License: Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International license (CC BY 4.0)
When quoting this document, please refer to the following
DOI: 10.4230/OASIcs.FAB.2022.5
URN: urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-162723
URL: http://dagstuhl.sunsite.rwth-aachen.de/volltexte/2022/16272/
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Del Pozzo, Antonella ; Rieutord, Thibault

Fork Accountability in Tenderbake

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OASIcs-FAB-2022-5.pdf (1 MB)

Abstract

This work investigates the Fork Accountability problem in the BFT-Consensus-based Blockchain context. When there are more attackers than the tolerated ones, BFT-Consensus may fail in delivering safety. When this occurs, Fork Accountability aims to account for the responsible processes for that safety violation.
As a case study, we consider Tenderbake when the assumption on the maximum number of Byzantine validators - participants involved in creating the next block - does not hold anymore. When a fork occurs, there are more than one-third of Byzantine validators, and we aim to account for the responsible validators to remove them from the system. In this work, we compare three different approaches to implementing accountability in the case of a fork. In particular, we show that in the case of a fork, if we do not modify Tenderbake or we enrich it with a reliable broadcast communication abstraction, then we can account Byzantine processes only in particular scenarios. Contrarily, if we change Tenderbake such that the exchanged messages also carry extra information (which size is proportional to the duration of the current consensus computation), then we can account for Byzantine processes in all kinds of scenarios; however, at the cost of unbounded message size and unbounded local memory.

BibTeX - Entry

@InProceedings{delpozzo_et_al:OASIcs.FAB.2022.5,
  author =	{Del Pozzo, Antonella and Rieutord, Thibault},
  title =	{{Fork Accountability in Tenderbake}},
  booktitle =	{5th International Symposium on Foundations and Applications of Blockchain 2022 (FAB 2022)},
  pages =	{5:1--5:22},
  series =	{Open Access Series in Informatics (OASIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-248-8},
  ISSN =	{2190-6807},
  year =	{2022},
  volume =	{101},
  editor =	{Tucci-Piergiovanni, Sara and Crooks, Natacha},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2022/16272},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-162723},
  doi =		{10.4230/OASIcs.FAB.2022.5},
  annote =	{Keywords: Blockchain, BFT-Consensus, Fork Accountability}
}

Keywords: Blockchain, BFT-Consensus, Fork Accountability
Collection: 5th International Symposium on Foundations and Applications of Blockchain 2022 (FAB 2022)
Issue Date: 2022
Date of publication: 21.06.2022

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