Hedonic Games and Treewidth Revisited

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Abstract

We revisit the complexity of the well-studied notion of Additively Separable Hedonic Games (ASHGs). Such games model a basic clustering or coalition formation scenario in which selfish agents are represented by the vertices of an edge-weighted digraph $G = (V, E)$, and the weight of an arc uv denotes the utility u gains by being in the same coalition as v. We focus on (arguably) the most basic stability question about such a game: given a graph, does a Nash stable solution exist and can we find it efficiently?

We study the (parameterized) complexity of ASHG stability when the underlying graph has treewidth t and maximum degree Δ. The current best FPT algorithm for this case was claimed by Peters [AAAI 2016], with time complexity roughly $2^{O(\Delta^5 t)}$. We present an algorithm with parameter dependence $(\Delta t)^{O(\Delta t)}$, significantly improving upon the parameter dependence on Δ given by Peters, albeit with a slightly worse dependence on t. Our main result is that this slight performance deterioration with respect to t is actually completely justified: we observe that the previously claimed algorithm is incorrect, and that in fact no algorithm can achieve dependence $t^{o(t)}$ for bounded-degree graphs, unless the ETH fails. This, together with corresponding bounds we provide on the dependence on Δ and the joint parameter establishes that our algorithm is essentially optimal for both parameters, under the ETH.

We then revisit the parameterization by treewidth alone and resolve a question also posed by Peters by showing that Nash Stability remains strongly NP-hard on stars under additive preferences. Nevertheless, we also discover an island of mild tractability: we show that Connected Nash Stability is solvable in pseudo-polynomial time for constant t, though with an XP dependence on t which, as we establish, cannot be avoided.

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1 Introduction

Coalition formation is a topic of central importance in computational social choice and in the mathematical social sciences in general. The goal of its study is to understand how groups of selfish agents are likely to partition themselves into teams or clusters, depending on their preferences. The most well-studied case of coalition formation are *hedonic games*, which have the distinguishing characteristic that each agent's utility only depends on the coalition on which she is placed (and not on the coalitions of other players). Hedonic games

Table 1 Summary of results. t, p, Δ, W denote the treewidth, pathwidth, maximum degree, and maximum absolute weight. Results denoted by (G) apply to general (possibly disconnected) Nash Stability, and by (C) to Connected Nash Stability.

Parameter	Algorithms	Lower Bounds
t, p	$(nW)^{O(t^2)}$ (C) (Theorem 11)	Strongly NP-hard for Stars (G) (Theorem 9) No $f(p) \cdot n^{o(p/\log p)}$ (C) (Theorem 12)
$t, p + \Delta$	$(\Delta t)^{O(\Delta t)} (n + \log W)^{O(1)}$ (G) (Theorem 4)	No $(p\Delta)^{o(p\Delta)}(nW)^{O(1)}$ (G) (Theorem 5) No $\Delta^{o(\Delta)}(nW)^{O(1)}$ if $p = O(1)$ (G) (Corollary 6) No $p^{o(p)}n^{O(1)}$ if $\Delta, W = O(1)$ (Theorem 7) (G,C)

have recently been an object of intense study also from the computer science perspective [1, 2, 6, 7, 9, 10, 12, 19, 27, 33, 40], due in part to their numerous applications in, among others, social network analysis [34], scheduling group activities [15], and allocating tasks to wireless agents [39]. For more information we refer the reader to [13] and the relevant chapters of standard computational social choice textbooks [4].

Hedonic games are extremely general and capture many interesting scenarios in algorithmic game theory and computational social choice. Unfortunately, this generality implies that most interesting questions about such games are computationally hard; indeed, even encoding the preferences of agents generally takes exponential space. This has motivated the study of natural succinctly representable versions of hedonic games. In this paper, we focus on one of the most widely-studied such models called Additively-Separable Hedonic Games (ASHG). In this setting the interactions between agents are given by an edge-weighted directed graph $G = (V, E)$, where the weight of an arc $uv \in E$ denotes the utility that u gains by being placed in the same coalition as v. Thus, vertices which are not connected by an arc are considered to be indifferent to each other. Given a partition into coalitions, the utility of a player v is defined as the sum of the weights of out-going arcs from v to its own coalition.

A rich literature exists studying various questions about ASHGs, including a large spectrum of stability concepts and social welfare maximization [3, 5, 17, 20, 23, 34, 35, 41]. In this paper we focus on perhaps the most basic notion of stability one may consider. We say that a configuration π is *Nash Stable* if no agent v can unilaterally strictly increase her utility by selecting a different coalition of π or by forming a singleton coalition. The algorithmic question that we are interested in studying is the following: given an ASHG, does a Nash Stable partition exist? Even though other notions of stability exist (notably when deviating players are allowed to collaborate [11, 16, 37, 42]), fully understanding the complexity of Nash Stability is of particular importance, because of the fundamental nature of this notion.

Nash Stability of ASHGs has been thoroughly studied and is, unfortunately, NP-complete. We therefore adopt a parameterized point of view and investigate whether some desirable structure of the input can render the problem tractable. We consider two of the most well-studied graph parameters: the treewidth t and the maximum degree Δ of the underlying graph. The study of ASHGs in this light was previously taken up by Peters [36] and the goal of our paper is to improve and clarify the state of the art given by this previous work.

Summary of Results. Our results can be divided into two parts (see Table 1 for a summary). In the first part of the paper we parameterize the problem by $t + \Delta$, that is, we study its complexity for graphs that have simultaneously low treewidth and low maximum degree.

The study of hedonic games on such graphs was initiated by Peters [36], who already considered a wide variety of algorithmic questions on ASHGs for these parameters and provided FPT algorithms using Courcelle's theorem. Due to the importance of Nash Stability, more refined algorithmic arguments were given in the same work, and it was claimed that Connected Nash Stability (the variant of the problem where coalitions must be connected in the underlying graph) and Nash Stability can be decided with parameter dependence roughly $2^{\Delta^2 t}$ and $2^{\Delta^5 t}$, respectively (though as we explain below, these claims were not completely justified). We thus revisit the problem with the goal of determining the optimal parameter dependence for Nash Stability in terms of t and Δ. Our positive contribution is an algorithm deciding Nash Stability in time $(\Delta t)^{O(\Delta t)}(n + \log W)^{O(1)}$, where W is the maximum absolute weight, significantly improving the parameter dependence for Δ (Theorem 4). This is achieved by reformulating the problem as a coloring problem with $t\Delta$ colors in a way that encodes the property that two vertices belong in the same coalition and then using dynamic programming to solve this problem. Our main technical contribution is then to establish that our algorithm is essentially optimal. To that end we first show that if there exists an algorithm solving Nash Stability in time $(p\Delta)^{o(p\Delta)}(nW)^{O(1)}$, where p is the pathwidth of the underlying graph, then the ETH is false (Theorem 5). Hence, it is not possible to obtain a better parameter dependence, even if we accept a pseudo-polynomial running time and a more restricted parameter.

If we were considering a parameterization with a single parameter, at this point we would be essentially done, since we have an algorithm and a lower bound that match. However, the fact that Δ and t are two a priori independent variables significantly complicates the analysis because, informally, the space of running time functions that depend on two variables is not totally ordered. To see what we mean by that, recall that [36] claimed an algorithm with complexity roughly $2^{\Delta^5 t}$, while our algorithm's complexity has the form $(\Delta t)^{\Delta t}$. The two algorithms are not directly comparable in performance: for some values of Δ, t one is better and for some the other (though the range of parameters where $2^{\Delta^5 t} < (\Delta t)^{\Delta t}$ is quite limited). As a result, even though Theorem 5 shows that no algorithm can beat the algorithm of Theorem 4 in all cases, it does not rule out the possibility that some algorithm beats it in *some* cases, for example when Δ is much smaller than t, or vice-versa. We therefore need to work harder to argue that our algorithm is indeed optimal in essentially all cases. In particular, we show that even if pathwidth is constant the problem cannot be solved in $\Delta^{o(\Delta)}(nW)^{O(1)}$ (Corollary 6); and even if Δ and W are constant, the problem cannot be solved in $p^{o(p)}n^{O(1)}$ (Theorem 7) unless the ETH is false. Hence, we succeed in covering essentially all corner cases, showing that our algorithm's slightly super-exponential dependence on *the product* of Δ and t is truly optimal, and we cannot avoid the slightly super-exponential on either parameter, even if we were to accept a much worse dependence on the other.

An astute reader will have noticed a contradiction between our lower bounds and the algorithms of [36]. It is also worth noting that Theorem 7 applies to both the connected and disconnected cases of the problem, using an argument due to [36]. Hence, Theorem 7 implies that, either the ETH is false, or *neither* of the aforementioned algorithms of [36] can have the claimed performance, as executing them on the instances produced by our reduction (which have $\Delta = O(1)$) would give parameter dependence $2^{O(t)}$, which is ruled out by Theorem 7. Indeed, in Section 3 we explain in more detail that the argumentation of [36] lacks an ingredient (the partition of vertices in each neighborhood into coalitions) which turns out to be necessary to obtain a correct algorithm and also key in showing the lower bound. Hence, the slightly super-exponential dependence on t cannot be avoided (under the ETH), and the dependence on t promised in [36] is impossible to achieve: the best one can hope for is the slightly super-exponential dependence on both t and Δ given in Theorem 4.

In the second part of the paper, we consider Nash Stability on graphs of low treewidth, without making any further assumptions (in particular, we consider graphs of arbitrarily large degree). This parameterization was considered by Peters [36] who showed that the problem is strongly NP-hard on stars and thus motivated the use of the double parameter $t + \Delta$. This would initially appear to settle the problem. However, we revisit this question and make two key observations: first, the reduction of [36] does not show hardness for additive games, but for a more general version of the problem where preferences of players are not necessarily additive but are described by a collection of boolean formulas (HC-nets [18, 25]). It was therefore explicitly posed as an open question whether *additive* games are also hard [36]. Second, in the reduction of [36] coalitions are disconnected. As noted in [26, 36], there are situations where Nash Stable coalitions make more sense if they are connected in the underlying graph. We therefore ask whether Connected Nash Stability, where we impose a connectivity condition on coalitions, is an easier problem.

Our first contribution is to resolve the open question of [36] by showing that imposing either one of these two modifications does *not* render the problem tractable: Nash Stability of additive hedonic games is still strongly NP-hard on stars (Theorem 9); and Connected Nash Stability of hedonic games encoded by HC-nets is still NP-hard on stars (Theorem 10). However, our reductions stubbornly refuse to work for the natural combination of these conditions, namely, Connected Nash Stability for additive hedonic games on stars. Surprisingly, we discover that this is with good reason: Connected Nash Stability turns out to be solvable in pseudopolynomial time on graphs of bounded treewidth (Theorem 11). More precisely, our algorithm, which uses standard dynamic programming techniques but crucially relies on the connectedness of coalitions, runs in "pseudo-XP" time, that is, in polynomial time when $t = O(1)$ and weights are polynomially bounded. Completing our investigation we show that this is essentially the best possible: obtaining a pseudo-polynomial time algorithm with FPT dependence on treewidth (or pathwidth) would contradict standard assumptions (Theorem 12). Hence, in this part we establish that there is an overlooked case of ASHGs that does become somewhat tractable when we only parameterize by treewidth, but this tractability is limited.

Related work. Deciding if an ASHG admits a partition that is Nash Stable or has other desirable properties is NP-hard [3, 5, 34, 38, 41]. Hardness remains even in cases where a Nash Stable solution is guaranteed, such as symmetric preferences, where the problem is PLS-complete [21], and non-negative preferences, where it is NP-hard to find a non-trivial stable partition [35]. The problem generally remains hard when we impose the requirement that coalitions must be connected [8, 26].

A related Min Stable Cut problem is studied in [29], where we partition the vertices into two coalitions in a Nash Stable way. Interestingly, the complexity of that problem turns out to be $2^{O(\Delta t)}$, since each vertex has 2 choices; this nicely contrasts with Nash Stability, where vertices have more choices, and which is slightly super-exponential parameterized by treewidth. Similar slightly super-exponential complexities have been observed with other problems involving treewidth and partitioning vertices into sets [24, 32].

2 Preliminaries

We use standard graph-theoretic notation and assume that the reader is familiar with standard notions in parameterized complexity, including treewidth t and pathwidth p [14]. We mostly deal with directed graphs and denote an arc from vertex u to vertex v as uv.

When we talk about the degree or the neighborhood of a vertex v, we refer to its degree and its neighborhood in the underlying graph, that is, the graph obtained by forgetting the directions of all arcs. Throughout the paper $\Delta(G)$ (or simply Δ, when G is clear from the context) denotes the maximum degree of the underlying graph of G. The Exponential Time Hypothesis (ETH) is the assumption that there exists $c > 1$ such that 3-SAT on formulas with n variables does not admit a c^n algorithm [28]. We will mostly use a somewhat simpler to state (and weaker) form of this assumption stating that 3-SAT cannot be solved in time $2^{o(n)}$.

In this paper we will be mostly interested in *Additively Separable Hedonic Games* (ASHG). In an ASHG we are given a directed graph $G = (V, E)$ and a weight function $w : V \times V \to \mathbb{Z}$ that encodes agents' preferences. The function w has the property that for all $u, v \in V$ such that $uv \notin E$ we have $w(u, v) = 0$, that is, non-zero weights are only given to arcs. A solution to an ASHG is a partition π of V, where we refer to the sets of V as classes or, more simply, as coalitions. For each $v \in V$ and $S \subseteq V$ the utility that v derives from being placed in the coalition S is defined as $p_v(S) = \sum_{u \in S \setminus \{v\}} w(v, u)$. A partition π is Nash Stable if we have the following: for each $v \in V$, if v belongs in the class S of π, we have $p_v(S) \geq 0$ and for each $S' \in \pi$ we have $p_v(S) \geq p_v(S')$. In other words, no vertex can strictly increase its utility by joining another coalition of π or forming a singleton coalition. We also consider the notion of *Connected Nash Stable* partitions, which are Nash Stable partitions π with the added property that all classes of π are connected in the underlying undirected graph of G.

3 Parameterization by Treewidth and Degree

In this section we revisit Nash Stability parameterized by $t + \Delta$, which was previously studied in [36]. Our main positive result is an algorithm given in Section 3.1 solving the problem with dependence $(t\Delta)^{O(t\Delta)}$.

Our main technical contribution is then to show in Section 3.2 that this algorithm is essentially optimal, under the ETH. As explained, we need several different reductions to settle this problem in a satisfactory way. The main reduction is given in Theorem 5 and uses the fact that a partition restricted to the neighborhood of a vertex with degree Δ encodes roughly $\Delta \log \Delta$ bits of information, because there are around Δ^Δ partitions of Δ elements into equivalence classes. This key idea allows the first reduction to compress the treewidth more and more as Δ increases. Hence, we can produce instances where both t and Δ are super-constant, but appropriately chosen to match our bound. In this way, Theorem 5 rules out running times of the form, say $(t\Delta)^{t+\Delta}$, as when t, Δ are both super-constant, $t + \Delta = o(t\Delta)$. By modifying the parameters of Theorem 5 we then obtain Corollary 6 from the same construction, which states that no algorithm can have dependence $\Delta^{o(\Delta)}$, even on graphs of bounded pathwidth. On the other hand, this type of construction cannot show hardness for instances of bounded degree, as when $\Delta = O(1)$, then $\Delta^\Delta = O(1)$, so we cannot really compress the treewidth of the produced instance. Hence, we use a different reduction in Theorem 7, showing that the problem cannot be solved with dependence $p^{o(p)}$ on instances of bounded degree. This reduction uses a super-constant number of coalitions that "run through" the graph, and hence produces instances with super-constant t. The three complementary reductions together cover the whole range of possibilities and indicate that there is not much room for improvement in our algorithm.

It is worth discussing here that, assuming the ETH, Theorem 7 contradicts the claimed algorithms of [36], which for $\Delta = O(1)$ would solve (Connected) Nash Stability with dependence $2^{O(t)}$, while Theorem 7 claims that the problem cannot be solved in time $2^{o(t \log t)}$.

Let us then briefly explain why the proof sketch for these algorithms in [36] is incomplete: the idea of the algorithms is to solve Connected Nash Stability, and use the arcs of the instance to verify connectivity. Hence, the DP algorithm will remember, in a ball of distance 2 around each vertex, which arcs have both of their endpoints in the same coalition. The claim is that this information allows us to infer the coalitions. Though this is true if one is given this information for the whole graph, it is not true locally around a vertex where we only have information about other vertices which are close by. In particular, it could be the case that u has neighbors v_1, v_2, which happen to be in the same coalition, but such that the path proving that this coalition is connected goes through vertices far from u. Because this cannot be verified locally, any DP algorithm would need to store some connectivity information about the vertices in a bag which, as implied by Theorem 7 inevitably leads to a dependence of the form t^t.

3.1 Improved FPT Algorithm

In order to obtain our algorithm for Nash Stability we will need two ingredients. The first ingredient will be a reformulation of the problem as a vertex coloring problem. We use the following definition where, informally, a vertex is stable if its outgoing weight to vertices of the same color cannot be increased by changing its color.

▶ **Definition 1.** *A Stable k-Coloring of an edge-weighted digraph G is a function $c : V \to [k]$ satisfying the following property: for each $v \in V$ we have $\sum_{u \in c^{-1}(c(v))} w(v,u) \geq \max_{j \in [k+1]} \sum_{u \in c^{-1}(j)} w(v,u)$.*

Note that in the definition above we take the maximum over $j \in [k+1]$ of the total weight of v towards color class j. Since c is a function that uses k colors, we have $c^{-1}(k+1) = \emptyset$ and hence this ensures that the total weight of v towards its own color must always be non-negative in a stable coloring. Also note that to calculate the total weight from v to a certain color class j, it suffices to consider the vertices of color j that belong in the out-neighborhood of v.

Our strategy will be to show that, for appropriately chosen k, deciding whether a graph admits a stable k-Coloring is equivalent to deciding whether a Nash Stable partition exists. Then, the second ingredient of our approach is to use standard dynamic programming techniques to solve Stable k-Coloring on graphs of bounded treewidth and maximum degree.

The key lemma for the first part is the following:

▶ **Lemma 2.** *Let $G = (V, E)$ be an edge-weighted digraph whose underlying graph has maximum degree Δ and admits a tree decomposition with maximum bag size t. Then, G has a Nash Stable partition if and only if it admits a Stable k-Coloring for $k = t \cdot \Delta$.*

Proof. First, suppose that we have a Stable k-Coloring $c : V \to [k]$ of the graph for some value k. We obtain a Nash Stable partition of $V(G)$ by turning each color class into a coalition. By the definition of Stable k-Coloring, each vertex has at least as high utility in its own color class (and hence its own coalition) as in any other, so this partition is stable.

For the converse direction, suppose that there exists a Nash Stable partition π of G. We will first attempt to color the coalitions of π in a way that any two coalitions which are at distance at most two receive distinct colors, while using at most $t \cdot \Delta$ colors. In the remainder, when we refer to the distance between two sets of vertices S_1, S_2, we mean $\min_{u \in S_1, v \in S_2} d(u,v)$, where distances are calculated in the underlying graph.

Consider the graph G^2 obtained from the underlying graph of G by connecting any two vertices which are at distance at most 2 in the underlying graph of G. We can construct a tree decomposition of G^2 where all bags contain at most $t \cdot \Delta$ vertices by taking the assumed tree decomposition of G and adding to each bag the neighbors of all vertices contained in

that bag. Furthermore, we can assume without loss of generality that any equivalence class C of the Nash Stable partition π is connected in G^2. If not, that would mean that there exists a class C that contains a connected component $C' \subseteq C$ such that C' is at distance at least 3 from $C \setminus C'$ in the underlying graph of G. In that case we could partition C into two classes $C', C \setminus C'$, without affecting the stability of the partition.

Formally now the claim we wish to make is the following:

▷ Claim 3. There is a coloring c of the equivalence classes of π with $k = t \cdot \Delta$ colors such that any two classes C_1, C_2 of π which are at distance at most two in the underlying graph of G receive distinct colors.

Proof. We prove the claim by induction on the number of equivalence classes of π. If there is only one class the claim is trivial.

Consider a rooted tree decomposition of G^2. For an equivalence class C of π we say that the bag B is the top bag for C if B contains a vertex of C and no bag that is closer to the root contains a vertex of C. Select an equivalence class C of π whose top bag is as far from the root as possible. We claim that there are at most $t \cdot \Delta - 1$ classes C' which are at distance at most 2 from C in G.

In order to prove that there are at most $t \cdot \Delta - 1$ other classes at distance at most two from C, consider such a class C', which is therefore at distance one from C in G^2. Let B be the top bag of C. If C' does not contain any vertex that appears in B then we get a contradiction as follows: first, C' has a neighbor of a vertex of C, so these two vertices must appear together in a bag; since all vertices of C appear in the sub-tree rooted at B, some vertices of C' must appear strictly below B in the decomposition; since B is a separator of G^2 and C' is connected, if no vertex of C' is in B then all vertices of C' appear below B in the decomposition; but then, this contradicts the choice of C as the class whose top bag is as far from the root as possible. As a result, for each C' that is a neighbor of C in G^2, there exists a distinct vertex of C' in B. Since $|B| \leq t \cdot \Delta$ and B contains a vertex of C, we get that the coalitions C' which are neighbors of C in G^2 are at most $t \cdot \Delta - 1$.

We now remove all vertices of C from the graph and claim that π restricted to the new graph is still a Nash Stable partition. By induction, there is a coloring of the remaining coalitions of π that satisfies the claim. We keep this coloring and assign to C a color that is not used by any of the at most $k - 1$ coalitions which are at distance two from C. Hence, we obtain the claimed coloring of the classes of π. ◁

From Claim 3 we obtain a coloring of the equivalence classes of π with $k = t \cdot \Delta$ colors, such that any two equivalence classes which are at distance at most 2 in the underlying graph of G receive distinct colors. We now obtain a coloring of V by assigning to each vertex the color of its class. In the out-neighborhood of each vertex v the partition induced by the coloring is the same as that induced by π, since all the vertices in the out-neighborhood of v are at distance at most 2 from each other in G. Hence, the k-Coloring must be stable, because otherwise a vertex would have incentive to deviate in π by joining another coalition or by becoming a singleton. ◀

▶ **Theorem 4.** *There exists an algorithm which, given an ASHG defined on a digraph $G = (V, E)$ whose underlying graph has maximum degree Δ and a tree decomposition of the underlying graph of G of width t, decides if a Nash Stable partition exists in time $(\Delta t)^{O(\Delta t)} (n + \log W)^{O(1)}$, where $n = |V|$ and W is the largest absolute weight.*

Proof. Using Lemma 2 we will formulate an algorithm that decides if the given instance admits a Stable k-Coloring for $k = (t + 1)\Delta$, since this is equivalent to deciding if a Nash Stable partition exists. We first obtain a tree decomposition of G^2 by placing into each bag of the given decomposition all the neighbors of all the vertices of the bag.

We now execute a standard dynamic programming algorithm for k-coloring on this new decomposition, so we sketch the details. The DP table has size $k^{(t+1)\Delta} = (\Delta t)^{O(\Delta t)}$ since we need to store as a signature of a partial solution the colors of all vertices contained in a bag. The only difference with the standard DP algorithm for coloring is that our algorithm, whenever a new vertex v is introduced in a bag B, considers all possible colors for v, and then for each $u \in B$, if all neighbors of u are contained in B, verifies for each signature whether u is stable. Signatures where a vertex is not stable are discarded. The key property is now that for any vertex u, there exists a bag B such that B contains u and all its neighbors (since in G^2 the neighborhood of u is a clique), hence only signatures for which all vertices are stable may survive until the root of the decomposition. ◀

3.2 Tight ETH-based Lower Bounds

▶ **Theorem 5.** *If the ETH is true, there is no algorithm which decides if an ASHG on a graph with n vertices, maximum degree Δ, and pathwidth p admits a Nash Stable partition in time $(p\Delta)^{o(p\Delta)}(nW)^{O(1)}$, where W is the maximum absolute weight.*

Proof. We will give a parametric reduction which, starting from a 3-SAT instance ϕ with n variables and m clauses, and for any desired parameter $d < n/\log n$, constructs an ASHG instance G with the following properties:

1. G can be constructed in time polynomial in n
2. G has maximum degree $O(d)$
3. G has pathwidth $O(\frac{n}{d \log d})$
4. the maximum absolute value W is $2^{O(d)}$
5. ϕ is satisfiable if and only if there exists a Nash Stable partition.

Before we go on, let us argue why a reduction that satisfies these properties does indeed establish the theorem: given a 3-SAT instance on n variables, we set $d = \lfloor \sqrt{n} \rfloor$. We construct G in polynomial time, therefore the size of G is polynomially bounded by n. Deciding if G has a Nash Stable partition is equivalent to solving ϕ by the last property. By the third property, the pathwidth of the constructed graph is $O(\frac{\sqrt{n}}{\log n})$, so $p\Delta = O(\frac{n}{\log n})$. Furthermore, $W = 2^{O(\sqrt{n})}$. If deciding if a Nash Stable partition exists can be done in time $(p\Delta)^{o(p\Delta)}(|G| \cdot W)^{O(1)}$, the total running time for deciding ϕ is $(p\Delta)^{o(p\Delta)}(|G| \cdot W)^{O(1)} = 2^{o(n)}$ contradicting the ETH.

We now describe our construction. We are given a 3-SAT instance ϕ with variables $x_0, \ldots, x_{n-1}$, and a parameter d, which we assume to be a power of 2 (otherwise we increase its value by at most a factor of 2). We also assume without loss of generality that all clauses of ϕ have size exactly 3 (otherwise we repeat literals). We construct the following graph:

1. **Selection vertices**: for each $i_1 \in \{0, \ldots, \lceil \frac{n}{d \log d} \rceil\}$, $i_2 \in \{0, \ldots, d-1\}$, $j \in \{0, \ldots, m\}$, we construct a vertex $u_{(i_1,i_2,j)}$.
2. **Consistency vertices**: for each $i_1 \in \{0, \ldots, \lceil \frac{n}{d \log d} \rceil\}$, $j \in \{1, \ldots, m-1\}$, we construct a vertex $c_{(i_1,j)}$. For $i_2 \in \{0, \ldots, d-1\}$ we give weights: $w(c_{(i_1,j)}, u_{(i_1,i_2,j)}) = 4^{i_2}$; $w(c_{(i_1,j)}, u_{(i_1,i_2,j+1)}) = -4^{i_2}$; $w(u_{(i_1,i_2,j)}, c_{(i_1,j)}) = w(u_{(i_1,i_2,j+1)}, c_{(i_1,j)}) = -4^d$.
3. **Clause gadget**: for each $j \in \{1, \ldots, m\}$ we construct two vertices s_j, s'_j and set $w(s_j, s'_j) = 2$. We also construct three vertices $\ell_{(j,1)}, \ell_{(j,2)}, \ell_{(j,3)}$ and set $w(\ell_{(j,1)}, s_j) = w(\ell_{(j,2)}, s_j) = w(\ell_{(j,3)}, s_j) = 2$ and $w(s_j, \ell_{(j,1)}) = w(s_j, \ell_{(j,2)}) = w(s_j, \ell_{(j,3)}) = -1$.
4. **Palette gadget**: we construct a vertex p and a helper p'. We set $w(p, p') = w(p', p) = 1$. Furthermore, for $i_1 = \lceil \frac{n}{d \log d} \rceil$ and for all $i_2 \in \{0, \ldots, d-1\}$, we set $w(p, u_{(i_1,i_2,0)}) = 1$ and $w(u_{(i_1,i_2,0)}, p) = -1$. We call selection vertex $u_{(i_1,i_2,0)}$ a *palette vertex*.

So far, we have described the main part of our construction, without yet specifying how we encode which literals appear in each clause. Before we move on to describe this part, let us give some intuition about the construction up to this point. The intended meaning of the palette gadget is that vertices $u_{(i_1,i_2,0)}$ for $i_1 = \lceil \frac{n}{d \log d} \rceil$ and $i_2 \in \{0, \ldots, d-1\}$ should be placed in distinct coalitions (p can be thought of as a stalker). These vertices form a "palette", in the sense that every other selection vertex encodes an assignment to some of the variables of ϕ by deciding which of the palette vertices it will join. Hence, we intend to extract an assignment of ϕ from a stable partition by considering each vertex $u_{(i_1,i_2,0)}$, for $i_1 \in \{0, \ldots, \lceil \frac{n}{d \log d} \rceil - 1\}$, $i_2 \in \{0, \ldots, d-1\}$. For each such vertex we test in which of the d palette partitions the vertex was placed, and this gives us enough information to encode $\log d$ variables of ϕ. Since we have $\lceil \frac{n}{d \log d} \rceil \cdot d \geq \frac{n}{\log d}$ non-palette selection vertices, and each such selection vertex encodes $\log d$ variables, we will be able to encode an assignment to n variables. The role of the consistency vertices is to make sure that the partition of the selection vertices (and hence, the encoded assignment) stays consistent throughout our construction.

In order to complete the construction, let us make the above intuition more formal. For $i_1 \in \{0, \ldots, \lceil \frac{n}{d \log d} \rceil - 1\}$, $i_2 \in \{0, \ldots, d-1\}$ and for any $j \in \{1, \ldots, m\}$, we will say that $u_{(i_1,i_2,j)}$ encodes the assignment to variables x_k, with $k \in \{i_1 \cdot d \log d + i_2 \log d, \cdots, i_1 \cdot d \log d + i_2 \log d + \log d - 1\}$. Equivalently, given an integer k, we can compute which selection vertices encode the assignment to x_k by setting $i_1 = \lfloor \frac{k}{d \log d} \rfloor$ and $i_2 = \lfloor \frac{k - i_1 d \log d}{\log d} \rfloor$. In that case, x_k is represented by $u_{(i_1,i_2,j)}$ (for any j).

Let us now explain precisely how an assignment to the variables of ϕ is encoded by the placement of selection vertices in coalitions. Let k be such that x_k is encoded by $u_{(i_1,i_2,j)}$ and let $i_3 = k - i_1 d \log d - i_2 \log d$. We have $i_3 \in \{0, \ldots, \log d - 1\}$. If x_k is set to True in the assignment, then $u_{(i_1,i_2,j)}$ must be placed in the same coalition as a palette vertex $u_{\lceil \frac{n}{d \log d} \rceil, i'_2, 0}$ where i'_2 has the following property: if we write i'_2 in binary, then the bit in position i_3 must be set to 1. Similarly, if x_k is set to False, then we must place $u_{(i_1,i_2,j)}$ in the same coalition as a palette vertex $u_{\lceil \frac{n}{d \log d} \rceil, i'_2, 0}$ where writing i'_2 in binary gives a 0 in position i_3. Observe that, given an assignment and a vertex $u_{(i_1,i_2,j)}$ which represents $\log d$ variables, this process fully specifies the palette vertex with which we must place $u_{(i_1,i_2,j)}$ to represent the assignment. In the converse direction, we can extract from the placement of $u_{(i_1,i_2,j)}$ an assignment to the vertices it represents if we know that all palette vertices are placed in distinct components, simply by finding the palette vertex $u_{(\lceil \frac{n}{d \log d} \rceil, i'_2, 0)}$ in the coalition of $u_{(i_1,i_2,j)}$, writing down i'_2 in binary, and using its $\log d$ bits in order to give an assignment to the $\log d$ variables represented by $u_{(i_1,i_2,j)}$.

We are now ready to complete the construction by considering each clause. Each vertex $\ell_{(j,\alpha)}$, $\alpha \in \{1, 2, 3\}$, corresponds to a literal of the j-th clause of ϕ. If this literal involves the variable x_k, we calculate integers i_1, i_2, i_3 from k as explained in the previous paragraph. Say, x_k is the i_3-th variable represented by $u_{(i_1,i_2,j)}$. We set $w(\ell_{(j,\alpha)}, u_{(i_1,i_2,j)}) = 1$. Furthermore, for each $i'_2 \in \{0, \ldots, d-1\}$ we look at the i_3-th bit of the binary representation of i'_2. If setting x_k to the value of that bit would make the literal represented by $\ell_{(j,\alpha)}$ True, we set $w(\ell_{(j,\alpha)}, u_{(\lceil \frac{n}{d \log d} \rceil, i'_2, j)}) = 1$; otherwise we set $w(\ell_{(j,\alpha)}, u_{(\lceil \frac{n}{d \log d} \rceil, i'_2, j)}) = 0$. We perform the above process for all $j \in \{1, \ldots, m\}$, $\alpha \in \{1, 2, 3\}$.

Our construction is now complete, so we need to show that we satisfy all the claimed properties. It is not hard to see that the graph can be built in polynomial time, and the maximum absolute weight used is $2^{O(d)}$ (on arcs incident on some consistency vertices). The vertices with maximum degree are the consistency vertices and the vertices representing literals, both of which have degree $O(d)$.

To establish the bound on the pathwidth we first delete p, p' from the graph, as this can decrease pathwidth by at most 2. Now observe that, for each j, the set $C_j = \{c_{(i_1,j)} \mid i_1 \in \{0, \ldots, \lceil \frac{n}{d \log d} \rceil\} \}$ is a separator of the graph. We claim that if we fix a j, then the set $C_j \cup C_{j+1}$ separates the set $C'_j = \{u_{(i_1,i_2,j)} \mid i_1 \in \{0, \ldots, \lceil \frac{n}{d \log d} \rceil\}, i_2 \in \{0, \ldots, d-1\} \} \cup \{s_j, s'_j, \ell_{(j,1)}, \ell_{(j,2)}, \ell_{(j,3)}\}$ from the rest of the graph. We claim that we can calculate a path decomposition of the graph induced by $C_j \cup C'_j \cup C_{j+1}$ with width $O(\frac{n}{d \log d})$ such that the first bag contains C_j and the last bag contains C_{j+1}. If we achieve this we can construct a path decomposition of the whole graph by gluing these decompositions together in the obvious way (in order of increasing j). However, a path decomposition of this induced subgraph can be constructed by placing $C_j \cup C_{j+1} \cup \{s_j, s'_j, \ell_{(j,1)}, \ell_{(j,2)}, \ell_{(j,3)}\}$ and a distinct vertex of the remainder of C'_j in each bag. This decomposition has width $2|C_j| + O(1) = O(\frac{n}{d \log d})$.

Finally, let us establish the main property of the construction, namely that ϕ is satisfiable if and only if the ASHG instance admits a Nash Stable partition. If there exists a satisfying assignment to ϕ we construct a partition as follows: (i) p, p' are in their own coalition (ii) each consistency vertex is a singleton (iii) for $i_2 \in \{0, \ldots, d-1\}$, the vertices of $\{u_{\lceil \frac{n}{d \log d} \rceil, i_2, j} \mid j \in \{1, \ldots, m\}\}$ are placed in a distinct coalition (iv) we place the remaining selection vertices in one of the previous d coalitions in a way that represents the assignment as previously explained (v) for each $j \in \{1, \ldots, m\}$ the j-th clause contains a True literal; we place the corresponding vertex $\ell_{(j,\alpha)}$ together with its out-neighbor in the selection vertices, and the remaining literal vertices together with s, s' in a new coalition. We claim that this partition is Nash Stable. We have the following argument: (i) p' is with p, while p cannot increase her utility by leaving p', since all its other out-neighbors are in distinct coalitions (ii) for each i_1, i_2, j, the vertices $u_{(i_1,i_2,j)}, u_{(i_1,i_2,j+1)}$ are in the same coalition. Hence, the utility of each consistency vertex is 0 in any coalition, and such vertices are stable as singletons (iii) each selection vertex $u_{(i_1,i_2,j)}$ has utility 0, and such vertices only have out-going arcs of negative weight (iv) in each clause gadget we have a coalition with s_j, s'_j together with two literal vertices, say $\ell_{(j,1)}, \ell_{(j,2)}$; no vertex has incentive to leave this coalition (v) finally, for literal vertices $\ell_{(j,\alpha)}$ which we placed together with a selection vertex, we observe that if the assignment sets the corresponding literal to True, the selection vertex that is an out-neighbor of $\ell_{(j,\alpha)}$ must have been placed in a coalition that contains a palette vertex towards which $\ell_{(j,\alpha)}$ has positive utility, hence the utility of $\ell_{(j,\alpha)}$ is 2 and this vertex is stable.

For the converse direction, suppose that we have a Nash Stable partition π. We first prove that all vertices $u_{\lceil \frac{n}{d \log d} \rceil, i_2, 0}$, for $i_2 \in \{0, \ldots, d-1\}$, must be in distinct coalitions. Indeed, if two of them are in the same coalition, p will have incentive to join the coalition that has the maximum number of such vertices. However, once p joins such a coalition, these vertices will have negative utility, contradicting stability. Second, we prove that for each i_1, i_2, j, the vertices $u_{(i_1,i_2,j)}, u_{(i_1,i_2,j+1)}$ must be in the same coalition. If not, consider two such vertices which are in distinct coalitions and maximize i_2. We claim that in this case $c_{(i_1,j)}$ will always join $u_{(i_1,i_2,j)}$. Indeed, from the selection of i_2, we have that for $i'_2 > i_2$, the contribution of arcs with absolute weight $4^{i'_2}$ to the utility of $c_{(i_1,j)}$ cancels out; while for $i'_2 < i_2$ the sum of all absolute utilities of arcs with weights $4^{i'_2}$ is too low to affect the placement of $c_{(i_1,j)}$ (in particular, $4^{i_2} - \sum_{j<i_2} 4^j > \sum_{j<i_2} 4^j$). But, if $c_{(i_1,j)}$ joins such a coalition, a selection vertex has negative utility, contradicting stability.

From the two properties above we can now extract an assignment to ϕ. For each selection vertex $u_{(i_1,i_2,j)}$, if this vertex is in the same coalition as $u_{(\lceil \frac{n}{d \log d} \rceil, i'_2, 0)}$, we give an assignment to the variables represented by $u_{(i_1,i_2,j)}$ as described, that is, we write i'_2 in binary and use one bit for each variable. Note that the choice of j here is irrelevant, as we have shown that thanks to the consistency vertices, for each i_1, i_2, all vertices $u_{(i_1,i_2,j)}$ are in the same coalition.

If $u_{(i_1,i_2,j)}$ is not in the same coalition as any $u_{(\lceil \frac{n}{d \log d} \rceil, i'_2, 0)}$, we set its corresponding variables in an arbitrary way. To see that this assignment satisfies clause j, consider s_j, which, without loss of generality is placed with s'_j. If three of the vertices $\ell_{(j,1)}, \ell_{(j,2)}, \ell_{(j,3)}$ are in the same coalition as s_j, then s_j has negative utility, contradiction. Hence, one of these vertices, say $\ell_{(j,1)}$, is in another coalition. But then, since the neighbors of this vertex among vertices $u_{(\lceil \frac{n}{d \log d} \rceil, i_2, j)}$ are all in distinct coalitions, $\ell_{(j,1)}$ is in the same coalition with one such vertex and its out-neighbor selection vertex. But this means that we have extracted an assignment from the corresponding vertex and that this assignment sets the corresponding literal to True, satisfying the clause. ◀

▶ **Corollary 6.** *If the ETH is true, there is no algorithm which decides if an ASHG on a graph with n vertices, maximum degree Δ, and constant pathwidth admits a Nash Stable partition in time $\Delta^{o(\Delta)}(nW)^{O(1)}$, where W is the maximum absolute weight.*

Proof. We use the same reduction as in Theorem 5, from a 3-SAT formula on n variables, but set $d = \lfloor \frac{n}{2 \log n} \rfloor$. According to the properties of the construction, the pathwidth of the resulting graph is $O(\frac{n}{d \log d}) = O(1)$, the maximum degree is $O(n/\log n)$, the maximum weight is $2^{O(n/\log n)}$ and the size of the constructed graph is polynomial in n. If there exists an algorithm for finding a Nash Stable partition in the stated time, this gives a $2^{o(n)}$ algorithm for 3-SAT. ◀

▶ **Theorem 7.** *If the ETH is true, there is no algorithm which decides if an ASHG on a graph with n vertices, constant maximum degree Δ, and pathwidth p admits a Nash Stable partition in time $p^{o(p)}n^{O(1)}$, even if all weights have absolute value $O(1)$.*

▶ **Corollary 8.** *Theorem 7 also applies to* Connected Nash Stability.

4 Parameterization by Treewidth Only

In this section we consider Nash Stability on graphs of bounded treewidth. Peters [36] showed that this problem is strongly NP-hard on stars, but for a more general version where preferences are described by boolean formulas (HC-nets). In Section 4.1 we strengthen this hardness result by showing that Nash Stability remains strongly NP-hard on stars for additive preferences. We also show that Connected Nash Stability is strongly NP-hard on stars, albeit also using HC-nets.

The only case that remains is Connected Nash Stability with additive preferences. Somewhat surprisingly, we show that this case evades our hardness results because it *is* in fact more tractable. We establish this via an algorithm running in pseudo-polynomial time when the treewidth is constant in Section 4.2. As a result, this is the only case of the problem which is not strongly NP-hard on bounded treewidth graphs (unless P=NP).

We then observe that our algorithm only establishes that the problem is in XP parameterized by treewidth (for weights written in unary). We show in Section 4.3 that this is inevitable, as the problem is W[1]-hard parameterized by treewidth even when weights are constant. Hence, our "pseudo-XP" algorithm is qualitatively optimal.

4.1 Refined paraNP-hardnesss

▶ **Theorem 9.** *Nash Stability of ASHGs is strongly NP-hard for stars.*

Proof. We present a reduction from 3-Partition. In this problem we are given a set of $3n$ positive integers A, a target value T, and are asked to partition A into n triples, such that each triple has sum exactly T. This problem has long been known to be strongly

NP-hard [22]. Furthermore, we can assume that the sum of all elements of A is nT (otherwise the answer is clearly No); and that all elements have values strictly between $T/4$ and $T/2$, so sets of sizes other than three cannot have sum T (this can be achieved by adding T to all elements and setting $4T$ as the new target).

We construct an ASHG as follows: for each element of A we construct a vertex; we construct a set B of n additional vertices; we add a "stalker" vertex s and a helper s'. The preferences are defined as follows: for all $x \in A \cup B$ we set $w(x, s) = -1$; for each $x \in B$ we set $w(s, x) = 2T$; for each $x \in A$ we set $w(s, x) = -w(x)$, where $w(x)$ is the value of the corresponding element in the original instance. Finally, we set $w(s, s') = T$ and $w(s', s) = 1$. The graph is a star as all arcs are incident on s.

If there exists a valid 3-partition of A, we construct a stable partition of the new instance by placing s with s' and, for each triple placing its elements in a coalition with a distinct vertex of B. Vertices of $A \cup B$ have utility 0 in this configuration and no incentive to deviate; while s would have utility T in any existing coalition, so it has no incentive to leave s'; s' is satisfied as she is together with s.

For the converse direction, if we have a stable configuration π, s' must be with s (otherwise s' has incentive to deviate). Furthermore, s cannot be with any vertex of $A \cup B$, as placing s with any such vertex would give that vertex incentive to leave. Hence, s, s' are one coalition of the stable partition, and s has utility T in this coalition. This implies that every coalition formed by vertices of $A \cup B$ must have utility at most T for s.

We now want to prove that every coalition of vertices of $A \cup B$ contains exactly one vertex of B. If we show this, then the weight of elements of A placed in each such coalition must be at least T, hence it must be exactly T (as the sum of all elements of A is nT). Therefore, we obtain a solution to the original instance.

To prove that every coalition that contains vertices of $A \cup B$ must contain exactly one vertex of B, suppose first that there exists a coalition that only contains vertices of A. Call the union of all such coalitions $A' \subseteq A$. Let $C_1, \ldots, C_k$ be the coalitions that contain some vertex of B, for some $k \leq |B| = n$. We now reach a contradiction as follows: first, since s does not have incentive to join C_i, for $i \in [k]$, we have $\sum_{v \in C_i} w(s, v) \leq T$, therefore $\sum_{i=1}^{k} \sum_{v \in C_i} w(s, v) \leq kT \leq nT$. On the other hand, $\sum_{i=1}^{k} \sum_{v \in C_i} w(s, v) \geq \sum_{v \in B} w(s, v) + \sum_{v \in A \setminus A'} w(s, v) > 2nT - nT = nT$, because if A' is non-empty $\sum_{v \in A \setminus A'} w(s, v) > -nT$. Hence we have a contradiction and from now on we suppose that every coalition that contains a vertex of $A \cup B$ has non-empty intersection with B.

Finally, consider a coalition that contains $k \geq 1$ vertices of B. These vertices give s utility $2kT$, meaning that the sum of weights of vertices of A placed in this coalition must be at least $(2k - 1)T$. Let t_i be the number of coalitions which contain exactly $i \geq 1$ vertices of B. We obtain the inequality $\sum_i t_i(2i - 1)T \leq nT$, because the weight of all elements of A is nT. On the other hand $\sum_i it_i = n$, as we have that $|B| = n$. We therefore have $\sum_i t_i(2i - 1) \leq n \Leftrightarrow \sum_i t_i \geq n = \sum_i it_i \Leftrightarrow \sum_{i>1}(1 - i)t_i \geq 0$, which can only hold if $t_i = 0$ for $i > 1$. ◀

▶ **Theorem 10.** *Deciding if a graphical hedonic game represented by an HC-net admits a connected Nash Stable partition is NP-hard even if the input graph is a star and all weights are in* $\{1, -1\}$.

4.2 Pseudo-XP algorithm for Connected Partitions

▶ **Theorem 11.** *There exists an algorithm which, given an ASHG instance on n vertices with maximum absolute weight W, along with a tree decomposition of the underlying graph of width t, decides if a connected Nash Stable partition exists in time $(nW)^{O(t^2)}$.*

Proof. Due to space constraints, we only sketch the proof. The algorithm uses standard DP techniques. In addition to connectivity information about which vertices of the bag are in the same connected component of the same coalition (which takes $t^{O(t)}$ to store in the DP table), we store for each vertex the utility it would have if it joined the coalition of each other vertex in the bag, and also the best coalition it has seen in the part of the graph that has already been processed. This gives $(nW)^t$ combinations per vertex in the bag, hence a DP table of the claimed size, and allows us to verify that all vertices are stable. The key property is that, since coalitions are connected, a coalition that has already been seen and does not contain any members in the bag is complete, in the sense that no further vertex can later be added to the coalition (as it would become disconnected). ◀

4.3 ETH-based lower bound for Connected Partitions

▶ **Theorem 12.** *If the ETH is true, deciding if an ASHG of pathwidth p admits a connected Nash Stable configuration cannot be done in time $f(p) \cdot n^{o(p/\log p)}$ for any computable function f, even if all weights are in $\{-1, 1\}$.*

By a slight modification of the previous proof we also obtain weak NP-hardness for the case where the input graph has vertex cover 2.

▶ **Corollary 13.** *It is weakly NP-hard to decide if an ASHG on a graph with vertex cover 2 admits a connected Nash Stable partition.*

5 Conclusions and Open Problems

Our results give strong evidence that the precise complexity of Nash Stability parameterized by $t + \Delta$ is in the order of $(t\Delta)^{O(t\Delta)}$. It would be interesting to verify if the same is true for Connected Nash Stability, as this problem turned out to be slightly easier when parameterized only by treewidth, and is only covered by Corollary 8 for the case of bounded-degree graphs. Of course, it would also be worthwhile to investigate the fine-grained complexity of other notions of stability. In particular, versions which are complete for higher levels of the polynomial hierarchy [37] may well turn out to have double-exponential (or worse) complexity parameterized by treewidth [30, 31]. Finally, it would be worth to investigate precise complexity of other stability notions of hedonic games (e.g., individual stability and core stability), or other variants of hedonic games (e.g., fractional hedonic games and social distance games).

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