to take back previous conclusions, even when the new information we gathered in no way makes us want to take back our previous assumptions ... It is most probable that intelligent automated systems will have to perform the same kind of (nonmonotonic) inferences.

[Kraus, et al 1990]

The point we wish to emphasize and to which we wish to draw the reader’s attention is this: Despite the acknowledgement by the artificial intelligence community that the goal of developing non-monotonic systems owes its justification to the success that ordinary people have in dealing with default reasoning, there has been no investigation into what sorts of default reasoning ordinary people in fact employ. Instead, artificial intelligence researchers rely on their introspective abilities to determine whether or not their system ought to embody such-and-so inference. And even the 25 Benchmark Problems of Lifschitz were formulated with absolutely no regard to whether ordinary people in fact do reason in the way prescribed! Given the central place that the Benchmark Problems occupy in the field—they are the minimal abilities that any artificial system must embody—it certainly behooves the Cognitive Science community to investigate whether or not non-monotonic reasoning as conceived by the formal non-monotonic reasoning community actually conforms to the promises and goals initially held out for it, especially those promises that it would mirror actual processes that people engage in. Principal to this is the question of the extent to which the non-
monotonic community has accurately characterized "ordinary", "common-sensical" reasoning. After all, the example non-monotonic arguments cited in the literature were all invented ex nihilo by theorists. None of them empirically investigated the extent to which real "ordinary, commonsensical reasoning" agreed with the examples. Yet, it was precisely such an agreement that was the entire raison d'être for the enterprise. We therefore pose the question: Do people actually reason in the manner prescribed by the non-monotonic logic community?

2. Results

In this paper, we present empirical results on the plausible conclusions people actually draw, given a Benchmark problem to solve. According to non-monotonic theories, the existence of, and information about, an exception object for a default rule (an object which does not obey the rule) should have no bearing on conclusions drawn about any other object when using that rule. Our results indicate this is not true for human reasoners: their plausible conclusions are influenced by specificity of information available about exception objects, and how similar an exception is to the object about which they are asked to reason. (A side result of our experiments suggests an "Asimov Effect": people are unwilling to allow robots to draw default conclusions they allow themselves to make.) The inheritance of default properties by some object also seems influenced by the knowledge of other subclasses and their relation to the default property. One interpretation of our findings is that people do not reason about defaults and exceptions as formal rules to be manipulated: they will put themselves in "problem-solving mode" and integrate all the information presented in some way to generate a plausible conclusion. This suggests that it may be difficult to develop robust models of non-monotonic reasoning without some goal-directed component, that in turn determines what kind of information is relevant to the application of a default rule.

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Non-Monotonic Formalisms
for Natural Language Semantics

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Comments welcome.
Non-Monotonic Formalisms for Natural Language Semantics

1. Introduction

I will try to do three things in this paper. First, I want to situate certain problems in natural language semantics with respect to larger trends in logicism, including:

(i) Attempts by positivist philosophers earlier in this century to provide a logical basis for the physical sciences;

(ii) Attempts by linguists and logicians to develop a “natural language ontology” (and, presumably, a logical language that is related to this ontology by formally explicit rules) that would serve as a framework for natural language semantics;

(iii) Attempts in artificial intelligence to formalize common sense knowledge.

Second, I want to propose an extension of Montague's framework, and to illustrate some of its applications in the semantics of words. Third, I'll distinguish between the problem of specifying a phenomenon like natural language semantics (or providing conditions on an adequate solution), and providing an account of the relevant procedures. I'll try to explain briefly why I think that we are a long way from an adequate, unified account of semantics for the purposes of natural language processing.

All of this is actually a tall order. The pressure of trying to fill it given limits of space, and—even more—my present state of ignorance or confusion on many of the central issues will affect the quality of the exposition and the views themselves. But I hope that you will bear with me, since I think that a partially successful and fragmentary attempt at the larger project may convince some members of my audience that the natural language semantics community and the subgroup of the AI community interested in formalizing common sense knowledge have a great deal in common, and much to learn from one another. To a large extent, the rhetorical goal of this paper is to make this message seem plausible and exciting, and to provide semanticists with a number of relevant references from the literature in AI.

2. Logicism

The material in this and the subsequent two sections of this abstract is lifted from [Thomason 91].

Let $X$ be a topic of inquiry. $X$ logicism is the view that $X$ should be presented as an axiomatic theory from which the rest can be deduced by logic. Science logicism is expressed as an ideal in Aristotle's Organon. But Aristotle's logic is far too weak to serve as a means of representing Aristotelian science, and logicism was in effect remained impracticable until the 17th century, when a separation of theoretical science from common sense simplified the task of designing an underlying logic.¹

¹Despite the simplification, of course, a workable formalism did not begin to emerge until the 19th century.
There is a moral here about logicism. X logicism imposes a program: the project of actually presenting X in the required form. But for the project to be feasible, we have to choose a logic that is adequate to the demands of the topic. If a logic must involve explicit formal patterns of valid reasoning, the central problem for X logicism is then to articulate formal patterns that will be adequate for formalizing X.

The fact that very little progress was made for over two millennia on a problem that can be made to seem urgent to anyone who has studied Aristotle indicates the difficulty of finding the right match of topic and formal principles of reasoning. Though some philosophers (Leibniz, for one) saw the problem clearly, the first instance of a full solution is Frege’s choice of mathematical analysis as the topic, and his development of the Begriffsschrift as the logical vehicle. It is a large part of Frege’s achievement to have discovered a choice that yields a logicist project that is neither impossible nor easy.

I will summarize some morals. (1) Successful logicism requires a combination of a formally presented logic and a topic that can be formalized so that its inferences become logical consequences. (2) When logicist projects fail, we may need to seek ways to develop the logic. (3) Logic development can be difficult and protracted.

3. Extensions to the empirical world

The project of extending Frege’s achievement to the empirical sciences has not fared so well. Of course, the mathematical parts of sciences such as physics can be formalized in much the same way as mathematics. Though the metamathematical payoffs of formalization are most apparent in mathematics, they can occasionally be extended to other sciences. But what of the empirical character of sciences like physics? One wants to relate the systems described by these sciences to observations.

Rudolph Carnap’s Aufbau was an explicit and ambitious attempt to extend mathematics logicism to science logicism, by providing a basis for formalizing the empirical sciences. The Aufbau begins by postulating elementary units of subjective experience, and attempts to build the physical world from these primitives in a way that is modeled on the constructions used in Frege’s mathematical logicism.

Carnap believed strongly in progress in philosophy through cooperative research. In this sense, and certainly compared with Frege’s achievement, the Aufbau was a failure. Nelson Goodman, one of the few philosophers who attempted to build on the Aufbau, calls it “a crystallization of much that is widely regarded as worst in 20th century philosophy.”

After the Aufbau, the philosophical development of logicism becomes somewhat fragmented. The reason for this may have been a general recognition, in the relatively small community of philosophers who saw this as a strategically important line of research, that the underlying logic stood in need of fairly drastic revisions.

This fragmentation emerges in Carnap’s later work, as in the research of many other logically minded philosophers. Deciding after the Aufbau to take a more direct, high-
level approach to the physical world, in which it was unnecessary to construct it from phenomenal primitives, Carnap noticed that many observation predicates, used not only in the sciences but in common sense, are "dispositional"—they express expectations about how things will behave under certain conditions. A malleable material will deform under relatively light pressure; a flammable material will burn when heated sufficiently. It is natural to use the word 'if' in defining such predicates; but the "material conditional" of Frege's logic gives incorrect results in formalizing such definitions. Much of [Carnap 36-37] is devoted to presenting and examining this problem.

Rather than devising an extension of Frege's logic capable of solving this problem, Carnap suggests dropping the requirement that these predicates should be explicated by definitions. This relaxation makes it harder to carry out the logicist program, because a natural way of formalizing dispositionals is forfeited. But it also postpones a difficult logical problem, which was not, I think, solved adequately even by later conditional logics in [Stalnaker & Thomason 70] and [Lewis 73]. Such theories do not capture the notion of normality that is built into dispositionals: a more accurate definition of 'flammable', for instance, is 'what will normally burn when heated sufficiently'. Thus, logical constructions that deal with normality offer some hope of a solution to Carnap's problem of defining dispositionals. Such constructions have only become available with the development of nonmonotonic logics.

4. Linguistic logicism

Though work in philosophical logic and its applications continues the logicist tradition to some extent, logicist projects are largely out of fashion in philosophy, and much of the work on projects of this sort is being carried on in other disciplines.

In linguistics, a clear logicist tradition emerged from the work of Richard Montague, who (building to a large extent on Carnap's work in [Carnap 56]) developed a logic he presented as appropriate for philosophy logicism. Montague's extreme logicist position is stated most clearly in a passage in [Montague 69].

It has for fifteen years been possible for at least one philosopher (myself) to maintain that philosophy, at least at this stage in history, has as its proper theoretical framework set theory with individuals and the possible addition of empirical predicates. ... [But] philosophy is always capable of enlarging itself; that is, by metamathematical or model-theoretical means—means available within set theory—one can "justify" a language or theory that transcends set theory, and then proceed to transact a new branch of philosophy within the new language. It is now time to take such a step and to lay the foundations of intensional languages.6

Montague's motivation for expanding his logical framework is the need to relate empirical predicates like 'red' to their nominalizations, like 'redness'. He argued that many such nominalizations denote properties, that terms like 'event', 'obligation', and 'pain' denote

6[Montague 74], pages 156-157.
properties of properties, and that properties should be treated as functions taking possible worlds into extensions. The justification of this logical framework consists in its ability to formalize certain sentences in a way that allows their inferential relations with other sentences to be captured by the underlying logic.

Philosophers other than Montague—not only Frege, but Carnap in [Carnap 56] and Church in [Church 51]—had resorted informally to this methodology. But Montague was the first to see the task of natural language logicism as a formal challenge. By actually formalizing the syntax of a natural language, the relation between the natural language and the logical framework could be made explicit, and systematically tested for accuracy. Montague developed such formalizations of several ambitious fragments of English syntax in several papers, of which [Montague 73] was the most influential.

The impact of this work has been more extensive in linguistics than in philosophy. Formal theories of syntax were well developed in the early 70s, and linguists were used to using semantic arguments to support syntactic conclusions, but there was no theory of semantics to match the informal arguments. “Montague grammar” quickly became a paradigm for some linguists, and Montague’s ideas and methodology have influenced the semantic work of all the subsequent approaches that take formal theories seriously.

As practiced by linguistic semanticists, language logicism would attempt to formalize a logical theory capable of providing translations for natural language sentences so that sentences will entail one another if and only if the translation of the entailing sentence follows logically from the translation of the entailed sentence and a set of “meaning postulates” of the semantic theory. It is usually considered appropriate to provide a model-theoretic account of the primitives that appear in the meaning postulates.

This methodology gives rise naturally to the idea of “natural language metaphysics,” which tries to model the high-level knowledge that is involved in analyzing systematic relations between linguistic expressions. For instance, the pattern relating the transitive verb ‘bend’ to the adjective ‘bendable’ is a common one that is productive not only in English but in many languages. So a system for generating derived lexical meanings should include an operator ABLE that would take the meaning of ‘bend’ into the meaning of ‘bendable’.

To provide a theory of the system of lexical operators and to explain logical interactions (for instance, to derive the relationship between ‘bendable’ and ‘deformable’ from the relationship between ‘bend’ and ‘deform’), it is important to provide a model theory of the lexical operators. So, for instance, this approach to lexical semantics leads naturally to a model-theoretic investigation of ability, a project that is also suggested by a natural train

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7It is hard to explain the lack of philosophical interest in the project. Recent linguistic work in natural language metaphysics is loosely connected to earlier attempts to exploit language as a source of insights into the nature of distinctively human patterns of thought about what might be called the common sense world. I am thinking here of works like [Cassirer 55] and of [Jespersen 65]. Both of these projects grew out of a rich philosophical tradition: Cassirer’s work, in particular, is firmly rooted in the European Kantian tradition. And, of course, there has been much work in the phenomenological tradition—which, however, has been much less formal.

8That the core concept that needs to be clarified here is ability rather than the bare conditional ‘if’ is suggested by cases like ‘drinkable’. ‘This water is drinkable’ doesn’t mean ‘If you drink this water it will have been consumed’. (Of course, ability and the conditional are related in deep ways.) I will return
of thought in logicist AI.\textsuperscript{9}

Theories of natural language meaning that, like Montague's, grew out of theories of mathematical language, are well suited to dealing with quantificational expressions, as in

4.1. Every boy gave two books to some girl.

In practice, despite the original motivation of his theory in the semantics of word formation, Montague devoted most of his attention to the problems of quantification, and its interaction with the intensional and higher-order apparatus of his logical framework.

But those who developed Montague's framework soon turned their attention to these problems, and much of the later research in Montague semantics—especially David Dowty's early work in [Dowty 79] and the work that derives from it—concentrates on semantic problems of word formation, which of course is an important part of lexical semantics.\textsuperscript{10}

5. Formalizing common sense

To a certain extent, the motives of the common sense logicists overlap with Carnap's reasons for the Aufbau. The idea is that the theoretical component of science is only part of the overall scientific project, which involve situating science in the world of experience for purposes of testing and application; see [McCarthy 84] for explicit motivation of this sort. For extended projects in the formalization of common sense reasoning, see [Hobbs & Moore 90] and [Davis 90].

The project of developing a broadly successful logic-based account of semantic interrelationships among the lexical items of a natural language is roughly comparable in scope with the project of developing a high-level theory of common sense knowledge. Linguists are mainly interested in explanations, and computer scientists are (ultimately, at any rate) interested in implementations. But for logicist computer scientists who have followed McCarthy's advice of seeking understanding before implementing, the immediate goals of the linguistic and AI projects are not that different.

And—at the outset at least—the subject matter of the linguistic and the computational enterprise are remarkably similar. The linguistic research motivated by lexical decomposition beginning in [Dowty 79] and the computational research motivated largely by problems in planning (or practical reasoning) both lead naturally to a focus on the problems of representing change, causal notions, and ability.

6. Formalizing nonmonotonic reasoning

briefly to the general problem of ability in Section 7.5, below.

\textsuperscript{9}See, for example, [Thomas et al. 90].

\textsuperscript{10}This emphasis on compositionality in the interpretation of lexical items is similar to the policy that Montague advocated in syntax, and it has a similar effect of shifting attention from representing the content of individual lexical items to operators on types of contents. But this research program seems to require a much deeper investigation of "natural language metaphysics" or "common sense knowledge" than the syntactic program, and one can hope that it will build bridges between the more or less pure logic with which Montague worked and a system that may be more genuinely helpful in applications that involve representation of and reasoning with linguistic meaning.
7. Case studies

I’ll illustrate the use of nonmonotonic formalisms in semantics with several case studies. In these studies, I’m merely trying to motivate the use of a nonmonotonic formalism in the semantics of words, and to suggest how it might be applied to some of the immediate problems that arise in this area. At the date of this version, I have not tried to work out the details. At this point, the abstract will become much more sketchy.

7.1. The -able suffix

The natural way to define ‘x is water-soluble’ is

\[ \text{If } x \text{ were put in some water, then } x \text{ would dissolve in the water.} \]

So at first glance, it may seem that the resources for carrying out the definition that Carnap found problematic will be available in a logic with a subjunctive conditional. But suppose it so happens that if one were to put this salt in some water, it would be this water, and this water is saturated with salt. The fact that the salt would not then dissolve is no reason why the salt should count as not water-soluble. This and other such thought experiments indicate that what is wanted is not the bare subjunctive conditional, but a “conditional normality” of the sort that is used in some nonmonotonic formalisms.\(^\text{13}\)

In a circumscripive framework, normality is obtained by conditions on a number of abnormality predicates, which are then circumscribed, or minimized relative to certain background assumptions, in obtaining models of the nonmonotonic theory. Events are an appropriate locus for organizing these abnormality predicates not only in the case of dissolving, but in many other cases of interest for purposes of lexical decomposition.

It is convenient to think of events as classified by a system of event types, from which abnormalities and other features are inherited. In treating the dissolving example, I will make the following assumptions.

\(^{11}\)See [Thomason 90] for a brief description and application of the combined theory (to discourse, rather than to lexical semantics).

\(^{12}\)See [Lifschitz 89].

\(^{13}\)See [Boutilier 92], [Asher & Morreau 91].
7.i. There is an event type $\phi$ of *put-in events*. Associated with this type (and, by inheritance, with events falling under it) there is a container $\text{container}(\phi)$ and a thing moved $\text{movee}(\phi)$.

7.ii. The event type $\phi$ has a subtype $\phi_1$, in which $\text{container}(\phi)$ is a quantity of water and $\text{movee}(\phi)$ is a quantity of salt. There is an abnormality predicate associated with $\phi_1$.

7.iii. There is an event type $\psi$ of *dissolving events*. I assume that associated with this event type (and, by inheritance, with events falling under it) there is an inception, a body, and a culmination (where the first two are events and the last is a state); also, an associated medium $\text{medium}(\psi)$ and a thing dissolved $\text{dissolvee}(e)$; also an abnormality predicate.

It will follow from general considerations about the event type $\psi$ that if a $\psi$-normal event of this type occurs, its associated culmination state will also occur. (See the remarks below on telicity.)

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14This event type itself has a decompositional analysis, but we can ignore that for purposes of the example.
Given this information about event types, the sort of analysis that I currently favor for dissolving amounts to this.

7.iv. Every φ₁-normal φ₁-event e₁ is also the inception of a φ-event e₂ such that

\[ \text{container}(e₁) = \text{medium}(e₂) \quad \text{and} \quad \text{movee}(e₁) = \text{dissolvee}(e₂). \]

This analysis invokes notions that have come to light in accounting for other phenomena in the analysis of word meaning. I will pass directly to these other phenomena, but will return to the problem of dispositionals briefly later, when I discuss ability.

7.2. Telicity

I am abstracting here away from all problems having to do with time and the progressive, and concentrating on the relation between a telic event and its culminating state.\(^{15}\) The most important feature of the type of telic events is that these events have three associated parts: the inception, the body, and the culmination. The inception is an initiating event. The culmination is the state that normally results. (Since the beginning, the theory of planning has concentrated on features of culminations, since these represent properties of the state that can be assumed to result if the agent performs an action.) The body is the process that normally leads to the culmination; often (as in closing a door or filling a glass), the body will consist of stages in which the goal is progressively achieved.\(^{16}\) We can lay it down as a general default on telic events that the culmination of such an event will occur if its inception and body occurs. In many cases (like dissolving, or filling a glass from a tap, not like filling a glass from a pitcher) the body will also normally occur if the inception occurs. Thus, I am likening unfulfilled telic events to Manx cats—they are objects that belong to a type that normally has a certain part, but that for some ad hoc reason happen to lack this part.

7.3. Agency

Some formalisms of agency in AI involve a separation of events into those that are in an agents' immediate repertoire and those that are not.\(^{17}\) If such a division is adopted for linguistic purposes, we can capture agency—at least, for telic events that normally follow from their inceptions—as follows.

7.v. \(\text{Do}(x, e)\) holds iff the inception \(e^0\) of \(e\) is identical to an immediate action \(e^0\) that is performed by \(x\), provided that the body of \(e^0\) occurs.\(^{18}\)

For example, it follows from this account that in case someone puts a piece of salt in water and it then dissolves in the ordinary way, then this person has also performed the action of dissolving it in water, assuming that putting the salt in water is immediate an immediate action. Moreover, the action of putting the salt in water will be the inception of the dissolving event.

\(^{15}\) It should be clear, though, that I have in mind an account that would relate the truth of a progressive sentence to the occurrence of the body of an event.

\(^{16}\) For ideas that are in some respects similar to these, see [Steedman & Moens 87].

\(^{17}\) See especially [Moore 90].

\(^{18}\) I want to say that the body of a telic event occurs even if it is partial or incomplete.
On this treatment, we dispense with an explicit use of any causal notions in the analysis of agency—though causal notions are certainly implicit if we believe that there is a connection between sequences of events conforming to patterns of normality and causal sequences. Since, despite the contribution of [Shoham 88], an explicit theory of common sense causality is not likely to be easy, I prefer such eliminative accounts. However, I'm not sure if explicit causality can be eliminated in general from the theory of agency.

7.4. Causality

The notion of causality is usually left unanalyzed in linguistic treatments of lexical decomposition. But theories of nonmonotonic reasoning offer some hope of either providing an account of causality in terms of defaults governing sequences of events, or at least of providing systematic relations between such defaults and causality. For the most extended treatment, see [Shoham 88]. This work provides another, independent reason for incorporating a theory of default reasoning in an account of the compositional semantics of words.

7.5. Ability

'This water is drinkable' doesn't mean

7.2. An attempt to drink this water will normally culminate in its being drunk.

Rather, the meaning is

7.3. Normally, one can drink this water.

This, linguistic examples, as well as obvious motivations in AI that relate to the needs of planning, lead to a need for an account of practical ability. I don't think that such an account can be given without an extended background theory of practical reasoning. For that reason, the account that I'll sketch here may seem circular or trivial. The reason (I hope) is that the background hasn't been filled in.

Let's suppose that there is a propositional constant practical_abnormality that is used in practical reasoning to reject alternatives because of utility considerations. That is, if a contemplated practical alternative is shown to lead (perhaps with the aid of defaults) to this constant, the alternative has thereby been shown to one that can be ruled out of consideration. A qualitative account of practical reasoning would have to relate this constant to desires and contingent circumstances.

The definition of practical ability would then be the following, where □ represents temporal necessity.

7.vi. can(ϕ) ↔ ¬□[ϕ → practical_abnormality]

7.6. Artifacts

Many artifacts are defined in terms of their normal uses. This suggests decompositional analyses such as the following example.

7.vii. A fastener is an object x such that, where ϕ is the event type of using x, every ϕ-normal occurrence of an event e of type ϕ is such that purposee is to fasten an object to another object.
8. The problem of reasoning

Many researchers in the area of knowledge representation have advocated a close association between the development of systems of representation and reasoning systems. For many practitioners, this may mean only that attention must be paid to the complexity of some of the algorithms associated with the representations; for others, it may mean that the representations should be deployed in a working system whose performance has been tested in practical terms. On the other hand, John McCarthy, one of the founders of AI and of the field of knowledge representation, seems to have steadfastly maintained a platonic research agenda, according to which we first clarify in logical terms the knowledge that we are trying to build into a reasoning system, without distracting ourselves with heuristics and implementation details.

Since it seems to me that we may not yet have adequate theories in which to describe our goals, and that attention to the design of successful systems is a likely source of good theories, and a good way of ensuring that they will ultimately have some reasonable relation to technology, I am a moderate on this issue.

However, I would not have been able to write this paper without pretending to be a platonist. Natural language semantics is such a large domain that it is very hard to think about it in the general way that linguistics seems to require while maintaining a good relation to some feasible reasoning task. The task of axiomatizing the theories that I have been contemplating in this theory is forbidding, and, if the axiomatization could be carried out, it is hardly likely that it would provide a promising path to any workable implementation.

Perhaps the best hope of closing the gap between theory and technology would be the development of compilers for higher-level planning languages that use the kinds of concepts that we have found useful for lexical decomposition. Some computer scientists are beginning to work in this direction, and compilers have even been written for simple languages of this sort. But this line of research will need a lot of development before we can hope to get much help from it in figuring out how to assign procedural significance to parts of lexical semantics, and at best it is pretty slender at the moment.

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19See [Brachman 90].
20See [Shoham forthcoming].
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THE FRAMEWORK OF UPDATE SEMANTICS

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1. The notion of an update system.

The standard definition of logical validity runs as follows: An argument is valid if its premises cannot all be true without its conclusion being true as well. By far the most logical theories developed so far have taken this definition of validity as their starting point. Consequently, the heart of such theories consists in a specification of truth conditions.

The heart of the theories developed within the framework I want to discuss does not consist of truth conditions but of update conditions. Within the framework of update semantics the slogan ‘You know the meaning of a sentence if you know the conditions under which it is true’ is replaced by this one: ‘You know the meaning of a sentence if you know the change it brings about in the information state of anyone who accepts the news conveyed by it’. Thus, meaning becomes a dynamic notion: the meaning \([\phi]\) of a sentence \(\phi\) is an operation on information states.

Let \(\sigma\) be an information state and \(\phi\) a sentence with meaning \([\phi]\). We write \(\sigma[\phi]\) for the information state that results when \(\sigma\) is updated with \(\phi\). In most cases \(\sigma[\phi]\) will be different from \(\sigma\), but every now and then it may happen that \(\sigma[\phi] = \sigma\). Then the information conveyed by \(\phi\) is already subsumed by \(\sigma\); if \(\sigma\) is updated with \(\phi\), the resulting information state turns out to be \(\sigma\) again. In such a case, i.e. when \(\sigma[\phi] = \sigma\), we write \(\sigma^a \phi\) and say that \(\phi\) is accepted in \(\sigma\). To specify an update semantics for a given language \(L\), one has to specify a set \(\Sigma\) of relevant (information) states, and a function \([\ ]\) that assigns some state \(\sigma[\phi]\) to each sentence \(\phi\) of \(L\) and each state \(\sigma\) in \(\Sigma\). Any such triple \(<L, \Sigma, [\ ]>\) will be called an update system.

DEFINITION
(i) Let \(<L, \Sigma, [\ ]>\) be an update system, and let \(\sigma, \tau \in \Sigma\). Then \(\sigma \leq \tau\) iff \(\sigma = \tau\) or there are \(\phi_1, ..., \phi_n\) in \(L\) such that \(\tau = \sigma[\phi_1]...[\phi_n]\). Whenever \(\sigma \leq \tau\), we say that \(\tau\) is accessible from \(\sigma\).
(ii) An update system \(<L, \Sigma, [\ ]>\) is expressively complete iff there exists a state \(0 \in \Sigma\), the minimal state, such that \(0 \leq \sigma\) for every state \(\sigma\).

Below, we will restrict our attention to systems that are expressively complete in the sense of (ii). (Assuming that there is such a thing as a minimal information state this seems a sensible thing to do. We are not interested in information states per se, we are interested in the impact that language
There are several global constraints one might want to put on update systems. For one thing, one might wonder whether the operation $\phi$ will always be total. In general the answer is no. It is not difficult to think of a situation in which for a given $\phi$ and a given information state $\sigma$, $\sigma [\phi]$ will be undefined. Take the case of a pronoun desperately looking for a referent:

‘He is just joking’

If it is not clear to whom the speaker is referring, the addressee will not know what to do with this statement. Or take the case of presupposition. As is shown in Beaver (1991), the framework of update semantics offers a natural explanation of the notion of this notion:

$\phi$ presupposes $\psi$ iff for every state $\sigma$, $\sigma [\phi]$ is defined only if $\sigma \models \psi$.

Another constraint that does not generally hold, is this:

**Idempotence**: For any state $\sigma$ and sentence $\phi$, $\sigma [\phi] = \phi$

At first sight this principle goes without saying — what would ‘updating your information with $\phi$’ mean if not at least ‘changing your information in such a manner that you come to accept $\phi$’? Still, there are sentences of natural language for which the Principle of Idempotence is questionable. Here paradoxical sentences like ‘This sentence is false’ are a point in case. As is shown in Groeneveld [to appear] shows there is no such thing as a successful update with the Liar, and that is where its paradoxality resides.

A third principle worth looking at is the Principle of Permutation:

**Permutation**: $\sigma [\phi] [\psi] = \sigma [\psi] [\phi]$

Here, too, it is not difficult to find counterexamples. The clearest ones are provided by sentences in which modal qualifications like ‘presumably’, ‘probably’, ‘must’, ‘may’ or ‘might’ occur. Consider:

— Somebody is knocking at the door... Presumably, it’s John... It’s Mary.

— Somebody is knocking at the door... It’s Mary... Presumably, it’s John.

These two sequences consist of the same sentences. Only the order differs. Nevertheless processing the first sequence does not cause any problems, but processing the second sequence does. Explanation: it is quite normal for one’s expectations to be overruled by the facts — that is what is going on in the first sequence. But if you already know something, it is a bit silly to pretend that you still expect something else, which is what is going on in the second.

One of the advantages of the dynamic approach is that these differences can be accounted for. The set-up enables us to deal with sequences of sentences, whole texts. Let $\phi_1 = ‘Somebody is knocking at the door’, \phi_2 = ‘Presumably, it’s John’, and $\phi_3 = ‘It’s Mary’. If we want, we can compare $\sigma [\phi_1] [\phi_2] [\phi_3]$ with $\sigma [\phi_1] [\phi_3] [\phi_2]$ for any information state $\sigma$, and see if there are any differences.
The phrase update semantics is a bit misleading. 'Updating your information state with δ' suggests that what you have to do is to just add the informational content of δ to the information you already have. But, as the next proposition shows, this picture only holds as long we are dealing with a system in which [ ] is idempotent and permutation invariant.

**DEFINITION**
An expressively complete update system < L, Σ, [ ] > is additive iff there exist a binary operation + on Σ, and a function "" which assigns to every sentence φ of L a state "φ' in Σ such that the following holds:

(i) the operation + has all the properties of a 'join' operation:
   \[
   \begin{align*}
   ϵ + σ &= σ \\
   σ + σ &= σ \\
   σ + τ &= τ + σ \\
   (p + σ) + τ &= p + (σ + τ)
   \end{align*}
   \]

(ii) for every sentence φ and state σ, σ [φ] = σ + "φ'

**PROPOSITION**
An expressively complete system < L, Σ, [ ] > is additive iff the principles of Idempotence and Permutation hold.

As soon as we are dealing with an additive system, the dynamic approach has little to offer over and above the static approach. In such a case one can just as well associate with every sentence φ of L a basic, static meaning — ϵ [φ], standing for the information contained in φ — and define the dynamic notion in terms of it. Only if one interested in describing phenomena for which Idempotence or Permutation do not hold, one has to go dynamic.

3. Notions of validity

Various explications of logical validity suggest themselves:

- An argument is valid1 iff updating the minimal information state 'ϵ' with the premises ψ₁, ..., ψₙ in that order, yields an information state σ in which the conclusion φ is accepted. Formally:

  \[
  ψ₁, ..., ψₙ \models φ \iff ϵ [ψ₁]...[ψₙ] ϵ φ.
  \]

- An argument is valid2 iff updating any information state σ with the premises ψ₁, ..., ψₙ in that order, yields an information state in which the conclusion φ is accepted. Formally:

  \[
  ψ₁, ..., ψₙ \models φ \iff \text{for every } σ, σ [ψ₁]...[ψₙ] ϵ φ.
  \]
• An argument is valid$_3$ if one cannot accept all its premises without having to accept the conclusion as well. More formally:

$$
\psi_1, \ldots, \psi_n \not\models \phi \iff \sigma^\# \phi \text{ for every } \sigma \text{ such that } \sigma^\# \psi_1, \ldots, \sigma^\# \psi_n
$$

PROPOSITION
In any expressively complete update system the next two statements are equivalent.
(i) The principles of Idempotence and Permutation hold.
(ii) $$\psi_1, \ldots, \psi_n \not\models \phi \iff \psi_1, \ldots, \psi_n \not\models \phi \iff \psi_1, \ldots, \psi_n \not\models \phi.$$ 

In the absence of Permutation the three explications of validity will give rise to different logics. And all three have their use as is argued in Veltman[to appear]. The third notion of validity is monotonic. If an argument with premises $\psi_1, \ldots, \psi_n$ and conclusion $\phi$ is valid$_3$, then it remains valid$_3$ if you add more premises to $\psi_1, \ldots, \psi_n$. The second notion will be non-monotonic. Note however that the second notion is at least left-monotonic:

If $\psi_1, \ldots, \psi_n \not\models \phi$, then $\chi, \psi_1, \ldots, \psi_n \not\models \phi$.  

What fails is right-monotonicity:

If $\psi_1, \ldots, \psi_n \not\models \phi$, then $\psi_1, \ldots, \psi_n, \chi \not\models \phi$.

The first notion is neither right nor left-monotonic. But it is easy to verify that it conforms to the following principle of Cautious Monotonicity:

If $\psi_1, \ldots, \psi_n \not\models \phi$ and $\psi_1, \ldots, \psi_n, \phi, \theta_1, \ldots, \theta_k \not\models \chi$, then $\psi_1, \ldots, \psi_n, \phi \not\models \chi$.

Moreover, it complies with the following version of the principle of Cut Elimination, which we shall call Cautious Cut:

If $\psi_1, \ldots, \psi_n \not\models \phi$ and $\psi_1, \ldots, \psi_n, \phi, \theta_1, \ldots, \theta_k \not\models \chi$, then $\psi_1, \ldots, \psi_n, \psi_1, \ldots, \psi_n, \not\models \chi$.

Given the principle of idempotence, we also find that this notion of validity is Reflexive.

$$\psi_1, \ldots, \psi_n, \phi \not\models \phi$$

PROPOSITION
(i) Let $\not\models$ be any consequence relation for which the three principles mentioned above hold. Then there is an expressively complete update system in which the principle of Idempotence holds such that $\psi_1, \ldots, \psi_n \not\models \phi$ iff $\psi_1, \ldots, \psi_n \not\models \phi$.

(ii) Let $\not\models$ be any consequence relation for which in addition to the three principles mentioned above is left-monotonic. Then there is an expressively complete update system in which the principle of Idempotence holds such that $\psi_1, \ldots, \psi_n \not\models \phi$ iff $\psi_1, \ldots, \psi_n \not\models \phi$.

In other words, the principles mentioned completely characterize the dynamic notions of validity.
References
Update Semantics and Discourse Grammar
Abstract

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The starting point of this talk is the version of Discourse Grammar developed by Pruest and Schäfer in recent years from the older proposals of Schäfer and Polanyi and the question what the relationship is between this kind of grammar and the developing account of pragmatics by means of update semantics and other dynamical approaches to interpretation.

I will set out by presenting a brief introduction to both topics and will continue by an attempt to integrate these two theories.

1 Discourse Grammar and the MSCD

In the theory of Pruest, VP-ellipsis and important subcases of anaphora are treated by means of the construction of the MSCD. If we have two clauses (or longer constructions) the MSCD is the maximal structure that combines all the information that is available in one of the two structures where the information is compatible and takes the generalisation where they are not compatible. The following is a definition for prolog terms.

1. \( \text{MSCD}(A, B) = C \) if \( C \) is the unification of \( A \) and \( B \)

2. \( \text{MSCD}(r(A_1, ..., A_k), r(B_1, ..., B_k)) = r(\text{MSCD}(A_1, B_1), ..., \text{MSCD}(A_n, B_n)) \) otherwise

3. \( \text{MSCD}(A, B) \) is an anonymous variable if neither 1 nor 2 apply.

Under the natural assumption of assigning a variable — but possibly typed — meaning to pronouns and omitted constituents, this notion allows us to treat simple cases of anaphora and ellipsis, by unifying the second of two clauses with the MSCD obtained from the two clauses:
The functor $p$ represents here various predication predicates.

Pruest generalises this too simple treatment to more complicated cases by developing a theory of structured semantic representations. Moreover, the knowledge which makes clauses submit to this process is guided by discourse grammar rules. Therefore, successful resolution or MSCDing in turn guides the parsing and interpretation process for discourses.

Nevertheless, the process fails to deal with important cases of anaphora as it stands. Notably, anaphora within the same clause cannot be treated and the theory gives up on anaphorical patterns where parallelism does not directly apply, such as contrast and elaboration. Thus the theory only applies to list structures, although in practice for many cases of elaboration and contrast the right predictions are obtained. Another feature that is not adequately dealt with are anaphorical processes where parallelism does apply, but where the reference of pronoun and antecedent are not the same. Such cases are found in temporal reference and by certain uses of definites.

Next to the considerable empirical coverage of VP-ellipsis achieved by Pruest an additional advantage is the explanation of parallelism in pronoun resolution. It is the only (partial) account of pronoun resolution that makes parallelism a starting point rather than a heuristic technique. Nevertheless, the computation of MSCDs stands itself in need of further explanation. A first explanation can be sought in perceptual psychology and particularly in the observed impossibility of not remarking similarities in two perceptual inputs that are offered in one after the other. Though important there is another explanation strategy here — not necessarily inconsistent with the psychological one— where MSCDs are explained in terms of information strategy. This view interprets the MSCD as the topic of the two sentences.

\section{Topics}

I will follow Van Kuppevelt 1991 in the assumption that all topics are questions. Sometimes in the course of a dialogue the topic is explicitly set by a question, more frequently the first assertion on a topic both sets an implicit question and answers it by new information. (This can be either the theme of the utterance or its focus. In the following I will equivocate over
themes and foci). This view has slightly more empirical bite as topics may derive from other sources than a process of comparing two sentences. It are these extra constraints that will be exploited below to give an improved, but still partial—account of anaphora. If we can think of an MSCD as being given externally and not as fully determined by formal relationships between clauses we also lose a correct feature of Pruest’s theory. It does no longer follow that the topic is the maximal common denominator. This is a problem which we can only deal with by stipulation in the current context. It would appear that discourse is like language in general and that we always assume the strongest interpretation. Intonational facts may of course help us out.

The two extra constraints that I am interested in are the following. In the first place, a chunk of discourse may be the reply to a question. In that case the topic can identical to the question (in a suitable format) and the question may fill in gaps and pronoun antecedents. As is well known, questions are not always literally replied to. The answer may go beyond what was actually asked by formally being the reply to a stronger question. Also a question may be underanswered. If we would apply the method of MSCDs here, we get in the first case a topic that is partially answered by an answer to the literal question. In the second case, we get a topic that is a subquestion of the question that was asked. So in this case we get a question that has a formal relationship to the question that was put. This relationship is easily describable in terms of a unification like ordering over questions.

The second constraint that seems important has to do with elaborations. Elaborations typically break parallelism in the resolution of pronouns but typically in a minimal way: as much remains parallel as can remain so. In fact, Pruest’s thesis contains a number of cases where MSCDs do fine in dealing with anaphora over elaborations. The point here is that the topic of elaborations is closely related to the content of the element that is elaborated. Elaborations either specify participants or adjuncts of that element or they further specify the kernel event of the utterance. The following table offers some possible questions after an assertion that could be the topic of an elaboration.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Bill hit Suzy</th>
<th>He got angry/She called him a liar.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Why did Bill hit Suzy</td>
<td>He is Suzy’s former boyfriend.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Who is Bill</td>
<td>She is my neighbour’s daughter.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Who is Suzy</td>
<td>With a newspaper.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>With what?</td>
<td>At 4/ When she called him a liar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>When?</td>
<td>In the kitchen./ On the head.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Where?</td>
<td>She came into the room. He had a newspaper and hit her on head.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How did it happen?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Specific answering strategies are sometimes responsible for more specific questions. Again we are in a position to say that the topic of an elaboration must bear a relationship to the element that it elaborates. The process of proving that it has will attach a discourse relation as well as antecedents to the elaboration.
So far we have seen relationships where there is formal content. The closest is between a question and its direct answer. A weaker relationship is found with topic specialisation and generalisation. Still weaker is the formal relationship in elaborations. No formal content at all remains when we are dealing with contrastive relationship. The reason for this is obvious. In a concessive statement we concede an element of which the truth is expected to be contradicted by the truth of the assertion we are currently making. What this statement is depends not on the form of the assertion but on the content of the system of beliefs and expectations. Formal relationships may be present or absent depending on the concession made and the reasoning that establishes a link between the conceded element and the statement that prompts its concession.

3 Updating with questions.

An assertion is processed by updating its contribution to the information state that is updated by means of the question. The assertion update is then not so much the update with its logical content as the update with the unification of the question and the content of the answer. (A refinement allows for undoing the question update in the case of negative answers like No to a WH-question or I do not know to an arbitrary question.) The unification to which the answers are submitted resolves pronouns and VP-ellipsis and is responsible for exhaustification effects such as Evans’ E-type readings and scalar implicatures.

Within the framework of a discourse grammar, this complex update procedure involves a number of constraints.

a. The topic must be unifiable with the discourse element which the discourse grammar tries to integrate into the parse.

b. For elaborations the elaboration topic must be a question that arises from the element from which the elaboration starts.

c. Before any element, its topic must be a proper question on the information state. This means that the information state allows two alternative answers and that the information state satisfies the question presupposition if the question has one.

d. After the element, it must have ceased to be a proper question. This means that the question is now answered completely.

For the purposes at hand, WH-questions will be formalised as open formulae to which a question operator is attached. A question update then does supply or rather construct some information. It supplies a pointer to the answer. As this is a new pointer, the information state will be restricted to those values of the pointer that are true and exhaustive with respect to the index at hand. The truth derives from the standard interpretation of variables, exhaustivity is due to the question operator.

Properly answering a question is asserting the identity between the question variable (or the question as such) and its answer.
4 The Question Ordering

Having open formulas as the interpretation of questions entails having a partial order over questions, which is in essence the unification order.

Who does what?
Who does sleep?
Which boy sleeps?
Does Bill sleep?

Logically, the order is a specialisation of the relation between questions: whenever $A$ answers $x$, $A$ answers $y$.

The order can be exploited for redefining answers to a question $x$: answering $x$ equals answering each of the questions $x_i$. What we want is some constraint $x = \text{sum}(X)$, with $x$ a question and $X$ a set of questions. For this to be true, it must hold that every $y \in X$ is a subquestion of $x$ (a formal constraint) and that the reference of the WH-variables in $x$, obtained after the update, is the sum of the references of the corresponding elements in the subquestions with respect to the information state at hand.

What did Bill do last Friday.

He went out.
He had a few beers.
He saw a film.
He came home at midnight.

Who sleeps

John sleeps.
Bill sleeps.
Harry sleeps.

5 A Grammar

I am assuming a syntax for basic clauses, which analyses them as feature structures with slots info-in, info-out, syntax and phonology. A clause is enriched to be a dcu by having slots for topic (value as for clause). In the syntax we incorporate indexes into elements of the evolving information state.

There are constraints here that the topic subsumes the clause slot after the clause slot is unified with a copy of the topic, that the topic holds exhaustively over info-in, and that
info-in does not equal info-out. (This latter constraint can be stated alternatively as the
requirement that the question is not answered already by info-in).

The discourse grammar rules are now there to make larger dcus out of the basic ones. We
have two constructions.

A. A list construction that adds to the semantics of each of the elements the
statement that the union of the topics equals the topic.

B. An elaboration construction that sets up a topic in a way constrained by
the topic of the element on which elaboration takes place.

LIST:phon = [DCU:phon,CONT:phon]
DCU:topic := LIST:topic
CONT:topic = LIST:topic
DCU:info-out = CONT:info-in
LIST:info-out = CONT:info-out
question(LIST:topic,LIST:info-in)
answered(LIST:topic,LIST:info-out)

CONT = REST or VOID

REST:phon= [DCU:phon, CONT:phon]
DCU:info-in = REST:info-in
DCU:topic := REST:topic
CONT:topic = LIST:topic
DCU:info-out = CONT:info-in
LIST:info-out = CONT:info-out

ELAB:phon = [DCU:phon,LIST:phon]
ELAB:topic = DCU:topic
question-about(LIST:topic,DCU:topic)

VOID:phon = []
VOID:info-in=VOID:info-out

ELEM:syntax:= ELEM:topic
ELEM:syntax:info-in = ELEM:info-in[ELEM:topic]
question(ELEM:topic,ELEM:info-in),
answered(ELEM:topic,ELEM:info-out)

Next to normal unification, we require one-way unification :=
Constraints

\text{question}(\text{QUESTION}, \text{INFOSTATE})

is the negation of

\text{answered}(\text{QUESTION}, \text{INFOSTATE})

A question is a syntactic-semantic representation of a question. A question is answered on an information state intuitively expresses that the information state already has an answer to the question. It depends on the nature of the information state (database, set of possible worlds, partial model) how this relation is to be defined. In standard update semantics, the following definition is a possible one: the question update is proper and limits the information state to elements which are determinate for the value of the WH-variables.

\text{answered}(\text{QUESTION}, \text{INFOSTATE})

The other constraint

\text{question-about}(\text{ASSERTION}, \text{QUESTION})

is of an entirely different nature and it is not clear that semantics is involved. It concerns the focus of the ASSERTION. The elements there are new and involve new referents. Concerning each of the referents (including the event marker) questions of identity can be put which in the case of eventmarkers can be questions with respect to cause and effect.

6 Appendix: the question update

The logical form of a question will be here that of a DRS within a question operator \( q(\varphi) \), with discourse markers associated to \( \varphi \). Updates proceed in a number of steps. \( q \) builds a copy of the current information state and computes the exhaustive reading for the discourse markers of \( \varphi \). On the copy \( \varphi \) is true and the reference of the discourse markers are maximal. A refusal to answer deletes the copy, a denial subtracts the closure of the updated copy from the original and a positive reply intersects the original with the updated copy after a further update with the answer.

The basic information carriers are possible worlds. For these purposes it is practical to see variables as constants (with just a formal distinction). Ontological operations (set formation or mereology) are characterised by a set of axioms which each world meets. Also we assume that the domains of the objects are taken from a common set.

Two worlds can be variants of each other with respect to a set of variables: all the values they assign are the same except for the values they assign to the variables in the set. Similarly worlds can be object-identical by assigning precisely the same values to all constants.
and variables (they can still differ in what is the case in these worlds). Finally worlds can be object-identical but for the value of a set of variables.

In terms of these relations and normal updates, it is possible to define the notion of a question update and the relation of a question being unanswered over a given information state.

A world \( w \) is exhaustive within a set of worlds \( W \) with respect to a set of variables \( X \) iff \( \forall w^0 \in W \forall w^0 \in W (w = x w^0 \land \text{objectidentical}(w, w^0)) \rightarrow (\exists w^0 \in W \text{objectidentical}(w^0, w^0) \land w^0 = x w^0) \)

A question update for a question \( q(\varphi) \) with discourse markers \( DM \) is then the set of exhaustive worlds in \( \sigma[\varphi] \) with respect to \( DM \).

References:


The common theme of the morning talks was non-monotonic reasoning and semantic formalisms. Various versions of non-monotonic reasoning have been developed over the last decade to facilitate knowledge representation tasks, but it also has became obvious that such techniques will be crucial for the semantic representation of a wide range of NL constructions (generic sentences, conditionals, and aspectual information, to name just a few). Beyond the sentence level, non-monotonic reasoning is needed in discourse semantics (especially to establish coherence relations).

Rich Thomason (Pittsburgh) gave a talk about "Non-monotonic formalisms for NL semantics", using his network representation containing "defeasible arrows". He discussed various applications, among others lexical semantics and in particular thematic role assignment (e.g., a transitive verb will have an agent/patient structure by default). Then he sketched the development of non-monotonic logics as an attempt to specify the underlying logic in informal reasoning systems as developed within AI. He stressed that it will be an important task to uncover the "NL metaphysics", and that non-monotonic rules will be essential to describe it (for example, that telic events typically, but not always have a culmination point). In the discussion, Bob Moore suggested to treat the well-known problem of the proper fine-grainedness of propositions in belief contexts by non-monotonic inferencing.

Espen Vestre and Bernd Nebel (Saarbruecken) talked about "Belief revision methods in NL semantics". Vestre discussed the relation between belief revision and the semantics of conditionals, following Gaerdenfors, showing that the simple possible world representation of beliefs runs into problems with examples like Hansson's "Man with the hamburger", and pointed out that the crucial problem is updating a knowledge state with a conditional. Nebel proposed to represent beliefs by finite sets of sentences (so-called bases), not possible worlds or deductively closed sets, and proposed a way to revise such bases with simple sentences and conditionals. The discussion centered on the distinction of indicative and counterfactual conditionals and on how to make sense of the intuitive notion of various degrees of epistemic entrenchment of belief contents.

Jeff Pelletier (Alberta), in his talk "Psychologically oriented studies in belief revision", argued that the study of non-monotonic reasoning differs from traditional branches of logic, as it is motivated by the actual reasoning of people. Hence it should be regarded as a psychological enterprise. He presented a series of experiments designed to test whether
Lifschitz's "benchmark tests" for nonmonotonic formalisms actually predict the behavior of persons, reported on a number of differences, and traced these effects back to possible factors. For example, it seemed to matter whether exceptions have been explicitly mentioned and whether they show an essential similarity to the object about which a conclusion should be drawn. In the discussion, David Dowty questioned the design of the experiments, as it did not take into account possible effects arising through conversational implicatures (e.g., mentioning a related exceptional case implicates that the case in question is also an exception). Frank Veltman contended that although psychological research may be very valuable, nonmonotonic reasoning should still be considered a branch of pure logic, as people can convince themselves that certain inference patterns are problematic.
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