License: Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International license (CC BY 4.0)
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DOI: 10.4230/DagSemProc.07271.11
URN: urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-11581
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Heydenreich, Birgit ; Müller, Rudolf ; Uetz, Marc ; Vohra, Rakesh

On Revenue Equivalence in Truthful Mechanisms

07271.HeydenreichBirgit.ExtAbstract.1158.pdf (0.2 MB)


The property of an allocation rule to be implementable in dominant strategies
by a unique payment scheme is called revenue equivalence. In this paper we give a
characterization of revenue equivalence based on a graph theoretic interpretation of
the incentive compatibility constraints. The characterization holds for any (possibly
infinite) outcome space and many of the known results about revenue equivalence
are immediate consequences.

BibTeX - Entry

  author =	{Heydenreich, Birgit and M\"{u}ller, Rudolf and Uetz, Marc and Vohra, Rakesh},
  title =	{{On Revenue Equivalence in Truthful Mechanisms}},
  booktitle =	{Computational Social Systems and the Internet},
  pages =	{1--4},
  series =	{Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings (DagSemProc)},
  ISSN =	{1862-4405},
  year =	{2007},
  volume =	{7271},
  editor =	{Peter Cramton and Rudolf M\"{u}ller and Eva Tardos and Moshe Tennenholtz},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-11581},
  doi =		{10.4230/DagSemProc.07271.11},
  annote =	{Keywords: Mechanism Design, Revenue Equivalence, Graph Theory}

Keywords: Mechanism Design, Revenue Equivalence, Graph Theory
Collection: 07271 - Computational Social Systems and the Internet
Issue Date: 2007
Date of publication: 02.10.2007

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